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Abstract 
The European Union is founded on a set of common principles of democracy, the rule of law, 
and fundamental rights, as enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union. Whereas 
future Member States are vetted for their compliance with these values before they accede to 
the Union, no similar method exists to supervise adherence to these foundational principles 
after accession. EU history proved that this ‘Copenhagen dilemma’ was far from theoretical. EU 
Member State governments’ adherence to foundational EU values cannot be taken for granted. 
Violations may happen in individual cases, or in a systemic way, which may go as far as 
overthrowing the rule of law. Against this background the European Parliament initiated a 
Legislative Own-Initiative Report on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the 
rule of law and fundamental rights and proposed among others a Scoreboard on the basis of 
common and objective indicators by which foundational values can be measured. This Research 
Paper assesses the need and possibilities for the establishment of an EU Scoreboard, as well as 
its related social, economic, legal and political ‘costs and benefits’. 
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Executive summary 
 
The European Union (EU)  received its core values at its inception: achieving peace and prosperity, the 
immediate goals of integration still with us since the times of the Schuman declaration, had a strong 
implied liberty component. Dictatorships and any countries which were not ‘free’ were not welcome to 
join the Union. Notwithstanding the fact that democracy and the rule of law were not part of the black 
letter law of the Communities for a long time, both have clearly been regarded as important unwritten 
principles, which became codified thanks to the pre-accession strategy in the context of the preparation 
of the ‘big-bang’ enlargement to the east of the continent. Currently there is Treaty basis behind EU 
values, such as democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights, which are entrenched in Article 2 
of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). Future Member States are vetted for their compliance with 
these values before they accede to the Union. The so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’ ensure that all new EU 
Member States are in line with the Union’s common principles before joining the EU. That 
notwithstanding, no similar method exists to supervise adherence to these foundational principles after 
accession. This has been referred to as the ‘Copenhagen dilemma’. 
 
Borrowing from James Madison, “If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls 
on government would be necessary.” History has shown that EU governments are no exceptions: they 
do violate foundational EU values in multiple ways. It happens in individual cases, or in a systemic 
manner that might result in a serious and persistent breach of EU values, which may go as far as 
overthrowing a system based on the rule of law.  
 
Beyond harming nationals of a Member State, all Union citizens in that State will also be detrimentally 
affected. Lack of limits to illiberal practices may encourage other Member States’ governments to follow, 
and subject other countries’ citizens to abuse. In other words, rule of law violations – if no consequences 
occur – may become contagious. Moreover, all EU citizens beyond the borders of the Member States 
concerned will to some extent suffer due to the given State’s participation in the EU’s decision-making 
mechanism, or to say the least, the legitimacy of Union decision-making will be jeopardised. Therefore, 
a state’s departure from the rule of law standards and the European consensus will ultimately hamper 
the exercise of rights of individuals EU-wide. As a further consequence of no consequent and uniform 
enforcement of fundamental rights throughout the Union, and regular health check of judicial 
independence of Member States for granted, mutual trust- and mutual recognition-based instruments 
are jeopardised. The CJEU has accepted that the presumption of EU Member States’ compliance with 
fundamental rights may be rebuttable – but if EU Member States cannot properly ensure an efficient, 
human rights-compliant and independent judiciary to carry out that test, how possibly could the 
principle of mutual recognition stand in EU JHA law? Beyond the political and social costs of the 
democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights deficit exposed in the non-compliant Member States, 
economic costs should also be mentioned. Rational law presents a necessary condition for economic 
transactions, and its application creates a sense of foreseeability and predictability on the part of 
economic agents. The latter is a necessary condition in order for rational economic actions to occur. 
Control of private capture and corruption, institutional checks on government, protection of property 
rights and mitigation of violence are all in close correlation with economic performance. Especially in 
times of financial and economic crises solid State institutions based on commonly shared values play a 
key role in creating or restoring confidence and fostering growth. 
 
In a democracy based on the rule of law, built-in correction mechanisms and sites of resistance 
compensate for the deficiencies of a majoritarian government, such as the concept of separation of 
powers, checks and balances, emphasis on independent judicial control, media freedom, etc. In a 
country where domestic checks fails, solely the control mechanism of international law including 
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supranational courts protecting the rule of law is left. Accordingly, international and EU norms and 
enforcement mechanisms shall be regarded as external tools of militant democracy whereby the people 
are granted protection against their substandard representatives, when all domestic channels of 
criticism have been effectively silenced and all domestic safeguards of democracy become inoperational 
– in short, when the rule of law has been efficiently deconstructed in a state of constitutional capture. 
 
Currently, the EU possesses of one sole supervisory mechanism to uphold its values, in the form of 
Article 7 TEU. The Article 7 TEU procedure has not been used ever since its introduction in the Treaties 
– not because there were no situations that would have justified its use, but for lack of political will. In 
response to this deficiency, both scholars and European institutions have called for reforms; the latter’s 
group of proposals most importantly include the Commission’s New EU Framework to Strengthen the 
Rule of Law, commonly referred to as pre-Article 7 procedure, currently being tested with regard to 
Poland.  
 
The formulation of a pre-Article 7 procedure is a milestone in a worrying trend of non-enforcement of 
European values to be witnessed for almost two decades. The Amsterdam Treaty introduced the Article 
7 sanction mechanism in 1999, and soon the Nice Treaty added a preventive arm to it. Whereas there 
were good reasons for instigating the mechanism in the recent history of integration, instead of making 
use of the already diluted procedure of Article 7(1), the Commission decided to water down the process 
even further by inserting a preventive-preventive process. Moreover is used selectively, thereby 
questioning the objectivity of the process and the equal treatment of Member States. Despite its 
weaknesses, the creation of the Commission’s new EU Rule of Law Framework can be seen as an 
acknowledgment of the rule of law problem, and as a step in the right direction to overcome it. On a 
positive note, the ongoing rule of law debate shifted its focus from an Article 7 TEU emergency-led 
context toward a discussion on shared European values and legal principles. Beyond supervision, EU 
values shall be promoted actively. Still, previous mechanisms and the EU Rule of Law Framework are 
crisis-driven and do not constitute a permanent and periodic monitoring and evaluation process of EU 
Member States’ compliance with Article 2 TEU legal principles. Neither do they go far enough in 
ensuring objective, independent and regular scrutiny of EU Member States’ rule of law obligations.  
 
The present Research Paper was written with the establishment of such a mechanism in mind, 
responding to a call by Resolution of 10 June 2015 the European Parliament to create an annual 
monitoring of compliance with democracy, the rule of law and the situation of fundamental rights in 
all Member States through a Scoreboard, to be established on the basis of common and objective 
indicators.  
 
The first part of the Research Paper – accompanied by three Annexes – provides a map of the state of 
the art; existing instruments in the EU, Council of Europe and United Nations settings to assess various 
aspects related to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental human rights; summaries of scholarly 
and institutional approaches to overcoming the Copenhagen dilemma; and finally, by way of currently 
ongoing procedures, an illustration of deep-seated tensions within the Union’s architecture to tackle 
rule of law backsliding and constitutional capture. The second and third parts highlight general and 
EU-specific methodological issues and challenges to be tackled. On the basis of our findings the fourth 
part incorporates an enumeration of substantive and procedural factors to be taken into account when 
considering the establishment of an EU Scoreboard. Annex 4 summarised the impact of the rule of law 
on economic performance and introduces factors to consider when assessing the costs of an EU 
Scoreboard.  
 
The Research Paper formulated the following recommendations with regard to the establishment of an 
EU Scoreboard on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. 
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1. The Research Paper understands the Scoreboard as a combination of ‘discussion and dialogue’, 
‘monitoring’, ‘measuring/evaluating and benchmarking’ and ‘supervision’, with various actors and 
methods channelled into one EU-specific system. In this sense a Scoreboard could be described as a 
‘process’ encompassing a multi-actor and multi-method cycle.  
 
2. The Research Paper argues with respect to the principle of conferral that the EU can intervene to 
protect its constitutional core, but what is more, the EU is also unequivocally obliged by the Treaties to 
act. Member Sates are interdependent in multiple areas, and depreciation of EU values will have EU-
wide effects in all possible ways. In order to ensure that the principle of subsidiarity and, by 
consequence, the sovereignty of the Member States are respected, it is indispensable for the Union to 
create reliable instruments of data collection and exchange, to enable it to be always on top of the 
situation on the ground in all the Member States. A Scoreboard instrument in this sense is not in 
contravention of the subsidiarity principle but, quite to the contrary, would contribute to making it 
operational.  
 
3. In order to prevent hypocrisy and enhance credibility in and outside the EU, preferably both the 
supranational entity – in the case at hand, the EU – and its constitutive elements, i.e. the Member States, 
shall be scrutinised via a Scoreboard, even if certain remedies are by nature exclusively applicable to 
the EU’s constitutive elements. 
 
4. Possibilities and limits of borrowing from existing monitoring and evaluation instruments in other 
international or regional fora shall be acknowledged. As has been shown in this Research Paper, making 
use of international mechanisms is already happening, with the EU Justice Scoreboard relying among 
others on the CoE CEPEJ model of evaluation/benchmarking, and the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
making use of the GRECO model. Borrowing may take place with regard to information, data, 
standards, structures and mechanisms. One option is to bring together all existing data and analyses 
from the international scene under one umbrella, in a ‘one-stop shop’, like the European Fundamental 
Rights Information System within the frame of the Fundamental Rights Agency. Already existing data 
and analyses on various ‘rule of law-related dimensions’ at the CoE and the UN should be taken in 
consideration during the EU Rule of Law Scoreboard.  
 
At the same time, bringing together data and analysing synergies, or even making comparisons as 
suggested in the literature, is an exercise that is close to impossible and more akin to ‘alchemy’. 
Standards, sources, data, data-handling methods and the interpretations of each of the various sets of 
tools are so different in nature and fundamentals, they necessitate a very tedious methodological 
exercise for making international mechanisms comparable and conclusions and findings meaningful.  
 
While relying on external sources and mechanisms, the EU element or specificity of the process shall 
always be kept. In other words, a rule of law mechanism shall never be ‘contracted out’ entirely to third 
parties, since non-EU actors fail to take due account of their relevance or links with existing European 
law and policies as well as general principles of European law, such as that of mutual recognition of 
judicial/administrative decisions. The EU shall be allowed to set higher standards than other 
international mechanisms.  
 
The EU Rule of Law Scoreboard could fit into the timetable of the European Semester and could be 
linked to the Cycle of Economic Governance. Beyond necessary overlaps in data collection however the 
EU Scoreboard shall be detached from other existing mechanism, with special regard to the latter’s 
weaknesses with regard to enforcement. EU values beyond monitoring.  
 
5. A case-by-case approach would be needed, where assessment through numerical indicators could be 
an element, but it should not constitute the core of the new Scoreboard. Instead, emphasis shall be 
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placed on a contextual, qualitative assessment of data and a country-specific list of key issues, in order 
to grasp interrelations between data and the causalities behind them.  
 
Limits of the Scoreboard should also be acknowledged: it would not be suitable to predict or prevent 
future trends; rank Member States according to who is performing ‘better’ or ‘worse’; or conduct 
simplistic cross-country comparative analyses.  
 
Fundamental rights to a lesser extent, but democracy and even more the rule of law are fluid concepts 
and phenomena, and there is no single ideal formula to achieve them. Rule of law is a contested concept, 
and even the most detailed definition, to be true to the idea of the rule of law, has to contain a share of 
vagueness in order to accommodate rule of law’s very nature. This requirement of vagueness plays 
strongly against any Quichotean attempts to turn the rule of law into a shopping list of elements, even 
if some examples of relatively good lists are known. Eliminating vagueness entirely, on such a reading, 
profoundly undermines the usefulness of the concept itself. Therefore the Research Paper argues against 
designing the standards along indicators – a rather dubious exercise that can easily be attacked as 
politically or ideologically biased. It is suggested to carefully consider whether needed and sparingly 
use benchmarking methods and indicators.  
 
Lack of agreement on standards and a context-sensitive analysis is not only benefiting states, but at the 
same time it does not allow rule of law backsliders to hide their efforts by referencing other states and 
claiming that there was nothing unorthodox about their structures. Whereas it may be true that formally 
a state borrowed the existing legal solutions, institutions and practices from various other jurisdictions, 
it might well be a selection of ‘worst practices’ and taken as a whole, in violation of EU values. 
 
6. The Research Paper systemized possible stages of respect for European values and identified three 
scenarios. In the first scenario, the boundaries of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are 
correctly set by national constitutional law and domestic bills of rights, whereas the enforcement of the 
values is first and foremost the task of the domestic courts, but other checks and balances are also 
operating well and fulfil their function. In this scenario an external mechanism is not vital but can have 
an added value. In a second scenario a Member State still adhering to democracy, the rule of law and 
fundamental rights might be in violation of individual rights, due to individual mistakes or structural 
and recurrent problems. In such cases, as a general rule, if domestic mechanisms (such as a 
constitutional court, civil society or media pressure) are incapable of solving the problem, the national 
law will be overwritten by international law and deficiencies in application of the law will be remedied 
to some extent by international apex courts. In other cases chronically lacking capacity to solve systemic 
problems such as corruption, international norms and fora cannot remedy the problems but can point 
to them and contribute to domestic efforts to tackle them. The third scenario is qualitatively different 
from the previous two. Without going into the details, this is the state of a constitutional capture with a 
systemic breach of separation of powers, constitutional adjudication, failure of the ordinary judiciary 
and the ombudsman system, civil society or the media. Before reaching that stage, the country on its 
way towards the third scenario, in a state of so-called rule of law backsliding shall be warned and a 
constitutional capture be prevented. 
 
7. The institutional framework behind the Scoreboard shall reflect objectivity. The proposal to establish 
a ‘EU Rule of Law Commission’ as an independent body of scholars should be seriously considered. 
The EU Rule of Law Commission could be placed at the centre of the EU Rule of Law Scoreboard. The 
selection and organizational model could follow the one currently utilized in actors like the Venice 
Commission and the CEPEJ. Yet particular attention should be paid to the academic and independent 
nature of the members.  
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The EU Rule of Law Commission shall make a context-specific assessment in light of data available or 
call for the need to gather extra information on EU issue-specific questions. The possibility to conduct 
country visits (following the UN Special Rapporteurs model) could also be envisaged. The UN model 
of well-established working relationships/close partnerships with national Human Rights Authorities 
and civil society organisations should be pursued.  
 
An EU Rule of Law Commission could draw up Annual (Country Specific) Reports on the basis of 
available and additional materials. The annual report shall point to the strengths and weaknesses, and 
suggest specific ways to overcome the latter.   
 
8. Tools and institutional design shall be adjusted to the needs, and accordingly the Scoreboard shall 
establish a two-prong mechanism for Member States ‘on track’ and ‘off the track’ of the rule of law.  
 
In both the first and second scenarios described above, i.e. when international mechanisms are used for 
upholding and promoting European values, remedying some breaches of single elements of European 
values or reversing the trends in the deterioration of some sub-elements of democracy, the rule of law 
and fundamental rights, the Scoreboard mechanism may follow a “‘sunshine policy’, which engages 
and involves rather than paralyses and excludes”, and where value-control “is owned equally by all 
actors”. 
 
In the second scenario, it may be useful to disentangle the interrelated values of democracy, the rule of 
law and fundamental rights. Maintaining the distinction is particularly useful at this point, since 
infringement in this second scenario typically affects fundamental rights, whereas a number of 
mechanisms exist in Europe to tackle fundamental rights problems.  
 
The third scenario – which is the trigger for the attempts to tackle the Copenhagen dilemma and also 
for the present Research Paper – is fundamentally different from the first two, and therefore the 
methodology of the Scoreboard shall introduce a second prong accordingly. When a State systematically 
undermines democracy, deconstructs the rule of law and engages in massive human right violations, 
there is no reason to presume the good intentions of those in power to engage in a sunshine approach 
involving a dialogue and soft measures in order to make the entity return to the concept of limited 
government – a notion that those in power wished to abandon in the first place.  
 
A challenge lies in identifying the point when a Member State enters or is on the path towards the third 
phase, and to remedy the situation. It is under this Scenario that the systemic infringement proceedings, 
the EU Rule of Law Mechanism or Article 7 TEU would come in. All these procedures have – and we 
assume all future mechanisms will have – a discussion phase, where the Member State in question can 
present its views on its laws, policies and their realisation in practice. The Scoreboard could guide the 
discussion and make the process foreseeable and transparent. The discussion could still be led by an 
inter-institutional arrangement/agreement, with the FRA and/or the Commission taking the lead.  
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Figure ES1. The three rule of law scenarios and responding mechanisms  
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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9. the procedural matters are in close correlation with the key challenge of any Scoreboard method, 
namely their ‘politicisation’ versus retaining their legitimacy when governments and the various EU 
institutions will accuse them of being ‘political’ and ‘non-neutral’. The main challenges identified with 
regard to ensuring and enhancing legitimacy were the need for objective standards, equal treatment of 
Member States, a prompt response to rule of law backsliders, respect for the principles of conferral and 
subsidiarity, potentially reversing the burden of proof of compliance with European values and shifting 
it from European institutions to the Member States, the need for follow-up mechanisms and the 
introduction of efficient, dissuasive and proportionate sanctions.   
 
10. Follow-up mechanism and efficient sanctions  
There was a general agreement between interviewees that a follow-up mechanism was needed, such as 
the Committee of Ministers in the framework of the Council of Europe overseeing Strasbourg 
judgments. After problems – whether individual or systemic – have been identified, there shall be 
regular assessment and a special procedure on compliance and follow-up with recommendations. The 
supervisory prong of the Scoreboard would however need to go beyond that. As is apparent from the 
state of the art and the depreciation of rule of law values, enforcement is the weak side of the existing 
legal framework overseeing European values – including the Article 7 mechanism or general 
infringement procedures according to Articles 258-260 TFEU. Enforcement with effective sanctions is 
also the weak side of suggestions by EU institutions and academic proposals. 
 
The highly probable failure of both naming and shaming, and also of a more positive discursive 
approach, shall be acknowledged: an illiberal State is unlikely to be persuaded to return to EU values 
by way of diplomatic attacks, political criticism, discussions and dialogue. Proposals “adding bite to the 
bark” therefore typically point to the power of the purse, i.e. operate with quasi-economic sanctions, 
such as the suspension, withholding or deduction of EU funds, or pecuniary sanctions. Whereas 
pecuniary sanctions may be effective with regard to all Member States, for the time being the power of 
the purse could be particularly strong, as paradoxically the main rule of law backsliders are countries 
which are net beneficiaries of European integration. Freezing EU funds in their case would also put an 
end to the paradox of using EU money to build authoritarian regimes in denial of EU values. 
 
11. Concerning the legal basis dilemma, we have several options under the current Treaty framework 
to set up an EU Rule of Law Commission as a consultative body. 
 
The option of an inter-institutional agreement without any further legal basis shall be considered. 
 
Also, Article 352 TFEU constitutes the foundations for Regulation 168/2007 establishing the FRA. There 
is therefore a precedent in its use. The FRA's organisational structure also includes a Scientific 
Committee composed of eleven independent persons, highly qualified, whose terms of office is not 
renewable. The Scientific Committee thus is a candidate for fulfilling the role of the EU Rule of Law 
Commission. However, there are strong reasons against entrusting the FRA or the FRA Scientific 
Committee with such a mandate. First,  autonomy and legitimacy of the entity can only be preserved, 
if  governments and the various EU institutions cannot accuse it of being ‘political’ and ‘non-neutral’, 
and therefore any such body shall be detached from EU institutions and bodies. Second, whereas 
democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are closely interrelated, they cannot be used as 
synonyms, and there are strong benefits in keeping these apart. 
 
Alternatively, or in parallel, the implementation of Article 70 TFEU could also be used. This article 
would give a sound entry point in an area, which is specific to EU law, namely mutual recognition.  
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Preferably the Court of Justice could get involved, in particularly at times of determining what is a 
systematic rule of law deficiencies. If the EU Rule of Law Commission determines that there are 
systematic deficiencies, one could consider to call the Court to intervene and have a substantial 
assessment even before the context of Article 7 TEU, particularly when the deficiencies affect mutual 
recognition based EU policies and aspects where fundamental rights of people are at stake, for example 
in cases of detention. An option is to make use of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure laid down in 
CJEU Rules of Procedure. 
 
Finally, the EU Rule of Law Commission could follow a similar format than the Venice Commission. 
An open question is who should appoint its members. In the Venice Commission it is the Member States. 
For the EU, prospective potential members should pass the test of the European Parliament before 
nomination, and they could be chosen from candidates proposed by Council and the Commission. 
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rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities” as the shared values in which the Union 
is rooted. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU became officially equipped with its own 
bill of rights in the form of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Moreover, national constitutional 
traditions of EU Member States, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, ECHR), and the jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg court are also constitutive elements of EU law. 
 
Member States are vetted for their compliance with these values before they accede to the Union (Article 
49 (1) EU). The so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’ established in 1993 are meant to ensure that all new EU 
Member States are in line with the Union’s common principles before joining the EU.1 Also, the Union 
is obliged by law to export these values, which underlie the Union’s international relations (Articles 21, 
3 (5) and 8 TEU).2 That notwithstanding, no similar method or ‘mechanism’ exists to supervise and 
regularly monitor adherence to these foundational legal principles after accession. A gap emerged 
between the proclamation of fundamental rights and foundational values and principles, and their 
actual enforcement. Whereas before accession the most severe sanctions could be imposed on a 
prospective member country – namely disregard of EU values could result in the suspension of 
membership negotiations and any financial assistance from the EU3 – there is no counterpart to such 
scrutiny after accession. In theory – and there is convincing evidence that also in reality – Member States 
may abuse the fact that EU membership is a one-way-street, and might jeopardise EU values to an extent 
that they would not be permitted to accede, had they not been already member countries. This has been 
referred to by Vice-President of the European Commission Viviane Reding as the ‘Copenhagen 
dilemma’.4  
 
Against this background former Commissioner Reding’s call in 2013 to stop applying double-standards 
in and outside the EU when it comes to respect for the rule of law shall be seen as an important initiative. 
“Whereas it is the duty of domestic legal systems to uphold the Treaties, including EU objectives, rule 
of law matters are no longer a ‘domain reservé’ for each Member State, but are of common European 
interest.”5  
 
The lack of monitoring, evaluating and supervisory mechanisms for the EU’s legal founding principles 
would not constitute a problem if Member States adhered to these principles after accession. This, 
however, is a very unlikely hypothetical scenario. As James Madison put it, “If angels were to govern 
                                                        
1 The criteria read as follows: “Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence 
of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within 
the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union”. Cf.: C. Hillion, ‘The Copenhagen Criteria and 
Their Progeny’ in: C. Hillion, EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach, Oxford: Hart, 2004, 1–23; D. Kochenov, ‘Behind the 
Copenhagen Façade. The Meaning and Structure of the Copenhagen Criterion of Democracy and the Rule of Law’, 
8 European Integration online Papers 10 (2004). 
2 Cf. L. Pech, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad’, in: D. Kochenov and F. Amtenbrink (eds.), The European Union’s 
Shaping of the International Legal Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 108–129; M. Cremona, 
‘Values in EU Foreign Policy’, in: M. Evans and P. Koutrakos (eds.), Beyond the Established Legal Orders: Policy 
Interconnections between the EU and the Rest of the World, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011, 275–315. 
3 C. Hillion, ‘Enlargement of the European Union: A Legal Analysis’, in: A. Arnull and D. Wincott (eds.), 
Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 401–418. 
4 “Once this Member State has joined the European Union, we appear not to have any instrument to see whether 
the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary still command respect”. European Parliament (2012), Plenary 
debate on the political situation in Romania, statement by V. Reding, 12 September 2012. See also V. Reding, “The 
EU and the Rule of Law: What Next?”, speech delivered at CEPS, 4 September 2013. 
5 V. Reding, “The EU and the Rule of Law: What Next?”, speech delivered at CEPS, 4 September 2013. 
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men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.”6 The whole idea of the 
rule of law implies that law is an effective check on the exercise of political power.7 However, 
governments of human beings, including Member State governments, may – and do – violate 
foundational principles,8 and they do so in at least two ways.  
 
First, concepts such as fundamental rights are fluid ones. Member States may violate them by sticking 
to their old black letter law or jurisprudence instead of responding to the changed social circumstances 
(criminalisation of homosexuality, non-criminalisation of domestic violence, or lack of reasonable 
accommodation are just illustrative and obvious examples).  
 
Second, a country may straightforwardly turn against its own previously respected principles of 
democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. This latter scenario may happen in a narrow field, 
but in a gravely injurious manner, which is typically the case with regard to fundamental rights. Cases 
in point include the Roma crises in France in 2010-13, the Italian Ponticelli incident, and the mass 
surveillance programmes of EU citizens by the British Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ) intelligence service and other EU Member States in collaboration with the United States NSA. 
Alternatively, a country may make a U-turn on the path of the rule of law, systematically eliminating – 
at least in the domestic setting – the channels for any kind of internal dissent, i.e. diminishing the 
potentialities of criticism by the voters (by media dominance, gerrymandering, etc.), civil society (by 
cutting funds and systematically harassing NGO representatives), and the state institutions (by 
weakening the powers of the constitutional court, influencing the judiciary, eliminating ombudsman’s 
offices, etc.), thereby deconstructing effective checks and balances. Hungary and more recently Poland 
are illustrative examples in this regard, and are yet not exceptions across the Union.  
 
Typically, depreciation of one foundational ‘value’ triggers depreciation of others. Take the 
discrimination against the Roma, which goes hand in hand with arbitrary determinations of a state of 
emergency. Also, unlimited electronic surveillance was possible due to lack of transparency and 
democratic and judicial accountability of intelligence communities’ practices. A systematic 
deconstruction of the rule of law results in fundamental rights violations in all possible ways. Since 
democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are co-constitutive, throughout the present Research 
Paper they will be discussed together, with due regard to their triangular relationship.9 
 
Against this background the present Research Paper examines the viability and added value (costs and 
benefits) of the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental 
                                                        
6 J. Madison, The Federalist No. 51. The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances 
Between the Different Departments, Independent Journal, 6 February 1788. 
7 G. Palombella and N. Walker (eds.), Relocating the Rule of Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009; G. Palombella, È 
possibile la legalità globale? Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012. 
8 On the relationship between democracy and the rule of law, see, e.g. L Morlino and G. Palombella (eds.), Rule of 
Law and Democracy: Inquiries into Internal and External Issues Leiden: Brill, 2010. 
9 S. Carrera, E. Guild and N. Hernanz, The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, Democracy and the Rule 
of Law in the EU, Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism, CEPS 2013, available at http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/ 
Fundamental%20Rights%20DemocracyandRoL.pdf; the original study done for the Directorate General for Internal 
Policies of the European Parliament, PE 493.031, 2013, is available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ 
etudes/etudes/join/2013/493031/IPOL-LIBE_ET(2013)493031_EN.pdf; S. Carrera, E. Guild and N. Hernanz, ‘Rule 
of law or rule of thumb, A new Copenhagen mechanism for the EU’, CEPS policy brief, 2013, available at 
http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/No%20303%20Copenhagen%20Mechanism%20for%20Fundamental%20Right
s_0.pdf. Cf. Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly), Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human 
Rights: The Principle of the Rule of Law, Doc. No. 11343, 6 July 2007, para. 5. One should not forget that the 
substance of EU values received a synergetic treatment also in the pre-accession context leading to the ‘big-bang’ 
enlargement: D. Kochenov, ‘Behind the Copenhagen Façade. The Meaning and Structure of the Copenhagen 
Criterion of Democracy and the Rule of Law’, 8 European Integration online Papers 10 (2004). 
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rights, making use of an EU Scoreboard assessing EU Member States’ compliance with democracy, the 
rule of law and fundamental rights. 
 
The methodology used in the elaboration of this Research Paper has included both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of data when assessing the various options and research questions, as well as their 
related social, economic, and political costs and benefits. The Research Paper is based on the information 
already gathered from publicly available sources of information and data (both primary and secondary 
sources), as well as own field research. The desk research was complemented with a set of semi-
structured (face-to-face) interviews with relevant EU policy-makers, representatives from other relevant 
supranational organisations and in the broader context, with individuals shaping the European 
understanding of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights.  
 
Chapter 1 provides an synthesised overview of existing EU instruments that assess EU Member States’ 
compliance with democratic, rule of law and fundamental rights legal principles ‘outside the scope of 
EU law’. At the same time, Council of Europe and UN instruments will be presented, which might well 
serve as inspirations or sources for an EU Scoreboard, as well as at times of reflecting on ways to avoid 
unnecessary duplications and take into account ‘lessons learned’ from these already existing 
instruments when (and if) developing a Scoreboard instrument specific to the EU. Scholarly and 
institutional approaches tackling the Copenhagen dilemma will be summarised and, finally, ongoing 
rule of law scrutiny against two Member States will be described as illustrations of institutional, 
procedural and political obstacles to conducting a meaningful supervision of EU legal principles.  
 
Chapter 2 highlights the general methodological challenges to be addressed by any Scoreboard 
measuring complex social phenomena and ‘rule of law in the EU legal system’ more generally. The 
focus of Chapter 3 is narrowed to the EU jurisdiction and the possible objections against a supervisory 
mechanism established at the EU level. Drawing on the considerations, challenges, obstacles, 
advantages and dangers identified in the previous parts of the Research Paper, Chapter 4 provides 
‘policy options’ and suggestions with regard to the value added and specficities of an EU Scoreboard 
designed to monitor and assess democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the EU legal 
system. 
1.2. A Typology of existing EU instruments  
What are the existing instruments that assess EU Member States’ compliance with rule of law-related 
or relevant aspects? This Section provides a synthesised overview of existing EU rule of law instruments 
that fall outside the formal institutional and procedural arrangements foreseen by the Treaties for the 
enforcement of EU, and of EU Member States’ practices that fall outside the scope of EU law.10 A 
detailed overview and typology of EU rule of law instruments has already been provided in a previous 
2013 European Parliament study.11 Table 1 below provides an updated snapshot of the set of most 
relevant and recent instruments, as well as a picture of the wider policy landscape of diversified 
methods and EU actors involved.  
                                                        
10 For a detailed account of compliance and enforcement of EU law refer to M. Cremona (ed.), Compliance and the 
Enforcement of EU Law, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2012; A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement 
of EU Law and Values, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, forthcoming. 
11 S. Carrera, E. Guild and N. Hernanz, The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, Democracy and the 
Rule of Law in the EU, Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism, CEPS 2013, available at 
http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Fundamental%20Rights%20DemocracyandRoL.pdf, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/493031/IPOL-
LIBE_ET%282013%29493031_EN.pdf, 4–15, and Annex 1 of the study.  
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Table 1. Landscape of combined EU rule of law methods and actors 
Supervision Evaluation Benchmarking Monitoring Discussion/ Dialogue 
Article 7 TEU EU Justice  Scoreboard 
EU Justice  
Scoreboard 
EU Framework to 
Strengthen the Rule 
of Law  
Council  
Rule of Law  
Dialogue 
 EU Anti-Corruption  report 
EU Anti-Corruption 
report   
 
Cooperation and 
Verification  
Mechanism  
(CVM) 
   
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
This overview shows that the EU already counts on an increasing framework of tools and processes that 
engage in different ways in various kinds of assessments and monitoring procedures focused on EU 
Member States’ compliance with Article 2 TEU-relevant legal principles under the current Treaties’ 
configurations, including the legally binding EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. These instruments can 
be grouped into various categories depending on their actual scope, normative nature and degree of 
enforcement/follow-up as follows: supervision (Section 1.2.1.); Evaluation/Benchmarking (Section 
1.2.2); Monitoring (Section 1.2.3); and Discussion/Dialogue (Section 1.2.4). 
1.2.1 Supervision 
Supervision instruments usually comprise monitoring and a detailed qualitative 
assessment/evaluation in cases where there are risks of a serious breach, or actual and persistent 
breaches, by an EU Member State of Article 2 TEU legal principles. In this way, this supervisory 
instrument has a preventive and a coercive arm. Supervising compliance is grounded on the Treaties or 
in an express provision envisaged in European law. There is also an enforcement or coercive arm in 
cases where EU Member States do not comply with their obligations. Article 7 TEU is the instrument 
serving such a function. 
 
Although the values laid down in Article 2 TEU, including, most importantly, democracy and the rule 
of law, do not lie, strictly speaking, within the scope of ordinary acquis of the Union in the sense that the 
Union cannot legislate based on this provision alone, their inclusion within the broader ambit of EU law 
cannot be disputed, as underlined by scholars on numerous occasions.12 In other words, it would be 
difficult to persuasively argue that the EU does not already possess a very clear and strong 
constitutional mandate to ensure that its foundational values are observed in each of its Member States. 
As a matter of law, EU Member States are in fact under a legal duty to cooperate in this endeavour and 
assist the EU in promoting its values both within and beyond the EU. 
 
The special nature of Article 2 TEU is demonstrated by the existence of Article 7 TEU, which offers a 
specific enforcement mechanism in two situations:  
 
1. Where there is a clear risk of a serious breach of Article 2 values in a Member State (a four-fifths 
majority of the Member States in Council is required, not counting the Member State subjected 
to the procedure). No sanctions can be adopted under this procedure. The ‘best’ outcome could 
be the adoption of recommendations provided that the European Parliament assents and a four-
fifths majority is reached in the Council, conditions which do not seem unattainable if there is 
a political will to act. 
                                                        
12 C. Hillion, ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov, Reinforcing the Rule of Law 
Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming; C. Closa, D. Kochenov 
and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union’, 2014/25 RSCAS Working Paper 
(2014); J.-C. Piris, The Lisbon Treaty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
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2. Where a serious and persistent breach of the same values has been established (unanimity of 
the Member States required, not counting the one subjected to the procedure). Once a breach is 
demonstrated under this procedure of Article 7, sanctioning of the troubled Member State is 
possible with the view of bringing it back to compliance with Article 2 TEU.  
 
That being said, Article 2 values unquestionably form part of the ‘Treaty’, which the Commission is also 
empowered to protect on a case-by-case basis via the ordinary infringement procedure under Article 
258 TFEU, notwithstanding the fact that the institution opted to interpret this power conservatively and 
has not deployed Article 258 TFEU procedure in this vein. 
 
A point of debate has been the actual material scope of Article 7 TEU. The Commission Communication 
on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union – Respect for and promotion of the values on which the 
Union is based, COM(2003) 606 final – underlined that: 
 
The fact that Article 7 of the Union Treaty is horizontal and general in scope is quite understandable 
in the case of an article that seeks to secure respect for the conditions of Union membership. There 
would be something paradoxical about confining the Union’s possibilities of action to the areas 
covered by Union law and asking it to ignore serious breaches in areas of national jurisdiction. If a 
Member State breaches the fundamental values in a manner sufficiently serious to be caught by 
Article 7, this is likely to undermine the very foundations of the Union and the trust between its 
members, whatever the field in which the breach occurs.13 
Table 2. Effects and remedies of infringing national law, EU law and EU values 
 Breach of national law Breach of EU law Breach of EU values in the national setting 
 Effect Remedy Effect Remedy Effect Remedy 
MS level       
EU level       
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
Article 7 TEU allows for EU intervention even if the threats or breaches of EU values concern issues 
lying outside of the EU scope of competence.14 It is however politically perceived as a remedy of last 
resort to use only in the most extreme circumstances, hence the ‘nuclear option’ label. Procedurally 
speaking, this provision is subject to relatively high decision-making thresholds. The presence of two 
countries in the EU in serious and persistent breach of EU values makes the deployment of the ‘biting’ 
clauses in the provision difficult, unless both problematic countries are tackled simultaneously. The 
Court of Justice can only review the legality of the procedure and not the decision establishing whether 
there is a risk or a persistent and serious threat to EU values.15 
 
Neither of the two Article 7 TEU procedures has been used even once in practice since this provision’s 
introduction into the Treaties. The provision does not provide any clear indication or way in which the 
determination and assessment of the rule of law threat is to be determined and by whom. The activation 
                                                        
13 Commission Communication on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union - Respect for and promotion of the 
values on which the Union is based, COM(2003) 606 final, 15 October 2003, page 5.  
14 C. Hillion, ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov, Reinforcing the Rule of Law 
Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming; L. F. M. Besselink, 
‘The Bite, the Bark and the Howl: Article 7 and the Rule of Law Initiatives’, in: A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (ed.), The 
Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Methods against Defiance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
15 Refer to Article 269 TFEU. 
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is also in hands of the various EU institutional actors, and is therefore subject to political manoeuvring 
or diplomatic will. The Council has been endowed with ample discretion when activating Article 7 
procedure and in applying sanctions. The European Commission has recognised, “The thresholds for 
activating both mechanisms of Article 7 TEU are very high and underline the nature of these 
mechanisms as a last resort.”16 All these legal and political barriers have left a considerable gap that 
limits its effective operability and undermines legal certainty. 
1.2.2 Evaluation and benchmarking 
Evaluation instruments entail a qualitative and quantitative assessment of a specific subject or area of 
intervention following well-established social-sciences standards. It often involves scientifically-based 
design, collection and analysis of data. They are non-legally binding tools aimed at fostering change in 
Member States’ arenas through soft methods of steering, coordination or non-coercive (guiding) tools. 
They are usually Member State or theme-specific or provide a qualitative comparison between EU 
Member States.  
 
Evaluation instruments usually present conclusions drawn from the analysis and provide non-binding 
suggestions or recommendations to Member States for addressing deficits or obstacles. There is a lack 
of a coercive arm. They are aimed at incentivising States to comply or align with international and 
European standards, yet they usually present legally weak (if any) ‘follow-up’ procedures of 
conclusions reached and for ensuring effective implementation of recommendations. 
 
A specific category of evaluation instruments are those covering ‘benchmarking’ methods, which utilise 
indicators and identify ‘best practices’ when comparing EU Member States’ performance. 
Benchmarking is not the same as evaluation, but entails a rather specific methodology based on complex 
indexing methodologies (calculation of averages), the identification of common principles and 
standards and the selection of good/bad practices (corresponding to the highest/lowest standard). The 
outputs are represented in complex, yet highly visually attractive, graphs and quantitative methods. 
There are several examples of EU evaluation instruments comprising a ‘benchmarking’ approach which 
are of relevance for the purposes of this Research Paper. These include, for example, the EU Justice 
Scoreboard (1.2.2.1) and the EU Anti-Corruption Report (1.2.2.2).17 
1.2.2.1 The EU Justice Scoreboard  
Since 2012 the quality, independence and efficiency of justice and national judicial regimes constitute 
one of the priorities in the EU yearly cycle of economic policy coordination, or ‘European semester’, to 
foster structural reforms at national levels.18 This has taken the form of the so-called ‘EU Justice 
Scoreboard’.19 The last edition was published in 2015.20  
 
                                                        
16 European Commission, Communication, A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, COM(2014)158, 
11.3.2014, page 6. 
17 Other examples include the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) for Bulgaria and Romania. For the 
latest CVM see http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/progress_reports_en.htm. 
18 See Communication from the Commission, Annual Growth Survey 2015, COM (2014) 902 final. For a study of 
the European semester method refer to 2013 CEPS Study. 
19 The EU Justice Scoreboard: Towards more effective justice systems in the EU, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/effective-justice/news/150309_en.htm. 
20 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/justice_Scoreboard_2015_en.pdf. The first edition of the EU 
Justice Scoreboard was published in 2013 by the previous European Commission. See European Commission 
(2013), The EU Justice Scoreboard – A tool to promote effective justice and growth, COM(2013) 160 final, Brussels, 
27 March. 
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The material scope of the EU Justice Scoreboard is rather limited. It only includes data that deals with 
civil, commercial and administrative justice. Criminal justice and other justice-relevant fundamental 
rights aspects fall outside the scope of evaluation. The driving approach pays particular attention to a 
set of ‘parameters’ which would enable any justice system to facilitate the improvement of business and 
investment. According to the Commission the main objective of the EU Justice Scoreboard is: 
 
to assist the EU and the Member States to achieve more effective justice by providing objective, 
reliable and comparable data on the functioning of the justice systems of all Member States. Quality, 
independence and efficiency are the key components of an ‘effective justice system’. Providing 
information on these components in all Member States contributes to identifying potential 
shortcomings and good examples and supports the development of justice policies at national and 
at EU level.21 
 
The EU Justice Scoreboard uses a number of indicators which broadly relate to the efficiency of the 
justice systems (length of proceedings, clearance rates, pending cases, etc.), quality of justice systems 
(monitoring, evaluation and survey tools, information and communication technology systems, courts’ 
communication policies, alternative dispute resolution methods, promoting judge training resources 
and equal share of female judges) and the independence of the judiciary (perceived and structural).22 
The source from which the data comes is mainly the Council of Europe’s Commission for the Evaluation 
of the Efficiency of Justice (refer to Section 1.3 below for a detailed overview of CEPEJ), on the basis of 
a study commissioned by the European Commission to this body,23 as well as two field studies 
commissioned to two external contractors.24 The financial costs granted to the CoE to deliver this work 
was approximately €800,000.25  
 
The results of the Scoreboard have reportedly received mixed reactions from EU Member States.26 Most 
important, the Scoreboard is incapable of catching the most atrocious violations: it does not sufficiently 
detect internal linkages, thus it examines individual elements but fails to supply a qualitative 
assessment of the whole.27 The Scoreboard does not foresee any coercive action or sanctions/penalties 
in a situation where an EU Member State may be seen as performing poorly on the above-mentioned 
                                                        
21 Page 3 of the Communication. 
22 The 2015 edition states, “The 2015 Scoreboard has evolved: this third edition of the Scoreboard seeks to identify possible 
trends whilst taking a cautious and nuanced approach as the situation varies significantly, depending on each Member State 
and indicator. The 2015 Scoreboard also contains new indicators and more fine-tuned data based on new sources of information, 
for example, on the efficiency of courts in the areas of public procurement and intellectual property rights, the use and the 
promotion of alternative dispute resolution methods (hereafter ADR), the use of Information and Communication Technology 
(hereafter ICT) for small claim proceedings, courts’ communications policies, composition and powers of Councils for the 
judiciary. It also contains, for the first time, data on the share of female professional judges, as more gender diversity can 
contribute to a better quality of justice systems”, page 6. Moreover, the Scoreboard states, “Pursuing efforts to promote 
the exchange of best practices is key for supporting the quality of justice reforms in Member States.” 
23 See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/cepj_study_Scoreboard_2015_en.pdf, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2015-
005198+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN and Nielsen, N., Hungary in surprise ranking on EU justice scoreboard, 27 March 
201, https://euobserver.com/justice/119597. 
24 European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, Case study on the 
functioning of enforcement proceedings relating to judicial decisions in Member States, Final Report, February, 
2015, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/enforcement_proceedings_final_report_en.pdf. See also 
Europe economics and Milieu (2015), Economic efficiency and legal effectiveness of review and remedies 
procedures for public contracts Final Study Report MARKT/2013/072/C. 
25 See http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:263765-2013:TEXT:EN:HTML&src=0 and 
http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:25222-2014:TEXT:EN:HTML&src=0. 
26 Nikolaj Nielsen, EU justice Scoreboard upsets some Member States, 17 March 2014, 
https://euobserver.com/justice/123507. 
27 K.L. Scheppele, ‘The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: Why Governance Checklists Do Not Work’, 26 Governance 
4, 559–562 (2013). 
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indicators. A key incentive supporting EU Member States’ implementation of the proposed reforms is 
through various sources of EU funding,28 including European structural and social funds and economic 
adjustment programmes.29 
1.2.2.2 The EU Anti-Corruption Report  
The European Commission adopted in 2011 the Decision C(20011) 3673 Establishing an EU Anti-
corruption reporting mechanism for periodic assessment (‘EU Anti-corruption Report’).30 The EU Anti-
Corruption Report is a ‘reporting mechanism’ for the periodic assessment of anti-corruption efforts in 
the Union in order to facilitate and support the implementation of a comprehensive anti-corruption 
policy in the Union. According to Article 2 of this Decision the Report has the following objectives: “(a) 
to periodically assess the situation in the Union regarding the fight against corruption; (b) to identify trends and 
best practices; (c) to make general recommendations for adjusting EU policy on preventing and fighting 
corruption; (d) to make tailor-made recommendations; (e) to help Member States, civil society or other stakeholders 
identify shortcomings, raise awareness and provide training on anti-corruption”. 
 
The first issue of the EU Anti-Corruption Report was published in 2014,31 and new editions are 
scheduled to appear every two years. According to the Report, it focuses on  
 
…selected key issues of particular relevance to each Member State. It describes good practices as well 
as weaknesses, and identifies steps which will allow Member States to address corruption more 
effectively. The Commission recognises that some of these issues are solely national competence. It 
is, however, in the Union’s common interest to ensure that all Member States have efficient anti-
corruption policies and that the EU supports the Member States in pursuing this work. The report 
therefore seeks to promote high anticorruption standards across the EU. By highlighting problems – 
as well as good practices – found inside the EU, the report also lends credibility to the EU’s efforts to 
promote anticorruption standards elsewhere.32 
 
                                                        
28 According to the 2015 EU Justice Scoreboard, “The European Structural and Investment Funds (ESI Funds)9 provide 
support to Member States’ efforts to improve the functioning of their justice systems. At the start of the new programming 
period 2014-2020, the Commission engaged in an intensive dialogue with Member States on establishing the strategic funding 
priorities of the ESI Funds in order to encourage a close link between policy and funding. Based on the draft partnership 
agreements, the total budget allocated to investments in institutional capacity of public administration amounts to almost 5 
billion euros for the next programming period. Out of the twelve Member States that received a country-specific-
recommendation in the area of justice in 2014, eleven identified justice as a priority area of support for the ESI Funds. Justice 
is also a priority in the Economic Adjustment Programmes for Greece and Cyprus which will use ESI Funds in this area. The 
country-specific-recommendations, the country specific assessment and the data provided in the Scoreboard are key elements 
for Member States when setting out their funding priorities. Member States which identified justice systems as a priority area 
intend to use ESI Funds mostly for improving the efficiency of the judiciary. Although concrete activities will depend on the 
particular needs of each Member State concerned, some types of activities are emerging as being common to more Member 
States, such as the introduction of case management systems, the use of ICT in courts, the monitoring and evaluation tools, 
and training schemes for judges. The extent of this support varies between the Member States: while some Member States 
intend to support a broad section of their justice systems, others will concentrate on only a few courts which are facing 
particular challenges or are selected for pilot purposes. The Commission emphasised the importance of robust indicators for 
monitoring effectiveness of the support and issued guidance documents on monitoring indicators in line with those used in the 
Scoreboard. They will ensure the regular reporting of the Member States to the Commission on achieved results. These data 
will help the evaluation of EU support in rendering Member States’ justice systems more effective”, page 4. 
29 For a detailed overview of the corrective and preventive arm of the European semester refer to 2013 CEPS study. 
30 European Commission Decision establishing an EU Anti-corruption reporting mechanism for periodic 
assessment (‘EU Anti-corruption Report’), 6 June 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/pdf/com_decision_2011_3673_final_en.pdf. 
31 European Commission Report From the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, EU Anti-
Corruption Report, COM(2014) 38 final, 3 February 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-
library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/docs/acr_2014_en.pdf. 
32 Page 2 of the Report.  
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The assessment has been based on a wide range of sources. These include existing evaluation 
mechanisms in other supranational fora, notably the Council of Europe’s Group of States against 
Corruption (GRECO) and the OECD. This constitutes a commonality with the above-mentioned EU 
Justice Scoreboard, which relies heavily on non-EU specific monitoring bodies and tools. It also 
benefited from a group of experts on corruption and a network of research correspondents. The Report 
is not based on detailed questionnaires or expert country visits.33 The assessment methodology also 
makes use of ‘indicators’, and is based on ‘qualitative’ rather than ‘quantitative’ assessment.34  
 
The Report was originally intended to give special emphasis to indicators including “perceptions, along 
with facts, trends, challenges and developments relevant to corruption and anti-corruption measures.” That 
notwithstanding, the actual assessment qualifies more as a proper country-by-country 
report/evaluation, still using indicators as reference points while acknowledging their profound 
methodological limitations. Indeed, the Annex on Methodology states  
 
During preparation of the list (of indicators), the Commission became aware that there might be a 
fundamental difficulty in relying primarily on indicators and statistical data for getting to the core of 
corruption problems, and most importantly for building actionable, tailor-made policy 
recommendations. Still, already established indicators directly relevant to the anti-corruption efforts 
supported by robust data were collected in order to examine the situation in Member States and 
identify areas for closer analysis in the country-specific research.35 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report covers all EU Member States and is structured as follows: introduction 
(presenting the policy setting and background, the results of Eurobarometer surveys on perceptions 
and experience on corruption, a chapter describing corruption-related trends across the EU; a thematic 
chapter focusing on a cross-cutting issue of particular relevance at EU level, which in the 2014 edition 
focused on ‘public procurement’; an Annex on Methodology and Country Chapters, which focuses on 
a ‘list of key issues’.36 The country reports end with a ‘future steps’ section which highlights points 
where further attention/action is required by the national government.37 
 
                                                        
33 Moreover, “Studies and surveys were specifically commissioned for the purpose of further extending the knowledge base in 
areas relevant to the report. An extensive study on corruption in public procurement involving EU funds, launched at the 
initiative of the European Parliament, was commissioned by OLAF”, page 37 of the Report.  
34 According to the Report, “Quantitative approaches play a lesser role, mostly because it is difficult to put a figure on how 
much of a problem corruption is, and even more difficult to rank the countries by results. The obstacle to using a quantitative 
approach is related to the fact that well-known surveys tend to compose their indexes using others’ data. This creates a cascade 
effect: composite indexes building on this approach may reflect data gathered one or two years before their publication. Surveys 
tend to use for instance the Eurobarometer results; however, by the time the composite index is published, another more recent 
Eurobarometer survey may be available.” Id. at 39. 
35 Page 40 of the Report. It continues by saying, “These data (1) were used for scene setting (i.e. an introduction to the 
country chapters), and (2) serve as a starting/complementary point for further research on particular matters/sectors at country 
or EU level pointing to identification of problem and assessment of response; (3) ultimately, they also helped identify flows or 
lack of coherence in the different sources”. 
36 According to the Report, “While the emphasis is on vulnerabilities and areas for improvement, the analysis is forward-
looking and points to plans and measures going in the right direction, and identifies issues that require further attention. Good 
practices which might be an inspiration for others are highlighted. Some country chapters do, however, include a specific 
analysis of public procurement; this is the case for countries where substantial problems with public procurement have been 
identified”. Id. at 4. 
37 See for instance http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-
trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/docs/2014_acr_austria_chapter_en.pdf  
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1.2.3 Monitoring  
Sine 2014, the EU has counts on an EU Framework to strengthen the rule of law,38 which was adopted 
in the form of a Commission Communication COM(2014)158.39 The EU Framework can be seen as a 
‘monitoring’ instrument focused on the Commission’s assessment of specific national developments 
posing ‘systematic threats to the rule of law’. The Framework is founded on the Commission’s role in 
Article 7 TEU but does not provide for legally-binding outcomes, as it cannot alter the procedures 
described in that provision. The softness of the Framework, as well as its potentially disruptive legal 
effects (as the Framework had come to be perceived as a stage in the Article 7 TEU procedures, 
consequently making speedy deployment of that provision difficult) was criticised.40 It constitutes an 
even ‘softer’ instrument than those falling under scope of ‘evaluation/benchmarking’, and the 
monitoring of a specific threat to the rule of law is framed and followed by a predominantly political or 
dialogue-driven nature between the Commission and the Member State concerned.  
 
In the Annexes accompanying the Communication, the Commission underlined a number of important 
definitional or conceptual clarifications when it comes to the notion of rule of law in the EU legal system. 
Here, the Commission made express reference to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, which over the various decades of European integration has developed a body of legal 
principles comprising the flesh and bones of the EU legal system and its foundations.41  
 
The Communication underlines that “the Court indicates that the rule of law is the source of fully justiciable 
principles applicable within the EU legal system”, and by doing so ascribes to this notion an ‘EU-specific 
meaning’. The Commission highlighted the following legal principles as being particularly important 
in this context:  
 the principle of legality; 
 legal certainty; 
 prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers; 
 independent and effective judicial review, including respect for fundamental rights; 
 an operational separation of powers implying an independent and effective judicial review; 
 equality before the law. 
 
Moreover, the Commission underlined, “Mutual trust among EU Member States and their respective legal 
systems is the foundation of the Union. The way the rule of law is implemented at national level plays a key role 
in this respect”.42 The Communication also recalls the competence of the European Commission as 
‘guardian of the Treaties’ to ensure the respect of the values on which the EU is founded and of 
protecting the general interest of the Union. The EU Framework to strengthen the rule of law aims at 
guaranteeing “an effective and coherent protection of the rule of law in all Member States”.43 It is a crisis-driven 
framework of operation, “to address and resolve a situation where there is a systemic threat to the rule of law”.44 
 
                                                        
38 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/rule-of-law/index_en.htm. 
39 European Commission, Communication, A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, COM(2014)158, 
11.3.2014. 
40 For an overview of key arguments, see D. Kochenov, L. Pech and S. Platon, ‘Ni panacée, ni gadget: Le ‘nouveau 
cadre de l’Union européenne pour renforcer l’Etat de droit’, Revue trimestrielle de droit européen (2015), forthcoming. 
41 L. Pech, ‘The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union’, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 
04/09 (2009); M.L. Fernández Esteban, The Rule of Law in the European Constitution, The Hague: Kluwer, 1999. 
42 See page 2 of the Communication. 
43 Id. at 3.  
44 Id. 
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The objective is to prevent situations in EU Member States from reaching the level or scope of 
application envisaged in the previously mentioned Article 7 TEU. It is seen to complement and precede 
this Treaty provision. The Communication reminds the reader,  
 
Its scope (Article 7 TEU) is not confined to areas covered by EU law, but empowers the EU to 
intervene with the purpose of protecting the rule of law also in areas where Member States act 
autonomously. As explained in the Commission’s Communication on Article 7 TEU, this is justified 
by the fact that if a Member State breaches the fundamental values in a manner sufficiently serious 
to be caught by Article 7, this is likely to undermine the very foundation of the EU and the trust 
between its members, whatever the field in which the breach occurs.45 
 
When justifying the need for an EU Framework safeguarding the rule of law, the Commission 
Communication states that recent developments in EU Member States show that existing instruments 
are not “always appropriate to quickly respond to threats to the rule of law in a Member State. There are therefore 
situations where threats relating to the rule of law cannot be effectively addressed by existing instruments”.46  
 
How does the EU Framework work in practice?47 The Framework would be activated in those cases 
where EU Member States are about to adopt laws/policies or tolerate practices which can be expected 
to systematically and adversely affect or constitute a threat to the integrity, stability and proper 
functioning of their institutions in securing the rule of law. This would cover challenges to constitutional 
structures and the principle of the separation of powers; or cover questions related to the independence 
of the judiciary, including judicial review of government actions. The Framework therefore does not 
constitute a comparative and regular/periodic country to country assessment on the state of rule of law 
in the Union.48 
 
Figure 1 below provides a visual representation of the various phases comprising the Commission’s 
framework. It is composed of three main phases: 
1. The first step is the Commission assessment leading to a ‘rule of law opinion’ where the 
concerns are developed, and granting the concerned Member State the possibility to answer. 
2. If the controversy is not resolved, the Commission would issue a ‘rule of law recommendation’ 
providing a time limit for providing an answer to the concerns and ways to address them. 
3. The final step would be a follow-up or monitoring of the rule of law recommendation, which if 
not complied with could activate Article 7 TEU. 
 
On which basis does the Commission assess the rule of law threat? The Communication vaguely states 
that it will seek ‘external expertise’ and  
 
…will collect and examine all the relevant information and assess whether there are clear indications 
of a systemic threat to the rule of law as described above. This assessment can be based on the 
indications received from available sources and recognized institutions, including notably the bodies 
of the Council of Europe and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights.49 
                                                        
45 Reference is here made to the above mentioned Commission Communication COM(2003) 606 final. 
46 Id. at 6. 
47 For a detailed criticism, see, D. Kochenov and L. Pech, ‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the 
EU: Rhetoric and Reality’, 11 European Constitutional Law Review, 512–540 (2015). 
48 For an analysis see S. Carrera and E. Guild, Implementing the Lisbon Treaty: Improving the Functioning of the 
EU on Justice and Home Affairs, Study done for the European Parliament AFCO Committee, 2015, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/519225/IPOL_STU(2015)519225_EN.pdf. 
49 Page 7. Page 9 reads, “Depending on the situation, the Commission may decide to seek advice and assistance from members 
of the judicial networks in the EU, such as the networks of the Presidents of Supreme Courts of the EU23, the Association of 
the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the EU24 or the Judicial Councils25. The Commission will 
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Concerning inter-institutional relations and roles, the EU Framework only envisages that the 
Commission will keep the European Parliament and the Council “regularly and closely informed of progress 
made in each of the stages.”50 
Figure 1. The EU Rule of Law Framework in practice 
 
Source: Annex 2, Commission Communication, A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law COM(2014) 
158 final, 11.3.2014, at 4. 
 
The first case in which the EU Framework was used in practice was against Poland.51 During his 
intervention before the European Parliament’s Plenary Session in Strasbourg on 19 January 2016, Vice-
                                                        
examine, together with these networks, how such assistance could be provided swiftly where appropriate, and whether 
particular arrangements are necessary to that end. The Commission will, as a rule and in appropriate cases, seek the advice of 
the Council of Europe and/or its Venice Commission, and will coordinate its analysis with them in all cases where the matter 
is also under their consideration and analysis”.  
50 See page 8 of the Communication. 
51 Rule of law in Poland: Commission starts dialogue, 13 January 2016, 
http://ec.europa.eu/news/2016/01/20160113_en.htm, which states, “The College agreed to come back to the matter by 
mid-March, in close cooperation with the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. Echoing what President Juncker said 
last week, First Vice-President Timmermans underlined after the College meeting that this is not about accusations and 
polemics, but about finding solutions in a spirit of dialogue. He underlined his readiness to go to Warsaw in this context.” See 
also European Commission – Fact Sheet, College Orientation Debate on recent developments in Poland and the 
14 | BÁRD, CARRERA, GUILD & KOCHENOV 
 
President of the European Commission Frans Timmermans laid down the reasons why the Commission 
had decided to assess the recent developments in Poland from a rule of law perspective:  
 
I would like to stress firstly that we are at the beginning of the process under the framework. The 
framework has a preventive nature, and the start of a detailed, factual and legal assessment in no 
way implies any automatic move to decisions at later stages. That will depend purely on the facts – 
and answering us so quickly will help to stimulate that dialogue and to have a constructive dialogue 
with the Polish government. We will engage in the dialogue in an impartial, evidence-based and 
cooperative way. It goes without saying that the Commission fully respects the sovereignty of the 
Republic of Poland, and carries out its duties in an objective and non-partisan manner, as for any 
other Member State in line with the duties imposed on the Commission by treaties that were signed 
and ratified by sovereign states – the members of the European Union. Finally, we will conduct our 
assessment in close cooperation with the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.52 
 
It is most regrettable that the Commission did not conduct serious analysis of the likely effects of 
the deployment of the Framework in the context of the subsequent invocability of Article 7 TEU. 
Invoking the Framework against one of the two Member States obviously allows the second to 
sabotage the deployment of Article 7 TEU sanctions, which indirectly require unanimity in the 
Council, since Article 7(2) TEU procedure is a necessary prerequisite for their activation. In such a 
context, leaving one of the problematic Member States outside the ambit of the Rule of Law 
Framework effectively switches off Article 7 TEU, leaving the EU absolutely powerless, as far as 
enforcement goes, in the face of the challenges to the rule of law and other values.53 
 
1.2.4 Discussion/Dialogue  
The General Affairs Council of 16 December 2014 formally adopted Conclusions on ensuring respect 
for the rule of law and established a Rule of Law Dialogue between EU Member States. The idea was to 
set up “a political dialogue among Member States to promote and safeguard the rule of law within the EU.” 
Paragraph 5 of the Conclusions stated,  
 
[K]ey challenges that require particular and urgent attention include, in particular, judicial reform, 
the fight against organised crime and corruption, the freedom of expression and the media, the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities, the non-discriminatory treatment of national minorities, as well 
as tackling discrimination of vulnerable groups such as the Roma, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons. Further work is also required to promote gender equality 
and the rights of women. The Council looks forward to the completion of preparations aimed at 
candidate countries’ participation as observers in the work of the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency. 
The rule of law is also crucial for economic development and creating a favourable business 
environment and investment climate. 
 
It is important to underline that the Conclusions were jointly adopted by the Council and the Member 
States meeting in the Council. They call for the Dialogue to be driven by “the principles of objectivity, non 
discrimination and equal treatment of all Member States…(and to be) conducted on a non partisan and evidence-
based approach”.54 The Dialogue is organised by each of the relevant Presidencies once a year in the 
                                                        
Rule of Law Framework: Questions & Answers, Brussels, 13 January 2016 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-62_en.htm. 
52 Statement by First Vice-President Frans Timmermans and Commissioner Günther Oettinger – EP Plenary Session 
– Situation in Poland, Strasbourg, 19 January 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-
114_en.htm. 
53 D. Kochenov, ‘The Commission vs. Poland: The Sovereign State is Winning 1-0’, 25 January 2016, 
http://verfassungsblog.de/the-commission-vs-poland-the-sovereign-state-is-winning-1-0/. 
54 Refer to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Conclusions. 
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context of the General Affairs configurations, not those under Justice and Home Affairs. The Presidency 
prepares a concept note.55 The Dialogue is then organised by the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER) and it is of a purely intergovernmental nature. There is no formal role 
envisaged for the European Commission or the European Parliament in the session. The Commission 
is invited. The discussion takes place on ‘thematic subject matters’ and is closed-doors.  
 
The first Dialogue took place under the Luxembourg Presidency in the second half of 2015.56 The 
Discussion Papers which provided the background for the Dialogue of 17 November 2015 at the General 
Affairs Council focused on a presentation by the European Commission of the outcomes of its annual 
colloquium on fundamental rights “Tolerance and respect: preventing and combating anti-Semitic and 
anti-Muslim hatred in Europe” on 1-2 October 2015. Member States were then asked to “to share one 
example of a best practice and one example of a challenge encountered at national level in relation to the respect 
for the rule of law, as well as the approach to respond to that challenge.” Moreover, the Luxembourg 
Presidency distributed a discussion paper on “the rule of law in the age of digitalization” which aimed 
at combining “the two themes in an attempt to identify areas in the digital environment where the rule of law 
could be strengthened in a useful and sustainable way.” The following specific themes were examined: 
freedom of expression, internet governance, data protection and cybersecurity. One can only add that 
the choice of the topics for the ‘Dialogue’, made in the context of overwhelmingly serious backsliding 
and constitutional capture in at least two Member States, already provides a serious indication of the 
likely workability of this instrument for the promotion of the Rule of Law and other Article 2 TEU 
values.  
 
The Dutch Presidency is currently preparing the ground for the second Dialogue. A preparatory 
seminar was organised on 2 February 2016 in Strasbourg on migration and rule of law which aimed at 
fueling the next Dialogue.57 
1.3 An overview of UN and Council of Europe instruments  
This Section provides a synthesised overview of the detailed mapping contained in Annexes 1 and 3 of 
this Research Paper. The overview of relevant rule of law institutional structures, actors and 
mechanisms focuses on the following questions: Who? (Section 1.3.1.) What? (Section 1.3.2.) and How? 
(Section 1.3.3.) 
 
                                                        
55 Council of the European Union, Ensuring respect for the rule of law in the European Union, Brussels, 15206/14 
FREMP 198 JAI 846 COHOM 152 POLGEN 156, 14 November 2014 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/ 
srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015206%202014%20INIT. See the first substantive Presidency Discussion Papers which provided 
the basis for the first Dialogue: 13744/15 KR/tt 1 DGD 2C EN, Council of the European Union, Ensuring the respect 
for the rule of law – Dialogue and exchange of views, 9 November 2015 13744/15 JAI 821 FREMP 243, 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13744-2015-INIT/en/pdf. 
56 General Affairs Council, Meeting n°3427, 17-18 November 2015, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ 
meetings/gac/2015/11/17/, which states, “Ministers held their first annual rule of law dialogue which was established 
in December 2014. They exchanged views on their experiences of challenges in this area and of how best to respond. Ministers 
also specifically addressed the issue of the rule of law in the digital era. “The launch of the political dialogue on the rule of law 
was one of the priorities of the Luxembourg presidency”, said Jean Asselborn, adding: “I’m glad that the incoming Netherlands 
presidency is committed to follow up these efforts and to build on the exchange of views held today.” 
57 The Dutch Presidency Priorities state, “The Netherlands Presidency will work to ensure an open dialogue on the rule of 
law that helps foster a new culture which allows improvements to be made in this area in the member states. The second 
dialogue on the rule of law will take place in the Council during the Netherlands Presidency, following a seminar in Strasbourg 
in February on the rule of law and current political issues. An essential element of ensuring respect for the rule of law is the 
protection of fundamental rights as laid down in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Netherlands will devote specific 
attention to this during its Presidency by holding a seminar on the Charter’s application in member states’ legislative and 
policy processes”, 13. 
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1.3.1 Who?  
The composition of the non-judicial monitoring UN and CoE bodies can be summarised as follows: 
 
First, national experts ensure impartiality and independence from the State party or government, 
and have specific expertise on the issue/theme being monitored, usually in a Member State party to 
the relevant system.  
 
In the context of the CoE, the Venice Commission is an independent consultative body composed of 
independent experts, serving in their individual capacity, and having achieved ‘eminence’ through their 
experience in democratic institutions or scholarship. Venice Commission experts “shall serve in their 
individual capacity and not receive or accept any instructions”. The members of the European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) are required to have high moral authority and 
recognised expertise in dealing with issues related to racism, discrimination, etc. Similar qualities of 
impartiality and independence are required of ECRI members.  
 
Similar features apply to members of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT). Its members come from different backgrounds, 
a number equal to that of the parties, and shall be chosen on the basis of their high moral character, 
competence in human rights and professional experience in prison and police matters covered by the 
Convention. The composition of the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice relies on experts 
who can best contribute to its aims and functions and have in-depth knowledge of the administration, 
functioning and efficiency of justice. Each member of the CoE shall appoint an expert to the CEPEJ. 
 
Similar qualities are required of members of the UN Treaty Bodies (see Annex 3 for a detailed overview), 
which by and large need to ensure their independence, acknowledged impartiality and specific 
expertise in the subjects covered by the relevant UN Convention or Covenant, and more generally 
human rights. As Table 3 below shows, UN Treaty bodies’ composition varies from 10 to 20 members. 
Table 3. Composition of UN Treaty Bodies 
Committee Membership Current number of State parties 
CERD 18 175 
Human Rights Committee 18 167 
CESCR 18 160 
CEDAW 23 187 
CAT 10 153 
CRC 18 193 
CMW 14 46 
SPT 25 67 
CRPD 18 129 
CED 10 37 
Source: UN, International Human Rights Instruments, Overview of the human rights treaty body system and 
working methods related to the review of State parties, 12 April 2013. 
 
Second, some monitoring actors are directly elected by the institutions composing the supranational 
actor. In the CoE context, the Commissioner for Human Rights is elected by the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the CoE, on the basis of candidates submitted by State parties. Similarly to the qualifications and 
qualities of national experts participating in other supranational monitoring bodies, the Commissioners 
are “eminent personalities of high moral character having recognized expertise in the field of human 
rights, a public record of attachment to the values of CoE and personal authority”.  
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The members of the CPT are elected by the Committee of Ministers, from a list of names drawn up by 
the Consultative Assembly of the CoE. Each national delegation of State parties puts forward three 
names.  
 
Third, nomination by State parties. There are other instances where the members are nominated 
directly by State governments. The members of the European Committee for Social Cohesion, Human 
Dignity and Equality (CDDECS) are representatives of CoE States. The governments designate one 
representative “of the highest possible rank and expertise in the relevant fields”. In the UN context, 
members of the UN Treaty Bodies are usually nominated by State parties, yet they serve in their 
personal capacities.  
 
Fourth, Member States’ representatives are appointed to monitoring bodies following mutual 
evaluation or peer review assessments. This is the case of the CoE Group of States against Corruption. 
Each State party nominates a delegation of two representatives who will participate in evaluation teams. 
 
Fifth, individual or working group model. Both in the context of the UN and the CoE, the model can 
be based on an individual or a team of experts or working group. Instances of individual models include 
the above-mentioned Commissioner for Human Rights. In the framework of the UN there are further 
examples, such as the Special Rapporteur or ‘Individual Expert’ model in the so-called Human Rights 
Council (Special Procedures). Special Rapporteurs are appointed by the Human Rights Council, in their 
personal capacities and have shown a special competence and expertise on specific themes that they 
cover. They have thematic or country-based mandates.58 
1.3.2 What? 
Both in the UN and CoE contexts, the monitoring systems focus generally on ensuring that State parties 
comply with their statuses, conventions/covenants and treaties and legal standards. When it comes to 
the ‘what’ question, human rights constitutes a central common dimension in the work that both 
supranational organisations carry out.  
 
This is the case for instance when it comes to the CoE Parliamentary Assembly Monitoring Committee. 
Similarly, the UN Universal Period Review, and the Special Procedures, focuses on the extent to which 
States respect their human rights obligations provided by the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and human rights instruments to which the State is party. The monitoring results, 
conclusions and recommendations resulting from UN Special Procedures and Treaty bodies feed into 
the work of the Universal Period Review (UPR). 
 
Sometimes, there are Committees dedicated to monitoring aspects of work that cover specific fields of 
action, such as the CoE Committee for Social Cohesion, Human Dignity and Equality (CDDECS), which 
focuses on CoE work in these domains. This sectoral approach becomes more important in the scope of 
the Treaty bodies system in the UN, which plays a key role in the wider UN institutional setting outlined 
in Table 4 below. (Annex 3 shows in detail UN human rights treaty bodies that focus on monitoring the 
application of specific conventions and covenants.) 
 
 
 
                                                        
58 http://spinternet.ohchr.org/_Layouts/SpecialProceduresInternet/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx?Type=TM 
(Thematic Mandates); 
http://spinternet.ohchr.org/_Layouts/SpecialProceduresInternet/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx (Country 
Mandates). 
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Table 4. UN institutional landscape 
Charter Bodies Treaty Bodies 
Human Rights Council Human Rights Committee 
Universal Periodic Review Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
Human Rights Council (HRC) Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
Special Procedures of the HRC Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
HRC Complaint Procedure Committee against Torture 
 Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture  
 Committee on the Rights of the Child 
 Committee on Migrant Workers 
 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
 Committee on Enforced Disappearances 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Table 5. UN Treaty Bodies and Relevant Convention/Covenant Monitored 
Treaty Bodies Conventions/Covenants  
Human Rights Committee International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR)  
International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) 
International Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Racial Discrimination 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 
Committee against Torture (CAT) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment  
Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (SPT) Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture 
(OPCAT) 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention on the Rights of the Child and Optional 
Protocols 
Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
(ICRMW) 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD) 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 
Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED) International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICPPED) 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
In the context of the CoE, the angle of ‘democratic rule of law’ comes into the picture as a way to ensure 
human rights protection, i.e. effective implementation and delivery of human rights.  
 
The Venice Commission focuses on “the guarantees offered by the law in the service of democracy” and 
the promotion of ‘rule of law’ and ‘democracy’ (see Table 6 below). The Venice Commission pays 
particular attention to the health check of the constitutional, legislative and administrative principles 
and practices. Efficiency of democratic and judicial institutions constitute a core dimension of work. The 
Venice Commission also pays attention to citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms when it comes to 
their participation in public life. ‘Democracy’ is here a key additional angle that falls under the material 
scope of its mandate, which includes actions in the electoral field.  
 
Some monitoring actors focus on specific themes, which have direct and indirect ramifications for rule 
of law related aspects. CEPEJ focuses on the efficiency, fairness and practical 
implementation/functioning of the judicial system of Member States, for the purpose of ensuring that 
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every person can enforce their legal rights effectively. It also covers facilitating a better implementation 
of CoE legal instruments and standards. This aims at fostering citizens’ trust in the justice systems. 
 
Also in the CoE, bodies like GRECO primarily focus on a specific field, i.e. corruption. Yet, they have 
the mandate to tackle the subject from a rule of law perspective. This is the case in its fourth evaluation 
round which deals with “the prevention of corruption in respect of members of parliament, judges and 
prosecutors”. (See Annex 1 for a detailed overview of GRECO.) GRECO aims at improving State parties’ 
capacity to fight corruption. It pays special attention to the implementation of the Guiding Principles 
for the Fight against Corruption adopted by the Council of Ministers in November 1997, and the 
implementation of international legal instruments. 
Table 6. CoE actors  
Institutions 
(including relevant 
Committees) 
Partial Agreements 
(not including all 
Member States) 
Theme Specific 
Body 
European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) 
European Commission for 
Democracy through Law 
(Venice Commission) 
European Commission 
against Racism and 
Xenophobia (ECRI) 
Parliamentary Assembly 
(Monitoring Committee) 
Group of States against 
Corruption (GRECO) 
 
Commissioner for Human 
Rights 
The European Commission for 
the Efficiency of Justice 
(CEPEJ) 
 
European Committee for Social 
Cohesion, Human Dignity and 
Equality (CDDECS) 
  
European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture (CPT) 
  
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
1.3.3 How? 
Each of the actors or bodies involved in monitoring systems and instruments in the context of the UN 
and CoE present their own specificities as regards the procedures and methods deployed when 
conducting the States parties’ assessment and evaluation. The following procedures can be broadly 
distinguished: 
 
1.3.3.1 State parties reporting 
A specific featuring component of the UN Treaty body system is that it is based on the reporting by the 
member countries to the relevant Committees. State parties are under the obligation to submit regular 
reports to the Committees on which rights under the relevant legal instrument are being implemented 
(with the exception of SPT, which does not require this task). This procedure and method of assessment 
shifts the burden of proof to the States and not the monitoring body.  
 
The reporting systems by States are usually organised around a list of issues (LOI) which are key themes 
of principal concern prepared by the respective Treaty bodies’ structures. The LOI is intended to give 
the government a preliminary indication of the issues that the Committee considers to be priorities for 
discussion. The LOI may take an article by article approach (CED and CEDAW), or be shaped around 
specific thematic priorities (Human Rights Committee). The LOI is not self-exclusionary as regards the 
material scope of the country assessment, as it does not generally restrict the dialogue with the State 
concerned as regards the issues to be tackled or monitored. 
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The kind of replies which are required from State parties vary from body to body. Some oblige them to 
reply in written form to the specific LOI (e.g. CEDAW, CESCR, CMW, CRC, CRPD and the Human 
Rights Committee), while others do not emphasise or envisage that duty (e.g. CAT, CED and CERD). 
In order to facilitate the reporting process, a majority of Treaty bodies have delivered reporting 
guidelines (common core document) which States are invited to use when submitting reports. 
 
The usual procedure foresees the presence of representatives or a delegation of State parties. The 
procedures in UN Treaty bodies are in general open to the public and ensure a high degree of public 
accountability (open to media as well). The country reports are discussed and examined in public 
hearings. The number and kind of sessions vary from body to body.59 The following procedures are 
shared by all the Treaty bodies in the framework of the so-called ‘constructive dialogue’ with State 
parties: 
 
(a) The State party is invited to send a delegation to attend the meetings at which the committee will 
consider the State party’s report; 
(b) The head of the delegation is invited to introduce the report and provide information on 
developments since its submission in a brief opening statement. Some committees, such as the 
Human Rights Committee, request the delegation to provide an oral summary of the State party’s 
written replies to the lists of issues; 
(c) Members of the committee, usually led by the country rapporteur(s) or country report task force 
members, raise questions on specific aspects of the report that are of particular concern and/or 
in relation to the oral summary of the written replies to the list of issues.60 
 
Sometimes this is preceded by a pre-sessional working group or system, which convenes some time 
before the formal meeting of the relevant Committee, and which identifies in advance the relevant 
questions and draft list of ‘key issues’ which will constitute the principal focus of the dialogue. The pre-
sessional working group usually leads to the adoption and enactment of the LOI (e.g. CRC, Human 
Rights Committee, CESCR). The UN Treaty body committees usually appoint a country rapporteur who 
is responsible for steering the implementation of the various phases of the monitoring procedure. 
 
During the phases preceding the preparation of reports by State parties, the Committees often consult 
with national human rights associations (NHRAs) and civil society organisations (CSOs), which provide 
additional information in the work of the Committee (e.g. CAT). 
 
The majority of Treaty bodies have the mandate to assess the reports submitted initially and periodically 
by State parties. The specific ‘periodicity’ in the reporting procedures varies from Treaty body and 
instrument, as outlined in Table 7 below. Usually, there is an initial reporting shortly after accession 
and this is followed by periodical reporting procedures. Three of the UN treaty bodies have adopted 
                                                        
59 According to UN, International Human Rights Instruments, Overview of the human rights treaty body system 
and working methods related to the review of State parties, 12 April 2013, “The number of sessions that each 
committee holds annually varies. Moreover, some committees have been given additional sessions or meeting time 
to address the backlog of reports and individual communications awaiting consideration. For example, CESCR will 
have one four-week session in 2013-2014, following the endorsements and approvals in General Assembly 
resolution 67/246. The General Assembly has also authorized CAT to hold two four-week sessions per year in 2011-
2012 (resolution 65/204); CERD to convene two four-week sessions from August 2009 until 2011 (resolution 
63/243); CEDAW to hold three three-week annual sessions and a one-week pre-sessional working group meeting 
for each session, for an interim period effective from January 2010, pending the entry into force of the amendment 
to article 20, paragraph 1, of the Convention (resolution 62/218); CRPD to hold two sessions per year, consisting of 
one one-week session and one two-week session (resolution 66/229). Since November 2012, CED convenes two 
two-week sessions per year.” 
60 Quoted from UN, International Human Rights Instruments, Overview of the human rights treaty body system 
and working methods related to the review of States parties, 12 April 2013. 
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so-called ‘simplified reporting procedures’:61 “All committees, except CMW, have adopted the practice of 
proceeding with the examination of the situation regarding the implementation of the relevant treaty by a State 
party even when no report has been received”.62  
Table 7. Reporting periodicity under the treaties 
Treaty Body Initial reports (years) Periodicity of reports 
ICERD 1 2 
ICCPR 1 3, 4, 5 or 6 
ICESCR 2 5 
CEDAW 1 4 
CAT 1 4 
CRC 2 5 
CRC-OPAC 2 Integrated into next CRC report, 
every five years; every five years for 
States not party to the CRC 
CRC-OPSC 2 Integrated into next CRC report, 
every five years; every five years for 
States not party to the CRC 
ICRMW 1 5 
CRPD 2 4 
CED 2 -- 
Source: UN, International Human Rights Instruments, Overview of the human rights treaty body system and 
working methods related to the review of State parties, 12 April 2013. 
 
The dialogue with State delegations broadly takes place in the scope of thematic debates or days of 
general discussion. As regards the considerations of State parties’ reports, the UN publication states,  
 
All the treaty bodies have adopted broadly the same approach towards the consideration of States 
parties’ reports, the main features of which are the constructive dialogue, in which the respective 
committee engages with a delegation from the State party whose report is under consideration, and 
the adoption of concluding observations, which acknowledge progress made and indicate to the 
State party where further action is required. However, there is still considerable variation in how the 
treaty bodies consider their States parties’ reports. 
 
The phase of ‘constructive dialogue’ with State parties leads to the drafting by the relevant Committee 
of so-called ‘concluding observations’, i.e. “all treaty bodies have adopted the practice established by CESCR 
in 1990 of formulating concluding observations or comments following the consideration of a State party’s 
report.”63 These include “introduction; positive aspects; principal subjects of concern; suggestions and 
recommendations.” State parties may submit comments on the concluding observations.  
 
Moreover, all Treaty bodies lay down their views on the actual content of the obligations taken by State 
parties in the shape of so-called ‘general comments’, which are based on Treaties concerned and their 
rules of procedure, which often relate to a specific article, provision or theme.64 The concluding 
observations usually follow and are presented in a similar thematic structure. They include positive 
                                                        
61 “In May 2007, CAT adopted a new, simplified and optional reporting procedure which consists in the preparation 
of a List of issues prior to reporting (LOIPR) to be transmitted to States parties prior to the submission of their 
respective periodic report (see A/62/44, paras 23-24). In October 2009 and in April 2011 respectively, the Human 
Rights Committee and the Committee on Migrant Workers also adopted this optional procedure”, 6, paragraph 17. 
62 Id. at 15. 
63 Id. at 14. 
64 See for instance CESCR outline for drafting general comments (E/2000/22, annex IX). 
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aspects (areas where progress has been achieved), factors and difficulties/challenges impeding the 
implementation, main issues of concern and suggestions and recommendations.  
1.3.3.2 Expert groups 
The CoE Venice Commission uses a monitoring method which is based on an expert group/commission 
model. The experts carry out legal analysis or research on the compliance of State parties’ draft pieces 
of legislation or laws already in force which are brought to its consideration. The group is assisted by a 
secretariat in the preparation of draft opinions and studies, which are then discussed and adopted at 
the Committee’s plenary sessions. Several actors can request an Opinion to the Venice Commission: 
Member States, Council of Europe (Secretary General, Committee of Ministers, Parliamentary Assembly 
and Congress of Local and Regional Authorities), international organisations, which include the EU and 
OSCE. 
 
The result of the assessment will result in an Opinion. Annex 3 outlines the specific phases comprising 
the procedure for the elaboration and adoption of an Opinion by the Venice Commission. The Opinion 
issued by the Venice Commission is usually structured around the following sections: preliminary 
remarks, analysis (general and specific remarks) and conclusions, which include outstanding issues, 
concerns and recommendations to the State party. Interestingly, in light of the current rule of law 
controversy with Poland, the Venice Commission has recently received a request by Poland on the 
constitutional issues addressed in the amendments to the Act on the Constitutional Court of 25 June 
2015.65 
1.3.3.3 Evaluation: indicators and benchmarking  
CEPEJ provides an example of a monitoring system based on benchmarking methodology. The 
assessment of State parties’ judicial systems is based on a set of ‘common principles’, and comprises 
common statistical criteria and ‘other means of evaluation’. CEPEJ has developed a biennial evaluation 
using a “Scheme for evaluating judicial systems”. The evaluation scheme, which aims at identifying 
‘areas of possible improvement’ and ‘problems’, is supplied with data by CEPEJ’s members/national 
correspondents (which by and large correspond with national Ministries of Justice). Their responses are 
analysed and processed by the CEPEJ Secretariat.  
 
The scheme is composed by six general indicators: demographic and economic data (number of 
inhabitants, GDP, budget allocated to courts, etc.); legal aid (access to justice, including number of legal 
aid cases), organisation of the court system and the public prosecution (including number of judges and 
prosecutors, level of computer facilities); the performance and workload of courts and the public 
prosecution (including number of cases related to Article 6 ECHR, number of civil and administrative 
law cases, number of cases received and treated by the public prosecutor, number of criminal cases); 
execution of court decisions and legal and judicial reform. On the basis of this method CEPEJ analyses 
quantitative and qualitative data and produces reports, statistics, ‘best practices’, guidelines, action 
plans, opinions and general comments.  
 
CEPEJ data feeds into the so-called ‘EU Justice Scoreboard’, which among its various data sources uses 
information provided by EU Member States using the CEPEJ methodology.66 The 2015 edition of the 
EU Justice Scoreboard states,  
 
                                                        
65 European Commission for Democracy through Law, (Venice Commission), Draft Opinion on Amendments to 
the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland, Opinion No. 833/2015, Cdl(2016)003, 26 February 
2016 
66 The 2015 EU Justice Scoreboard, retrievable from http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-
justice/files/justice_Scoreboard_2015_en.pdf. 
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Most of the quantitative data are currently provided by the Council of Europe Commission for the 
Evaluation of the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) with which the Commission has concluded a contract 
in order to carry out a specific annual study. These data are from 2013 and have been provided by 
Member States according to the CEPEJ methodology. This year the data have been collected by 
CEPEJ specifically for EU Member States. The study also provides country fiches which give more 
context and should be read together with the figures.67 
1.3.3.4 Mutual evaluation and peer-review 
One of the instruments assessed in the context of the CoE uses a mutual evaluation or peer-review 
method of monitoring and evaluation, i.e. GRECO. The Group of States against Corruption implements 
a ‘horizontal evaluation procedure’ where all State parties are evaluated in the same round and which 
consists of a system of ‘mutual evaluation’. So far GRECO has launched four evaluation rounds. Each 
member identifies a maximum of five experts who will be able to perform the evaluation tasks in the 
scope of ‘evaluation teams’. A questionnaire is elaborated for each evaluation round, which provides 
the framework for the evaluation procedure. The evaluation teams will examine the answers to the 
questionnaire and can request additional information from the member State parties. This is 
accompanied by ‘country visits’ following the instruction of GRECO for the purpose of gathering extra 
information related to law or practical elements (with two months’ prior notice). The results of the 
procedure are ‘evaluation reports’, which are confidential in nature. 
 
The European Commission has used GRECO data in its 2014 Anti-Corruption Report,68 which states,  
 
The Commission was determined to avoid duplicating existing reporting mechanisms and adding 
to the administrative burden on Member States which are subject to various resource intensive peer 
review evaluations (GRECO, OECD, UNCAC, FATF, Moneyval). The report is therefore not based 
on detailed questionnaires or expert country visits. It is based on the abundance of information 
available from existing monitoring mechanisms, together with data from other sources including 
national public authorities, research carried out by academic institutions, independent experts, think-
tanks, civil society organisations etc.69 
 
                                                        
67 Id. at 5. For the information used by the Commission in conducting the Scoreboard it is stated that “[w]hen 
preparing the EU Justice Scoreboard for 2015, the European Commission asked the Council of Europe’s 
Commission for the Evaluation of the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) to produce a Study on the functioning of judicial 
systems in the EU Member States, Facts and figures from the CEPEJ questionnaires 2010-2012-2013. The Commission also 
made use of field studies that were commissioned to external contractors for this purpose: Case study on the 
functioning of enforcement proceedings relating to judicial decisions in Member States and study on the economic efficiency 
and legal effectiveness of review and remedies procedures for public contracts”, quoted from The EU Justice Scoreboard: 
Towards more effective justice systems in the EU, 9 March 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/effective-
justice/news/150309_en.htm. Refer to European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) (2015), Study on 
the functioning of judicial systems in the EU Member States Facts and figures from the CEPEJ questionnaires 2010-
2012-2013, CEPEJ(2014)17final (v2.0 – 16 feb.2015), 16 February 2015. See Annex 3 of the CEPEJ study which 
provides an ‘Extract of the CEPEJ Scheme for evaluating Judicial Systems’, 867 and ss. 
68 European Commission, EU Anti-Corruption Report, COM(2014) 38 final, 3 February 2014. For more information 
refer to http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/ 
corruption/anti-corruption-report/index_en.htm. 
69 It also emphasises, “The report does not replicate the detailed, technical analysis included in GRECO or the OECD reports, 
though it builds upon their recommendations whenever they are still not implemented and relevant to key issues in focus as 
identified for a particular country chapter. By bringing to the fore selected recommendations that have been previously 
identified within other mechanisms, the report aims at promoting their implementation. The synergy with GRECO is 
particular important given that it covers all EU Member States as well as other European countries of relevance for future 
enlargement and the Eastern Partnership. The Commission is currently taking measures which will allow full accession of the 
EU in the future, allowing also for closer cooperation in view of subsequent editions of the EU Anti-Corruption Report”, at 
41. 
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1.3.3.5 Country visits 
The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CPT) uses a country visit model in its monitoring competences. The CPT organises visits 
to places of detention to examine treatment of individuals who are deprived of their liberty. CPT 
members are to be given unlimited access to any national detention facilities and can carry out 
interviews and communications with any domestic actor or person of relevance for their assessment of 
the situation in the context at issue.  
 
The visit leads to the elaboration of a country general report which will lay down the facts (findings), 
taking account of the observations provided by the State party, and recommendations to address the 
situation, along with comments and requests for further information, if necessary. The general reports 
are developed following a set of thematic standards which deal with law enforcement agencies, prisons, 
psychiatric institutions, immigration detention, juveniles deprived of their liberty under criminal 
investigation, women deprived of their liberty, documenting and reporting medical evidence of ill-
treatment, combating impunity and electrical discharge weapons. 
1.3.4 Follow-up 
1.3.4.1 UN 
The UN Treaty system provides a toolbox of follow-up special procedures and institutional 
arrangements intended to ensure the implementation by State parties of the suggestions and 
recommendations resulting from the several monitoring venues and procedures (Annex 3 provides a 
detailed overview). The status of the ‘follow-up’ procedures are provided in a chart which is maintained 
on the websites of the Committees. 
 
Some UN Committees use a special ‘follow-up’ procedure on the implementation of the conclusions 
and recommendations submitted to State parties.70 That is the case, for instance, of CAT, CERD, CED, 
CEDAW and the Human Rights Committee. These generally require State parties to provide data on 
how their recommendations have been followed up or implemented.71 Some Treaty bodies issue 
recommendations on how State parties can better ensure the implementation of a specific Convention 
or Covenant. Some recommendations may require ‘immediate action’ by the State concerned and 
require reporting back in a period of one year (e.g. the Human Rights Committee). Some Committees 
(e.g. CERD) may request additional information or even a new written report on the implementation of 
their recommendations.  
 
The Human Rights Committee elaborates a follow-up progress report for every session, which in 
addition to information on follow-up actions includes additional data provided by civil society 
organisations (see Annex 2 for more information).72 It appoints a special rapporteur to report back to 
the Committee on the information received by the State party on implementation of the 
recommendations issued. In cases of non-cooperation by the government, the special rapporteur may 
call for a meeting with a representative of the State party. The Human Rights Committee has developed 
                                                        
70 For a full overview by Committee refer to 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/FollowUpProcedure.aspx. 
71 “In addition to indicating the time frame for follow-up to specific recommendations, CERD also draws the 
attention of the State party concerned to a few recommendations of particular importance and requests detailed 
information their implementation in the next periodic report. CAT invites States parties concerned to accept to 
report under the optional reporting procedure within a one-year time frame, in order to prepare the list of issues 
prior to reporting in a timely manner”, at 14. 
72 Id. at 3.  
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a table containing all the relevant information concerning follow-up procedures with State parties since 
July 2006. 
 
In all its concluding observations the CESCR asks the State to report back on implementation issues in 
the next periodic reporting exercise. It may also request that the State provide more detailed information 
or statistics on specific follow-up issues before the next reporting period. CESCR can ask a State party 
to implement a technical assistance mission (composed by Committee members). If the State is not 
willing to collaborate in the procedure, the CESCR can refer the issue to the Economic and Social 
Council.  
 
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has had a follow-up 
procedure since 2008, which calls on States to provide follow-up information on how they have taken 
steps to address its recommendations within a period of one or two years. Similar to the Human Rights 
Committee, it also appoints a rapporteur on follow-up and a deputy rapporteur who monitors and 
examines the follow-up information. A similar special procedure is practised by the Committee against 
Torture (CAT), which appoints a rapporteur to follow up on the State party’s compliance with requests 
and sends reminders to the governments concerned. Other UN Treaty bodies also appoint a rapporteur 
to follow up and report back to the Committee about activities (e.g. The Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities and the Committee on Enforced Disappearances). 
 
Despite the development of ‘special follow-up procedures’ by UN Treaty bodies, there is evidence that 
some State parties do not comply with their reporting obligations. A clear example is the CAT Annual 
Report (2014-15: Chapter II), which states, 
 
The Committee deplores the fact that that some States parties do not comply with their reporting 
obligations under article 19 of the Convention. At the time of reporting, there were 28 States parties 
with overdue initial reports and 37 States parties with overdue periodic reports. 
 
The same Annual Report makes reference to the oral report to the Committee by the Rapporteur in 
November 2014, which reads, 
 
…[I]n the light of the treaty body strengthening process and the Convention against Torture Initiative 
to ensure universal ratification within 10 years, it was incumbent upon the Committee to enhance 
the follow-up procedure. [The Rapporteur] also said that two overriding questions were how to 
strengthen compliance with the Convention and how to measure the extent of that compliance. In 
May 2015, he suggested that the follow-up procedure could be strengthened in several ways, such 
as by making the recommendations clearer and more implementable, inviting State parties to meet 
with the Committee on follow-up, using an assessment grading system to evaluate compliance, and 
using quantitative indicators to assist with the assessment of implementation. He also highlighted 
the role of civil society organizations in the follow-up procedure.73 
 
Some UN Treaty bodies do not have special follow-up procedures. For instance, the only follow-up 
tools available to the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture (SPT) in cases where a State party 
refuses to cooperate and take steps to address its recommendations is to request CAT to make a public 
statement on the matter and publish the SPT country report. The Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) does not have a general obligation or special procedure either. Still, the State is ‘expected’ to send 
the Committee written information on how it has addressed its recommendations. CRC can send ‘any 
relevant information’ and reports to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), International Labour Organization (ILO), 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health 
                                                        
73 Page 17 of the annual report. 
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Organisation (WHO) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
containing requests or calling for the need to ensure technical assistance/advice to the country 
concerned. CRC has informed State parties that in cases where they do not submit the necessary 
information the Committee will in any case consider the situation of child rights in the State. UNICEF 
contributes to the follow-up of concluding observations by CRC. 
 
As stated above, the monitoring results, conclusions and recommendations resulting from UN Special 
Procedures and Treaty bodies feed into the work of the Universal Period Review (UPR). The State under 
review is expected to provide information on its actions to address the recommendations made by the 
UPR first review. In cases of persistent non-cooperation by State parties, the Human Rights Council 
may decide on the appropriate measures to take. 
1.3.4.2 Council of Europe 
The Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly has at its disposal the possibility to penalise 
‘persistent failures’ by Member States to comply with their obligations and lacking cooperation in 
monitoring processes. It may adopt a Resolution and/or Recommendation “by the non-ratification of 
the credentials of a national parliamentary delegation or by the annulment of ratified credentials”. In 
case of persistence, the Assembly may submit a recommendation to the Committee of Ministers for 
taking appropriate actions (see Annex 3 for more details on specific actions). 
 
Some CoE monitoring bodies have no formal procedures for ensuring the implementation of their 
conclusions and recommendations by State parties. This is the case, for instance, of the Venice 
Commission and CEPEJ, which do not have any specific follow-up procedure. The Venice Commission 
only offers facultative assistance to State parties to implement its opinions and recommendations.  
 
GRECO does provide a more elaborate procedure for following, via a graduated approach, the 
implementation of its recommendations by governments. GRECO has the competence to re-examine 
outstanding recommendations and issue compliance reports, which may include an overall conclusion 
on the implementation of all the recommendations. GRECO can also issue public statements when a 
member remains passive or has taken insufficient action to address its recommendations. Similarly, the 
CPT may deliver a public statement in cases where a party fails to cooperate or refuses to improve the 
situation in light of its recommendations. 
1.4 Scholarly approaches to overcoming challenges  
The Union’s vulnerabilities when it comes to safeguarding its values are fundamental in nature and 
pose a very serious threat to the success of the whole integration project. Given the perceived novel 
nature of the threat – as the adherence to the values of Article 2 TEU had been taken for granted before 
the backsliding of several Member States in recent years74 – simply falling back on the old time-tested 
approaches is not an option: academic literature had until recently focused exclusively on the Union’s 
                                                        
74 The term has been coined by Jan-Werner Müller, see J.-W. Müller, ‘Safeguarding Democracy inside the EU: 
Brussels and the Future of Liberal Order’ Working Paper No. 3, Washington DC: Transatlantic Academy (2013).  
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own adherence to the rule of law75 and the candidate countries’ records in this area,76 assuming that any 
– indeed, all – serious rule of law deficiencies within each EU Member State would be dealt with by the 
relevant national authorities.  
 
The problems we are currently facing were thus largely unforeseen in ‘a Community based on the rule 
of law’,77 all the instruments described above notwithstanding. Academics and policy-makers have 
however quickly caught up with the issue of rule of law backsliding and constitutional capture in the 
EU and formulated an array of proposals of how to deal with the outstanding problems.78 
 
The majority of proposals focus on institutional action, either within the context of the Union, or with 
the involvement of outside actors and institutions. The first types of proposals include the actions by 
both existing institutions – the Council,79 the European Commission,80 the Fundamental Rights Agency 
of the EU81 – and actions by institutions yet to be created, such as the proposed ‘Copenhagen 
Commission’.82 Reliance on the Member States’ courts83 and a potential fine-tuning of the EU’s powers 
                                                        
75 L. Pech, ‘The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union’, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 
04/09, (2009); M. L. Fernández Esteban, The Rule of Law in the European Constitution, The Hague: Kluwer, 1999. One 
has to note here that such accounts have always been self-congratulatory, marking an important weakness of 
scholarship on this, given that a much more critical account is also possible. Once the EU’s own adherence to the 
rule of law and other values is not merely presumed but tested empirically, numerous questions arise: G. 
Palombella, ‘Beyond Legality – before Democracy: Rule of Law Caveats in the EU Two-Level System’, in: C. Closa 
and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016, forthcoming; D. Kochenov, ‘EU Law without the Rule of Law: Is the Veneration of Autonomy Worth 
It?’, Yearbook of European Law, 2015; A. Williams, ‘Taking Values Seriously: Towards a Philosophy of EU Law’ 29 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 549–577 (2009). 
76 E.g. D. Kochenov, ‘Behind the Copenhagen Façade. The Meaning and Structure of the Copenhagen Criterion of 
Democracy and the Rule of Law’, 8 European Integration online Papers 10 (2004). 
77 Case 294/83 Partie Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para. 23. 
78 For brief overviews, see C. Closa, D. Kochenov and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight in the 
European Union’, 2014/25 RSCAS Working Paper (2014); EPRS briefing ‘Member States and the rule of law Dealing 
with a breach of EU values’ (2015) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/554167/ 
EPRS_BRI(2015)554167_EN.pdf. For more in-depth analyses, see the contributions in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov 
(eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, 
forthcoming; A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
79 Council of the European Union, Press Release no. 16936/14, 3362nd Council meeting, General Affairs, Brussels, 
16 December 2014, 20–21; E. Hirsch-Ballin, ‘Mutual Trust: The Virtue of Reciprocity Strengthening the Acceptance 
of the Rule of Law through Peer Review’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in 
the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
80 K.L. Scheppele, ‘Enforcing the Basic Principles of EU Law through Systemic Infringement Actions’, in: C. Closa 
and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016, forthcoming (outlining how to empower the Commission to intervene in the cases related to the breach 
of Art. 2 TEU based on a so-called ‘systemic infringement procedure’, allowing for a more effective deployment of 
Art. 258 TFEU). 
81 G.N. Toggenburg and J. Grimheden, ‘The Rule of Law and the Role of Fundamental Rights: Seven Practical 
Pointers’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
82 J.-W. Müller, ‘Should the European Union Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law in Its Member States’ 21 
European Law Journal 2, 141–160, (2015); J.-W. Müller, ‘The EU as a Militant Democracy’, Revista de Estudios 
Políticos,141–162, (2014). 
83 A. von Bogdandy, M. Kottmann, C. Antpöhler, J. Dickschen, S. Hentrei, M. Smrkolj, ‘Reverse Solange–Protecting 
the essence of fundamental rights against EU Member States’ 49 Common Market Law Review, 2, 489–519 (2012). For 
analyses, see J. Croon-Gestefeld, ‘Reverse Solange – Union Citizenship as a Detour on the Route to European Rights 
Protection against National Infringements’, in: D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming; D. Kochenov, ‘On Policing Article 2 TEU Compliance 
– Reverse Solange and Systemic Infringements Analyzed’, XXXIII Polish Yearbook of International Law, 145–170 (2014). 
See also an upgraded versions of this proposal: A. von Bogdandy, C. Antpöhler, J. Dickschen, S. Hentrei, M. 
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through a broad interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU84 by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union have also been advocated. The proposals of the second type look to the outside, 
arguing for the involvement of the Venice Commission.85 
 
Not all of the proposals fall within these two categories. Two proposals on the table are Member State-
focused and go beyond mere supranational/international involvement, focusing on what the Member 
States themselves can do. The first among the two expects the Member States to take the lead in bringing 
systemic infringement actions to the Court of Justice,86 while the second investigates Member States’ 
direct retaliation against backsliding peers, grafting the alien tissue of reciprocity on the body of the EU 
legal order.87 A watered down version of direct Member State involvement is the encouragement of 
peer-review among them, which, however, is most likely to happen within the framework of the 
Council, bringing us back to the main bulk of the proposals: those focusing on the institutions. 
 
Besides the legally-articulated ways, there is of course always a possibility of ad hoc actions, akin to the 
kind that marked the EU’s involvement in Austrian politics 15 years ago in reaction to the building of a 
governing coalition in that State, which involved the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), an extreme 
right nationalist party, which was still unusual in the political context of the time, but now looks to 
some degree as a strange exaggeration.88 We leave such possible ad hoc actions outside the scope of this 
Research Paper, noting only that their legality is of dubious nature, given the abundance of procedures 
in the Treaties designed specifically to deal with the situation at hand, including, but not limited to, the 
two procedures of Article 7 TEU.89 
 
In this vast sea of academic proposals, eight stand out. They offer contrasting visions, and due to the 
complexity of the problems we are facing, none of them appears sufficient on its own to solve the 
problem at hand, but they nonetheless offer EU policy-makers plenty of food for thought. Most 
important, there is enormous potential to deploy different elements of these in combination with each 
other. While the majority of them attempt to offer short-term solutions and are thus deployable 
                                                        
Kottmann and M. Smrkolj, ‘A European Response to Domestic Constitutional Crisis: Advancing the Reverse-
Solange Doctrine’, in: A. von Bogdandy and P. Sonnevend (eds.), Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional 
Area: Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania, Oxford: Hart, 2015, 248–267; A. von Bogdandy, C. Antpöller 
and M. Ioannidis, ‘Enforcing European Values’, in: A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and 
Values, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
84 A. Jakab, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as the Most Promising Way of Enforcing the Rule of Law 
against EU Member States’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European 
Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
85 K. Tuori, ‘From Copenhagen to Venice’, in: C. Closa and D Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in 
the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming; J. Nergelius, ‘The Role of the 
Venice Commission in Maintaining the Rule of Law’, in: A. von Bogdandy and P. Sonnevend (eds.), Constitutional 
Crisis in the European Constitutional Area: Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania, Oxford: Hart, 2015, 291–
310. 
86 D. Kochenov, ‘Biting Intergovernmentalism: The Case for the Reinvention of Article 259 TFEU to Make It a Viable 
Rule of Law Enforcement Tool’, 7 The Hague Journal of the Rule of Law 2, 153–174 (2015). 
87 I. Canor, ‘My Brother’s Keeper? Horizontal Solange: “An Ever Closer Distrust among the Peoples of Europe”’, 50 
Common Market Law Review 2, 383–421 (2013). 
88 GG.N. Toggenburg ‘La crisi austriaca: delicate equilibrismi sospesi tra molte dimensioni’ 2 Diritto pubblico 
comparato ed europeo, 735–756 (2001); K. Lachmayer, ‘Questioning the Basic Values – Austria and Jörg Haider’, in: 
A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 
forthcoming. 
89 See, for a meticulous analysis, C. Hillion, ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov, 
Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, 
forthcoming; L. F. M. Besselink, ‘The Bite, the Bark and the Howl: Article 7 and the Rule of Law Initiatives’, in: A. 
Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 
forthcoming.  
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immediately (at least according to their creators), several unquestionably require a Treaty change, 
which is clearly an unfeasible option in the current legal-political climate. We still chose to include 
several such proposals in this overview in order to demonstrate the options available for long-term 
solutions to current problems. One should not doubt that the need to ensure the observation of Union 
values will not disappear in the years to come; it will rather become more acute. 
 
The same concerns the emphasis on the actual enforcement of values, which is present in the proposals 
to a varying degree: not all of them come equipped with a fine-tuned sanctioning mechanism beyond a 
possibility to use the exiting instruments, such as the shaming of the problematic Member State, or the 
suspension of the participation of that State in the Union institutions via Article 7 TEU or, alternatively, 
shaping and financial penalties via Articles 258, 259 and 260 TFEU.  
 
The key proposals we chose to discuss in brief include: 
a. Systemic infringement procedure (Scheppele). 
b. Biting intergovernmentalism (Kochenov). 
c. Reverse Solange (von Bogdandy). 
d. The Copenhagen Commission (Müller). 
e. The ‘exit card’ (Closa). 
f. Peer review and ‘Horizontal Solange’ (Hirsch Ballin/Canor). 
g. Unrestricted fundamental rights jurisdiction for the EU (Reding). 
h. Outsourcing monitoring and enforcement to non-EU institutions (Buquicchio). 
 
1.4.1 Systemic infringement procedure 
Kim Lane Scheppele’s ‘systemic infringement procedure’ proposal deserves to be examined first.90 In a 
nutshell, this proposal aims to ensure the most effective use of the already existing infringement 
procedures, which have been used relatively successfully by the Commission in the context of the 
enforcement of EU law since the founding of the Communities, as analysed above. The proposal makes 
a sound attempt to address the shortcomings of the already existing EU law enforcement machinery 
concerning its ability to deal with any potential as well as actual serious breaches of EU values. This is 
done in two fundamental steps, covering both the procedure for stating the breach of values and the 
enforcement of compliance. 
 
                                                        
90 K.L. Scheppele, ‘Enforcing the Basic Principles of EU Law through Systemic Infringement Actions’, in: C. Closa 
and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016; her proposal has been analysed in the Verfassungsblog in great detail. For the details of the proposal, see 
K.L. Scheppele, ‘What Can the European Commission Do When Member States Violate Basic Principles of the 
European Union? The Case for Systematic Infringement Actions’, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/ 
assises-justice-2013/files/contributions/ 
45.princetonuniversityscheppelesystemicinfringementactionbrusselsversion_en.pdf; for the proposal in brief, see 
K.L. Scheppele, ‘EU Commission v. Hungary: The Case for the “Systemic Infringement Action”’, Verfassungsblog, 
22 November 2013, http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/the-eu-commission-v-hungary-the-case-for-the-
systemic-infringement-action/#.Uw4mfPuzm5I. For the discussion, see, Verfassungsblog, ‘Hungary – Taking 
Action, Episode 2: The Systemic Infringement Action’, 
http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/category/focus/ungarn-vertragsverletzungsverfahren-scheppele/ 
#.Uw4m4Puzm5J. See also K.L. Scheppele, ‘The EU Commission v. Hungary: The Case for the “Systemic 
Infringement Action,”’ Assizes de la Justice, European Commission, November 2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice-2013/files/contributions/ 
45.princetonuniversityscheppelesystemicinfringementactionbrusselsversion_en.pdf and K.L. Scheppele, ‘Making 
Infringement Procedures More Effective: A Comment on Commission v Hungary, Case C-288/12’ Eutopia, 29 April 
2014, http://eutopialaw.com/2014/04/29/making-infringement-procedures-more-effective-a-comment-on-
commission-v-hungary-case-c-28812-8-april-2014-grand-chamber/. 
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Firstly, Scheppele suggests enabling the bundling up of infringements so as to empower the 
Commission to present a whole infringement package to the CJEU, rather than pursuing single 
instances of non-compliance on a case-by-case basis. The crucial underlying assumption in this 
approach is that pursuing numerous infringements simultaneously amounts to more than just the sum 
of its parts, as it should enable the Commission to present a clear picture of systemic non-compliance 
as regards Article 2 TEU. In this way – especially if Article 2 TEU is coupled with the duty of loyalty 
laid down in Article 4(3) TEU91 – the Court could for instance hold that the rule of law has been breached 
by a Member State on the basis of multiple single breaches of EU law bundled together and submitted 
by the Commission in one go. Multiple individual beaches might not even be required, as long as a 
complex pattern of developments described in the case testifies to a violation of EU values. While it is 
often assumed that Article 2 TEU lacks justiciability, combining it with Article 4 TEU could potentially 
solve this problem, with jurisdiction stemming from the overwhelming demonstration of the 
seriousness of the breach. Moreover, this ‘bundling approach’ would not in fact be new, although it has 
only been used so far with respect to a systemic breach of the EU acquis.92 Scheppele’s proposal should 
therefore be commended for offering a creative route to enforcing Article 2 TEU on the basis of an 
already existing and well-tried procedure through merely altering the mode and scope of its 
application, by taking a step from strictly dwelling in the field of the acquis of the Union into the area of 
values.  
 
The second part of Scheppele’s proposal is just as important and is designed to deal with the limited 
effectiveness of financial sanctions as a tool to ensure compliance. The proposal is simple: Rather than 
imposing financial sanctions, the EU should seek to subtract any EU funds that the relevant Member 
State is entitled to receive. Although some secondary legislation would likely be needed to make this 
part of the proposal a reality,93 it is definitely an approach to be considered very seriously. While the 
effectiveness of this change may not work with respect to countries that do not depend on EU moneys, 
it may well be effective with respect to Member States particularly dependent on EU funds, such as 
Hungary. While both elements of the proposal are legally solid, the weakest spot is the second part of 
the proposal, not the first. Given that sanctions are usually particularly ineffective in bringing about a 
regime change, any country which is not merely becoming autocratic but already is will be most unlikely 
to change its ways under financial pressure.94 This problem is generally applicable to virtually all the 
proposals to be considered below, however: not much can be done with money against an autocratic 
government which is particularly nasty and absolutely determined. Some other tools should be found. 
There is a second important weak spot: the Commission’s approach to reading Article 258 TFEU and 
applying this instrument seems to be hostile to taking EU values into account when bringing a case. 
This resulted in a number of missed opportunities – the judicial retirement case with regard to Hungary, 
which was a glorified loss, in terms of the Rule of Law, rather than a win, being one example. Besides, 
this approach also sees the value of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union potentially 
                                                        
91 “Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, 
assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. The Member States shall take any appropriate 
measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from 
the acts of the institutions of the Union…” 
92 E.g. Case C-494/01 Commission v. Ireland (Irish Waste) [2005] ECR I-3331. 
93 A certain change in the ECJ’s approach to the calculation of penalties under Article 260 TFEU, in particular the 
criterion of the ‘ability to pay’, could also be in need of a certain rethinking but is unlikely to form an overwhelming 
obstacle to the implementation of the proposal: D. Kochenov, ‘On Policing Article 2 TEU Compliance – Reverse 
Solange and Systemic Infringements Analyzed’, XXXIII Polish Yearbook of International Law, 145–170 (2014). 
94 N. Tocci, Can the EU Promote Democracy and Human Rights through the ENP? The Case for Refocusing on the Rule of 
Law, in: M. Cremona and G. Meloni (eds.), The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for Modernisation?, 
2007/21 EUI Working Paper LAW, 2007, 23–35, 29. See also D. Kochenov, ‘On Policing Article 2 TEU Compliance 
– Reverse Solange and Systemic Infringements Analyzed’, XXXIII Polish Yearbook of International Law, 145–170 (2014), 
168. 
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undermined, as no case has been brought under Article 258 TFEU based, at least in part, on the 
Charter.95 The proposal, however legally sound, is bound to be unworkable, unless the Commission 
changes its counterproductive and artificially narrow approach to the scope of Article 258 TFEU. 
 
All in all, Scheppele’s proposal creatively attempts to solve two key problems which have prevented 
the effective use of the EU’s infringement procedure against Member States guilty of violating Article 2 
TEU values.96  
1.4.2 Biting intergovernmentalism 
‘Biting intergovernmentalism’97 builds on the idea of utilising the systemic infringement procedure 
explained above, but offers a potentially more sensitive way to deploy the procedure, while not 
expecting the Commission to change its ways. In this sense, biting intergovernmentalism is deployable 
immediately. The core idea consists in bringing systemic infringement cases based on Article 259 TFEU, 
rather than Article 258 TFEU. The former provision allows the Member States themselves to bring to 
court their peers violating the Treaties. The presumption behind the provision is that all the members 
of the Union are equally interested – just as the institutions – in ensuring sustained compliance with the 
Treaties by their peers. Importantly, no demonstration of direct concern is needed to meet the standing 
requirements: the mere fact of a breach of EU law is sufficient.98 
 
Under Article 258 TFEU the Commission enjoys absolute discretion in bringing Article 258 TFEU 
cases.99 Given that it might choose, at any moment, not to bring a case even where there is a clear breach, 
or, which would be even more counterproductive in the context of values enforcement, to bring a case 
based merely on the violation of the rules of the acquis sensu stricto, getting 27 additional potential 
litigators on board is hugely important. True, the Commission is the first point of contact for a Member 
State bringing a case under Article 259 TFEU – the provision even allows the Commission to take over. 
What is crucial in this context, however, is that the Member State is not bound by the Commission’s 
exercise of discretion. This concerns both the Commission’s decision not to take over the case and the 
Commission’s selection of arguments on the basis of which to proceed once the case has been taken 
over. In both instances the Member State concerned with the failure to abide by the Treaties evident 
from the state of affairs in one (or more) of its peers is free to bring the latter to court, construing the 
case as it sees fit.100 
 
                                                        
95 A. Łazowski, ‘Decoding a Legal Enigma: The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and 
Infringement Proceedings’ 14 ERA Forum, 573–587 (2013). 
96 For a more detailed assessment and criticism of this proposal, see Verfassungsblog, ‘Hungary – Taking Action, 
Episode 2: The Systemic Infringement Action’, available online at http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/category/ 
focus/ungarn-vertragsverletzungsverfahren-scheppele/#.Uw4m4Puzm5J. C. Closa, D. Kochenov and J.H.H. 
Weiler, ‘Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union’, 2014/25 RSCAS Working Paper (2014); D. 
Kochenov, ‘On Policing Article 2 TEU Compliance – Reverse Solange and Systemic Infringements Analyzed’, XXXIII 
Polish Yearbook of International Law, 145–170 (2014). 
97 D. Kochenov, ‘Biting Intergovernmentalism: The Case for the Reinvention of Article 259 TFEU to Make It a Viable 
Rule of Law Enforcement Tool’, 7 The Hague Journal of the Rule of Law 2, 153–174 (2015). 
98 This is the case since Article 259 – just like 258 TFEU – is not intended to protect the claimants’ rights. Rather, the 
provisions aim to ensure general compliance with EU law, e.g. Case C-431/92 Commission v. Germany [1995] ECR 
I-2189, para. 21. Compare L. Prete and B. Smulders, ‘The Coming of Age of Infringement Proceedings’, 47 Common 
Market Law Review 1, 9–61 (2010), 13. 
99 E.g. Opinion of AG Tizzano in Joined cases C-466 and 476/98 Commission v. UK et al. [2002] ECR I-9741, para. 30. 
Compare L. Prete and B. Smulders, ‘The Coming of Age of Infringement Proceedings’, 47 Common Market Law 
Review 1, 9–61 (2010), 14. 
100 See, e.g. Case 141/78 France v. UK [1979] ECR 2923. For an overview of relevant practice, see, e.g. L. Prete and B. 
Smulders, ‘The Coming of Age of Infringement Proceedings’, 47 Common Market Law Review 1, 9–61 (2010), 27 (and 
the references cited therein). 
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This is the first great advantage of the biting intergovernmentalism proposal over a simple systemic 
infringement action brought by the Commission: the Commission’s limited reading of the scope of 
infringement proceedings cannot deprive biting intergovernmentalism of its effectiveness, making the 
deployment of a systemic infringement proposal straightforward and available immediately. 
 
There is a second advantage, however: the Union is constantly criticised for ‘creeping competences’ and 
‘power grabs’, allowing the Member States failing to comply with the values of Article 2 TEU to 
(misre)present the Commission’s systemic infringement action under Article 258 TFEU as a blunt 
attempt to violate Member States sovereignty by a power-hungry Union. The same argument is difficult 
to make when another Member State is bringing a systemic infringement action, which gives the biting 
intergovernmentalism proposal a political edge. 
 
With regard to the actual enforcement of values once a non-compliant Member State has been found in 
breach under Article 259 TFEU, the standard financial sanctioning procedure will then need to be 
applied. 
1.4.3 ‘Reverse Solange’ 
One of the most widely discussed proposals to consider is based on AG Poiares Maduro’s Opinion in 
Centro Europa and was popularised by Armin von Bogdandy.101 Similarly to the two proposals discussed 
above, the existing law and institutional structure of the Union are relied upon to address the rule of 
law crises in the EU, thus no Treaty change is required. The core idea focuses on grave violations of 
fundamental rights. Once the seriousness of rights violations in a given Member State is particularly 
grave, this allows the Union courts (including that very Member State’s courts in their capacity as 
enforcers of EU law) to intervene. The graveness of violation would create jurisdiction.102 
 
This proposal is known as the ‘Reverse Solange’ as it purports to espouse the logic of the 
Budesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) in the so-called Solange I and Solange II cases.103 In these two cases, the 
BVerfG reserved for itself the final say on matters of EU law in situations where EU law could threaten 
                                                        
101 Opinion of the Advocate General, Case C-380/05 Centro Europa [2007] ECR I-349, para. 14 et seq. See, for an 
academic articulation: A. von Bogdandy, M. Kottmann, C. Antpöhler, J. Dickschen, S. Hentrei, M. Smrkolj, ‘Reverse 
Solange–Protecting the essence of fundamental rights against EU Member States’ 49 Common Market Law Review, 2, 
489–519 (2012). For the criticism of von Bogdandy’s proposal, see: Verfassungsblog, ‘Recue Package for Fundamental 
Rights’, available at http://www.verfassungsblog.de/rettungsschirm-fr-grundrechte-ein-onlinesymposium-auf-
dem-verfassungsblog-2/#.Uw4rVPuzm5I. See also D. Kochenov, ‘On Policing Article 2 TEU Compliance – Reverse 
Solange and Systemic Infringements Analyzed’, XXXIII Polish Yearbook of International Law, 145–170 (2014), and the 
upgraded versions of the proposal: A. von Bogdandy, C. Antpöhler, J. Dickschen, S. Hentrei, M. Kottmann and M. 
Smrkolj, ‘A European Response to Domestic Constitutional Crisis: Advancing the Reverse-Solange Doctrine’, in: A. 
von Bogdandy and P. Sonnevend (eds.), Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area: Theory, Law and 
Politics in Hungary and Romania, Oxford: Hart, 2015, 248–267; A. von Bogdandy, C. Antpöller and M. Ioannidis, 
‘Enforcing European Values’, in: A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016. 
102 In this sense the proposal is in line with the case law of the Court of Justice, which finds jurisdiction based on 
the gravity of consequences caused by the deprivation of rights, e.g. D. Kochenov, ‘A Real European Citizenship; 
A New Jurisdiction Test; A Novel Chapter in the Development of the Union in Europe’ 18 Columbia Journal of 
European Law 56–109 (2011), 56.  
103 BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974); BVerfGE 73, 339 (1986); BVerfGE 89, 155 (1993). For analysis, see, e.g. J.H.H. Weiler, 
‘Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision’, 1 European Law Journal 3, 
219–258 (1995); M. Herdegen, ‘Maastricht Decision and the German Constitutional Court: Constitutional Restraints 
from an “Ever Closer Union”’, 31 Common Market Law Review, 235–249 (1994). See also BVerfGE 63, 2267 (2009). For 
analysis, see, e.g. D. Thym, ‘In the Name of Sovereign Statehood: A Critical Introduction to the Lisbon Judgment 
of the German Constitutional Court’, 46 Common Market Law Review 6, 1795–1822 (2009); C. Wohlfahrt, ‘The Lisbon 
Case: A Critical Summary’, 10 German Law Journal 8, 1277;–1286 (2009); A. Steinbach, ‘The Lisbon Judgment of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court – New Guidance on the Limits of European Integration?’, 11 German Law 
Journal 4, 367–390 (2010). 
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the core of human rights protection established by the German Basic Law. Although the BVerfG has 
never actually acted on its threat, its Solange jurisprudence led the Court of Justice to reconsider its 
earlier stance regarding human rights protection in the early 1960s and hold that respect for human 
rights is one of the key conditions governing the lawfulness of EU acts.104  
 
The essence of von Bogdandy’s proposal is to ‘reverse’ the Solange approach by allowing the Court of 
Justice to move within the domain of the national law with a view to protecting EU values. The authors 
of the proposal presume that such a jurisdictional move would only be possible in truly exceptional 
cases of systemic non-compliance.105 It is suggested that in a situation where human rights would be 
systemically violated in a ‘captured’ Member State, national courts should be empowered to make a 
preliminary reference under Article 267 TFEU in order to invite the Court of Justice to consider the 
legality of national actions in the light of Article 2 TEU, which the Court is not currently entitled to do. 
 
While normatively defensible, this proposal however suffers from several shortcomings, as it is most 
likely unworkable both in theory and in practice. Most important, it does not even address the key 
issues related to the lack of compliance with Article 2 TEU in some Member States. This is due, first of 
all, to the proposal’s heavy reliance on national courts, whereas the judiciary is normally the first 
institution which illiberal forces would seek to capture, as the Hungarian example shows. Tellingly, 
Poland follows suit very closely, as obstructing the work of the Constitutional Tribunal was among the 
priorities of the new government. If national courts are packed and decapitated,106 one can hardly expect 
them to play any effective role in promoting Article 2 TEU compliance in the captured State of which 
they are part. 
 
More important, however, the requirement of systemic non-compliance makes the implementation of 
the proposal practically impossible: the threshold is simply too high.107 Ultimately, the presumption 
that the logic of trying not to give up existing jurisdiction – the original driver behind BVerfG’s Solange 
– and the logic behind claiming new powers by the ECJ – which is the driver behind the Reverse Solange 
proposal – are comparable seems to significantly underplay the fundamental differences between the 
two.108 As a consequence, the so-called ‘Reverse Solange’ seems to be misnamed.  
 
The last thing to say about this proposal is that not all backsliding in terms of the rule of law implies 
grave and persistent human rights violations. Quite the contrary seems to be true: a well-executed 
dismantlement of the rule of law and the constitutional checks and balances can happen – or at least go 
through crucial initial stages – without blunt violations of human rights.109 Once the main jurisdictional 
argument made in Reverse Solange is considered outside of its rights context, however, it is very similar 
in essence to the one employed in the context of the systemic infringements proposal: the graveness of 
violation as such combined with their demonstrable character allows for intervention. For the reasons 
                                                        
104 E.g. Case C-1/58 Stork [1958-59] ECR 17. For an analysis, see: B. de Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Supremacy and the 
Nature of the Legal Order’, in: P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999, 177–213. 
105 A. von Bogdandy, M. Kottmann, C. Antpöhler, J. Dickschen, S. Hentrei, M. Smrkolj, ‘Reverse Solange–Protecting 
the essence of fundamental rights against EU Member States’ 49 Common Market Law Review, 2, 489–519 (2012). 
106 E.g. Baka v. Hungary. Application no. 20261/12, 27 May 2014. 
107 The example used in the proposal itself is ‘the refusal to abide by the decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights’. See A. von Bogdandy, M. Kottmann, C. Antpöhler, J. Dickschen, S. Hentrei, M. Smrkolj, ‘Reverse Solange–
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108 See D. Kochenov, ‘On Policing Article 2 TEU Compliance – Reverse Solange and Systemic Infringements 
Analyzed’, XXXIII Polish Yearbook of International Law, 145–170 (2014), for a very detailed analysis. 
109 C. Closa, D. Kochenov and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union’, 
2014/25 RSCAS Working Paper (2014). 
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above, however, it is abundantly clear that systemic infringement procedures – via either Article 258 
TFEU or Article 259 TFEU – are overwhelmingly preferable to Reverse Solange: they are not limited in 
their deployment to human rights; the thresholds are more manageable and formulated more clearly; 
they do not rely on the national institutions in the backsliding Member States. 
 
The problem of enforcement sensu stricto is as acute with Reverse Solange as with other proposals 
discussed: it comes down to Article 260 TFEU again, the effectivene ss of which is not beyond doubt.  
1.4.4 The Copenhagen Commission 
None of the proposals mentioned above suggested the creation of a new EU body, unlike the proposal 
put forward by Jan-Werner Müller who proposed to create a ‘Copenhagen Commission’. This new body 
would ensure regular monitoring and the enforcement of compliance of current EU Member States with 
Article 2 TEU. Thus this proposal does not, unlike the previous proposals, rely on existing law and 
structures.110 
 
The creation of a special Copenhagen Commission is potentially very attractive, as it will be an 
important step in the direction of establishing a “swift and independent monitoring mechanism and an 
early-warning system”, which the Tavares Report also wanted to see in place.111 The new body would 
build on the Copenhagen criteria idea, going back to the 1993 European Council in Copenhagen, which 
established, inter alia, the political conditions for membership in the Union, including respect for 
democracy, the rule of law and the protection of fundamental rights, which had to be complied with by 
all the countries willing to join.112 
 
Unlike the previously examined proposals, which are mostly related to mending the holes in the EU’s 
Article 2 TEU enforcement by relying on the existing tools already in place, the creation of a special 
organ with a new mechanism would clearly amount to a systemic mid- to long-term solution, which is 
no doubt preferable, as it would potentially allow for turning the EU into a full-fledged militant 
democracy.113 This being said, the institutional innovation in question should not be viewed as 
necessarily stemming from a Treaty change. Some authors argued that it was possible to establish a 
binding ‘Copenhagen mechanism’ within the current Treaty framework, by inter-institutional 
agreement with the contribution of independent academic experts in the process of monitoring Member 
States’ compliance with article 2 TEU.114 Yet another option to consider, in this regard, is to involve the 
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Fundamental Rights Agency of the Union more in the matters of Article 2 TEU compliance, which will 
most likely require only the amendment of some secondary legislation.115 
 
The proposal is, however, of little use in addressing immediate challenges, as the creation of any new 
EU body of this nature would no doubt require the approval, as well as full participation, of the Member 
State already experiencing problems with Article 2 TEU compliance. Moreover, questions remain as to 
the desirability of further complicating the institutional structure of the Union, as well as, 
fundamentally, the mechanics of the actual enforcement of the decisions of the Copenhagen Commission. 
1.4.5 The ‘Exit Card’  
A more radical proposal still, which would definitely require a Treaty change, has been advanced by 
Carlos Closa.116 It suggests the introduction of a provision akin to Article 8 of the Statute of the Council 
of Europe and a number of other international organisations,117 on the basis of which the EU could force 
out a chronically non-compliant EU Member State. Such a new provision would complement Article 50 
TEU, which currently permits voluntary withdrawal from the Union.118 As outlined by Closa,119 the idea 
is not to start throwing countries out of the Union, but to increase credibility in the sanctions, which the 
EU may adopt on the basis of either Article 7 TEU or Article 260 TFEU.  
 
The option to force an EU country out would be even more radical than the so-called ‘nuclear option’ 
laid down in Article 7 TEU and which, as previously noted, has never been used. It may be that the 
sheer possibility of being ‘kicked out’ of the EU would be of greater persuasive value for the non-
compliant Member State in question than the mere possibility of losing voting rights in the Council.120  
 
The crucial problem with this proposal is that it can only be deployed in the long-term and 
unquestionably requires a Treaty change. Moreover, such a proposal will have truly far-reaching 
implications for the concept of EU citizenship.121 Viewed from the citizens’ standpoint, ejecting a 
Member State facing severe troubles in the field of the rule of law and human rights could potentially 
demonstrate the Union’s inability to guarantee actual Article 2 TEU compliance and protect the citizens 
of the ‘captured’ State. Building upon the presumption that this option would enter the Treaties on the 
assumption that it is never to be used, like the Council of Europe’s own Article 8 of the Statute, adding 
the possibility of ejecting a Member State is definitely helpful, as it will dispel the unfortunate sense that 
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Article 7 TEU is the last resort measure and should thus not be used. Enriching EU law with a Member 
State ejection option is thus likely to be a positive development, notwithstanding the fact that, strictly 
speaking, it will not help solve the problems of the non-compliant Member State.  
1.4.6 Peer review and Horizontal Solange 
Peer review and ‘Horizontal Solange’ options are profoundly interconnected as, similarly to the biting 
intergovernmentalism proposal, they attempt to involve the Member States, not the Union institutions, 
as much as possible in solving the rule of law crises. Unlike biting intergovernmentalism, however, the 
deployment of these two options is either potentially non-consequential (peer review) or potentially too 
costly in terms of ensuring the proper functioning of the law of the Union (Horizontal Solange). One 
could be branded as a ‘positive’ version of the other. 
 
The positive proposal has been made by Ernst Hirsch Ballin and a team of researchers in the 
Netherlands and focuses on mutual peer review of the Member States’ compliance with the rule of 
law.122 To a degree the Council has heeded this proposal.123 Peer review would allow the EU to avoid a 
number of problems, which are at the core of all the other proposals under review. Namely, it would 
not require any clear definition of the scope of EU law and the acquis, since peer review is to happen 
based on the agreements between the Member States outside of the framework of EU law. Although 
there is an obvious problem with detaching Article 2 TEU compliance from the EU legal system, the 
peer review solution could be swiftly implemented. The obvious drawback of the proposal is the 
presumption that naming and shaming works, while we know from experience that it often does not, 
which explains, for instance, the inclusion of Article 260 TFEU in the Treaties: initially, the Court did 
not have a legal ability to fine non-compliant Member States. The Treaties were amended in the face of 
the reality that Member States failing to comply with EU law would ignore Court decisions calling on 
them to respect the law.124 It is indeed difficult to expect fundamental change from an illiberal national 
government as a result of other governments stating that tout n’est pas rose there. The problem of 
enforcement persists. 
 
The ‘negative’ proposal allows the Member States rather than the EU to enforce sanctions against the 
non-compliant government by de facto disapplying EU law in bilateral relations with the ‘guilty’ state. 
This approach, recently analysed by Iris Canor, has been branded ‘Horizonal Solange’.125 Although the 
idea is not new, such treatment of non-compliant Member States profoundly undermines the very 
foundations of EU law, which is not based on reciprocity.126 It strikes therefore at the core of the acquis 
and is thus unattractive for both normative and pragmatic reasons. In essence, it has the potential to 
turn the EU’s internal market chaotic by opening up the Pandora’s box of mutual accusations and 
immediate retaliation by Member States – precisely what the EU has been so successful in outlawing 
over so many decades. This approach is thus of very limited attractiveness, merely offering countless 
possibilities for abuse.  
                                                        
122 See Advisory Council on International Affairs, ‘The Rule of Law: Safeguard for European Citizens and 
Foundation for European Cooperation’, Report No. 87, 2014, 35. See also E. Hirsch-Ballin, ‘Mutual Trust: The Virtue 
of Reciprocity Strengthening the Acceptance of the Rule of Law through Peer Review’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov 
(eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, 
forthcoming. 
123 Council of the EU, Press Release no. 16936/14, 3362nd Council meeting, General Affairs, Brussels, 16 December 
2014, 20–21. For a critical analysis, see D. Kochenov and L. Pech, ‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law 
in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality’, 11 European Constitutional Law Review, 512–540 (2015). 
124 K. Lenaerts, I. Maselis, K. Gutman, J.T. Nowak, EU Procedural Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
125 I. Canor, ‘My Brother’s Keeper? Horizontal Solange: “An Ever Closer Distrust among the Peoples of Europe”’, 50 
Common Market Law Review 2, 383–421 (2013). 
126 Joined cases 90 and 91/63 Commission v. Belgium and Luxembourg [1964] ECR 626. 
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1.4.7 Unrestricted fundamental rights jurisdiction for the EU 
In her speech of 4 September 2013, the former Commission’s Vice-President Reding indicated a 
preference for the abolition of Article 51 of our Charter of Fundamental Rights, which states that the 
provisions of the Charter are applicable to the Member States “only when they are implementing Union 
law, so as to make all fundamental rights directly applicable in the Member States, including the right 
to effective judicial review.”127 Such a move would certainly have a federalising effect, which would 
lead to a situation where the EU Charter becomes a ‘federal standard’ as, similarly to the Federal Bill of 
Rights in the US, it would eventually apply “irrespective of the subject-matter at issue, that is to say 
irrespective of whether it falls within federal or State competence.”128 In this scenario, however unlikely 
due to reluctance of several EU Member States to revise the EU Charter along these lines, the Court of 
Justice would be entrusted with “the task performed by the US Supreme Court, that of protecting any 
individual citizen, on the basis of a ‘federal’ standard of respect for fundamental rights, against any 
public authority of any kind and in any area of substantive law.”129 Article 51(1) of the Charter, however, 
currently clearly precludes such a ‘federal’ evolution as it unmistakably implies that the EU Courts still 
lack the power to review the compatibility with EU fundamental rights – including those of a procedural 
nature such as the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial – of national rules which fall outside 
the scope of Union law.  
 
Be that as it may, Reding’s proposal did demonstrate a certain appetite within the Commission for a 
potential power-grab, however unrealistic, at least in the short- to medium-term, as a Treaty change 
would be required to change or abolish the provision in question. Not unsurprisingly, there is little 
consensus or even a sense of urgency on this issue amongst the Member States, which tend to prefer 
focusing on the EU’s alleged democratic and possibly also justice deficit.130 Because of the EU’s own 
limitations when it comes to complying with its own values, it has been suggested that it would be 
unwise to grant the EU a wide competence to police rule of law issues and other values at national level, 
as he who lives in a glass house shouldn’t throw stones.131 However promising, Reding’s proposal is in 
any event unrealistic, as is the suggestion that the Court of Justice should neutralise entirely the 
limitations Article 51(1) imposes on its human rights jurisdiction.132 Such a judicial move would actually 
undermine the rule of law by negating the clear intent of the Union’s constituent power, i.e. its Member 
States.  
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1.4.8 ‘Outsourcing’ the monitoring/enforcement of EU values  
The President of the Venice Commission, Gianni Buquicchio, put forward another noteworthy 
proposal.133 He suggested that the EU should avail of the expertise of his institution. The Venice 
Commission, which is not an EU organ, belonging to the Council of Europe system instead, has built 
up a solid reputation on the issues of the rule of law both in the context of its protection and promotion 
in the EU countries, and elsewhere in Europe.134 All the Member States are represented in it. 
 
The Venice Commission proposal did not come as a surprise to those interested in the enforcement of 
EU values, as this body of legal experts has traditionally played an important role in ensuring 
compliance with the rule of law in current EU Member States.135 Given the established tradition of 
fruitful cooperation between the EU and the Venice Commission, which is already a reality, deepening 
the relations between the two offered a promising path. Buquicchio’s offer does however raise two 
fundamental problems for the EU: one of a practical nature, the other of a normative nature.  
 
From a practical point of view, one must note that the Venice Commission, although it obviously 
possesses an impressive track-record and admirable expertise, cannot boast any enforcement machinery 
to ensure Article 2 TEU compliance where it is most needed. In other words, outsourcing rule of law 
questions to the Council of Europe would not solve the key issue: how to guarantee actual change in 
the non-compliant Member States? 
 
From a normative point of view, it is important to stress that Article 2 TEU established the core values 
on which both the Union and the Member States are built. Outsourcing Article 2 TEU issues thus 
potentially amounts to sending a signal of the EU’s inability to deliver on its core promise. For this 
reason alone taking up the kind offer from the Venice Commission would seem to be inappropriate, as 
it would most likely undermine further EU authority in this fundamental area. In the light of the Venice 
Commission’s inability to enforce compliance with the rule of law standards it may formulate, taking 
up the offer, next to being inappropriate, would also be of little use.  
 
1.5 Institutional approaches to overcoming problems  
History and recent events proved the Copenhagen dilemma to be a very vivid one in the EU. It exists 
despite the fact that the EU is already a rule-of-law actor, relying on a set of policy and legal instruments, 
assessing (to varying degrees) Member States’ compliance with democracy, the rule of law, and 
fundamental rights under the current treaty configurations.136 It is so because these mechanisms 
constitute a scattered and patchy setting of Member States’ EU surveillance systems as regards their 
obligations enshrined in Article 2 TEU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
 
The only ‘hard law’ having a Treaty-basis is Article 7 TEU as described in Chapter 1.2.1. Article 7 
consists of a preventive arm in Section (1) (determining a clear risk of a breach) and a corrective arm in 
Sections (2)-(3) (determining a serious and persistent breach). These require different thresholds to 
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become operational. Article 7(1) requires four-fifths of the Member States’ votes in the Council to 
become operational, whereas Article 7(2) requires unanimity of all Member States except the one in 
breach of EU values. Determination of sanctions does not require unanimity, but only applies as a 
follow-up to Article 7(2). The scope of application is rightly broad, and has the clear advantage, as 
compared to other mechanisms, of being not only limited to Member States’ actions when implementing 
EU law but also of covering breaches in areas where they act autonomously. It also provides for more 
or less clear sanctions: if there is a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the values referred 
to in Article 2, this Member State might be sanctioned and suspended from voting at Council level. 
Article 7 has however never been activated in practice due to a number of political and legal obstacles.  
 
Other EU-level instruments that evaluate and monitor (yet do not directly supervise) Article 2-related 
principles at Member State level (discussed supra under Subchapters 1.3. and 1.4.) present a number of 
methodological challenges. First, they constitute soft policy, i.e. are non-legally binding, or make use of 
benchmarking techniques and exchange ‘good practices’ and mutual learning processes between 
Member States. Second, they are affected by politicisation and as a consequence make use of non-neutral 
and subjective evaluation methodologies. Third, many of these are characterised by a lack of democratic 
accountability and judicial control gaps, with a limited or non-existent role for the European Parliament 
and the Court of Justice of the European Union.137 
 
The new EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, described in Chapter 1.2.3, can be seen as a first 
attempt to construct a viable mechanism.138 While the EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law can 
be seen as a step in the right direction, it has a number of limitations:139  
 
The formulation of a pre-Article 7 procedure is a milestone in a worrying trend of non-enforcement of 
European values spanning almost two decades.140 The Amsterdam Treaty introduced the Article 7 
sanction mechanism in 1999, and soon a situation arose triggering the potential applicability of the 
provision. Whereas Article 7 came into existence foremost out of fear of post-Communist countries’ 
retrogression, it was ultimately Austria, one of the old Member States with a consolidated democracy, 
which was seen as taking a dangerous path towards rule of law backsliding by an extreme right-wing 
party entering into the governing coalition. The remaining then 14 Member States opted for political 
and diplomatic segregation of Austria; seven months later the Three Wise Men entrusted with assessing 
the Austrian situation came to the conclusion that European values – and in particular minority rights 
– were being respected.141 The incident was “swept under the carpet as an event which was 
embarrassing for everyone involved”.142 More important for our purposes, the case also triggered the 
amendment of Article 7 by adding a preventive arm to it and breaking down the mechanism into Article 
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7(1) and Articles 7(2) and (3) (the previous Article 7). When Hungary – a new candidate for the 
mechanism – entered the scene, instead of making use of the already diluted procedure of Article 7(1), 
the Commission decided to water down the process by inserting a preventive-preventive process.  
 
The application of this heavily problematic procedure raises even further questions. First, the 
monitoring dimension is rather weak in nature. It is a crisis-led monitoring instrument and does not 
offer a comparative and regular/periodic assessment by relevant thematic area (corresponding with the 
fundamental rights enshrined in the EU Charter) for each individual EU Member State, so as to have a 
country-by-country assessment on the state of the rule of law.143 Second, the discretion held by the 
Commission to assess the situation in a Member State and activate the Framework remains great. The 
assessment and operability of the Framework are not subject to any sort of external scrutiny or judicial 
and democratic accountability method (i.e. specific roles for the Parliament and the CJEU). Third, the 
framework does not propose any specific model, internal strategy or policy cycle144 for EU inter-
institutional coordination between the findings resulting from the rule of law assessment and those 
from other EU monitoring or evaluation processes of Member State performances, such as the European 
semester cycle and soft economic governance.145 Fourth, and most important, it potentially gravely 
undermines the effectiveness of the deployment of Article 7 TEU, in the context when more than one 
Member State is backsliding or in a state of constitutional capture and the Framework is only activated 
in relation to one, leaving the second one free to block the application of Article 7 TEU sanctions, should 
such a need arise.  
 
The Communication was acknowledged by the General Affairs Council meeting of 18 March 2014.146 
Yet it has not been followed up by the Council since then. Instead, EU Member States’ representatives 
raised several institutional and procedural questions regarding the Commission’s initiative, which were 
examined by the Council Legal Service (CLS) in an Opinion issued in May 2014.147 The CLS emphasised 
that “the respect of the rule of law by the Member States cannot be the subject matter of an action by 
the institutions of the Union irrespective of the existence of a specific material competence to frame this 
action, with the sole exception of the procedure described in Article 7 TEU”. Tongue in cheek, it 
concluded that Article 7 TEU cannot constitute the appropriate basis to amend this procedure and that 
the Commission’s initiative was not compatible with the principle of conferral. It also stated that there 
is no legal basis in the Treaties that empowers the institutions to create a new supervision mechanism 
for the respect of the rule of law by the Member States, additional to what is laid down in Article 7 TEU, 
either to amend, modify or supplement the procedure laid down in this Article. Were the Council to act 
along such lines, it would run the risk of being found to have abased its powers by deciding without a 
legal basis. The CLS suggested as an alternative the conclusion of an intergovernmental international 
agreement designed to supplement EU law and to ensure the respect of Article 2 TEU values. This 
agreement could envisage the participation of European institutions, and specific ways in which EU 
Member States would commit to subject themselves to a ‘review system’.  
 
The opinion of the CLS is, with all due respect, legally dubious, however. In response to their chief 
criticism of lacking legal basis, one may on the contrary assert that since the Commission is one of the 
                                                        
143 S. Carrera, E. Guild and N. Hernanz, The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, Democracy and the 
Rule of Law in the EU, Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism, CEPS 2013, available at 
http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Fundamental%20Rights%20DemocracyandRoL.pdf. 
144 As proposed by European Parliament (2012), Resolution on the situation of fundamental rights in the EU (2010-
2011), P7_TA(2012)0500, 12 December 2012, Rapporteur: Monika Flašíková Beňová. 
145 See also European Parliament (2015), Draft Report on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union 
(2013-2014), (2014) 2254 (INI), 2015, Rapporteur: Laura Ferrara. 
146 Press Release, Council meeting, General Affairs, 3306th, Brussels, 18 March 2014. 
147 Council of the European Union, Commission’s Communication on a new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule 
of Law: Compatibility with the Treaties, Doc. 10296/14, Brussels, 27 May 2014. 
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institutions empowered, under Article 7 TEU, to trigger the procedure contained therein, it should in 
fact be commended for establishing clear guidelines on how such triggering is to function in practice. 
In other words, a strong and convincing argument can no doubt be made that Article 7(1) TEU already 
and necessarily implicitly empowers the Commission to investigate any potential risk of a serious breach 
of the EU’s values by giving it the competence to submit a reasoned proposal to the Council should the 
Commission be of the view that Article 7 TEU ought to be triggered on this basis.148 Moreover, given 
the overwhelming level of interdependence between the EU Member States, and the blatant disregard 
for EU values in at least one EU country, the Commission fulfilled its duty as Guardian of the Treaties 
by putting forward a framework that would make Article 2 TEU operational in practice.149 
 
The General Affairs Council of 16 December 2014 adopted Conclusions on ensuring respect for the rule 
of law as described in Chapter 1.2.4.150 The Council committed itself to establishing a dialogue among 
all EU Member States to promote and safeguard the rule of law “in the framework of the Treaties”. Such 
an inter-governmental framework of cooperation unquestionably cannot be conducive to effectively 
addressing current rule of law challenges across the Union.151 
 
Upholding and promoting European values, or reversing the trends in the deterioration of some sub-
elements of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, may follow a “‘sunshine policy’, which 
engages and involves rather than paralyses and excludes”, a “value-control which is owned equally by 
all actors”152 – but only if the Member State in question is playing by the rules, i.e. accepts the validity 
of European norms, the power of European institutions to supervise these, and is benevolently 
following recommendations and good practices. Since the success of such a positive approach is very 
much dependent on the willingness of the recipients to adhere to the concept of cooperative 
constitutionalism, it will not work when a state systematically undermines democracy, deconstructs the 
rule of law and/or engages in massive human right violations. There is no reason to presume the good 
intentions of those in power to engage in a sunshine approach involving a dialogue and soft measures 
to make the entity return to the concept of limited government – a notion that those in power wished to 
abandon in the first place.  
 
                                                        
148 Such a reading is fully in line with the Commission’s practice regarding Article 49 TEU. In the context, the 
Commission regularly adopts a number of ‘monitoring’ documents in which EU candidate countries’ progress and 
alignment with EU acquis are reviewed: D. Kochenov EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality, Kluwer Law 
International, 2008, Chapter 2.  
149 See, for further criticism, D. Kochenov and L. Pech, ‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: 
Rhetoric and Reality’, 11 European Constitutional Law Review, 512–540 (2015). 
150 General Affairs Council, Meeting n°3362, 16 December 2014, 
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/gac/2014/12/16. 
151 D. Kochenov, L. Pech and S. Platon, ‘Ni panacée, ni gadget: Le ‘nouveau cadre de l’Union européenne pour 
renforcer l’Etat de droit’ Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, (2015), forthcoming. 
152 G.N. Toggenburg and J. Grimheden, ‘The Rule of Law and the Role of Fundamental Rights: Seven Practical 
Pointers’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.) Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
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1.6 A pair of test cases for the European Union 
Whereas there are several candidates that could well deserve the stigma of ‘rule of law backsliders’, the 
direct triggers for establishing an efficient supervisory mechanism for European values are the current 
contexts and events in Hungary153 and Poland.154 
 
The Hungarian Fundamental Law of 2011 and the constitutionally relevant cardinal laws are used as 
tools in deconstructing checks on the government, ruled in Hungary by the majoritarian unicameral 
Parliament.155 The ruling party was famous for not tolerating any kind of internal dissent,156 and after 
forming the second Fidesz government it eliminated – at least in the domestic setting – all potentialities 
of criticism by both the voters and the state institutions, which might have materialised in the form of 
effective checks and balances. 
 
Should a discontent electorate wish to correct deficiencies, it will be difficult for it to do so due to the 
novel rules of the national ballot. Gerrymandering, extension of citizenship and the introduction of the 
one-round election procedure all fundamentally endanger the fairness of future elections. Leaks about 
secret lists of voters’ party preferences, and the general sense of insecurity and arbitrariness157 that can 
touch upon anyone, might have a significant chilling effect through self-censorship. Judicial oversight 
and the Constitutional Court’s room for correcting the failures of a majoritarian government have been 
considerably impaired,158 along with the powers of other fora designed to serve as checks on government 
powers. Distortions of the media and lack of public information159 lead to the impossibility of a 
meaningful public debate and weaken the chances of restoring deliberative democracy.  
 
                                                        
153 I. Vörös, ‘Hungary’s Constitutional Evolution During the Last 25 Years’, 63 Südosteuropa 2, 173–200 (2015); I. 
Vörös, ‘The constitutional landscape after the fourth and fifth amendments of Hungarian Fundamental Law’ 55 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 1–20; P. Bárd, ‘The Hungarian Fundamental law and related constitutional changes 2010-
2013’, 20 Revue des Affaires Européennes: Law and European Affairs 3, 457–472 (2013); G.A. Tóth (ed.) Constitution for a 
disunited nation, Budapest: CEU Press, 2012. 
154 Is Poland a failing democracy? POLITICO asked leading thinkers, politicians and policymakers to weigh in on 
the Polish question, 13 January 2016, http://www.politico.eu/article/poland-democracy-failing-pis-law-and-
justice-media-rule-of-law/; E. Maurice, Polish government curtails constitutional tribunal’s powers, 23 December 
2015, https://euobserver.com/political/131662; T.T. Koncewicz, Polish Constitutional Drama: Of Courts, 
Democracy, Constitutional Shenanigans and Constitutional Self-Defense, International Journal of Constitutional 
Law Blog, 6 December 2015, http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/12/polish-constitutional-drama-of-courts-
democracy-constitutional-shenanigans-and-constitutional-self-defense; A. Śledzińska-Simon, Poland’s 
Constitutional Tribunal under Siege, 4 December 2015; A. Śledzińska-Simon, Midnight Judges: Poland’s 
Constitutional Tribunal Caught Between Political Fronts, 23 November 2015, 
http://verfassungsblog.de/midnight-judges-polands-constitutional-tribunal-caught-between-political-fronts/. 
155 Some argue that this point was reached in the fall 2012. This view is shared by, among others, former HCC Judge 
Imre Vörös and representatives of the Eötvös Károly Institute. Others associate the deconstruction of the rule of 
law with the Fourth Amendment adopted in the spring 2013. The first HCC President and former President László 
Sólyom is among them. See Sz. Nagy, ‘Eltemetett demokrácia – Vörös Imre volt alkotmánybíró szerint államcsíny 
történt’, Vasárnapi Hírek, 25 November 2012; Eötvös Károly Institute (L. Majtényi, Z. Miklósi, B. Somody, M.D. 
Szabó and B. Vissy), A jogállam helyreállításának elvei nyolc tételben. Ajánlat a demokrácia híveinek, September 2012, 
http://www.ekint.org/ekint/ekint.news.page?nodeid=557; L. Sólyom, ‘A hatalommegosztás vége’, Népszabadság, 
11 March 2013, http://www.nol.hu/archivum/20130311-a_hatalommegosztas_vege. 
156 Former Fidesz MP István Hegedűs locates the beginning for eliminating dissent in January 1991 already. See Gy. 
Petőcz (ed.), Csak a narancs volt, Budapest: Irodalom, 2001, 146. 
157 M. Komiljovics, ‘Unions slam new Labour Code’, 30 January 2012, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/ 
2011/11/articles/hu1111011i.htm; A. Tóth, ‘The New Hungarian Labour Code – Background, Conflicts, 
Compromises’, Working Paper, Friedrich Ebert Foundation Budapest, June 2012. 
158 A. Vincze, ‘Wrestling with Constitutionalism: the supermajority and the Hungarian Constitutional Court’, 7 ICL 
Journal 86–97 (2013). 
159 Cf. Curtailing freedom of information via Act CXII of 2011 and also ECtHR, TASZ v Hungary, Application no. 
37374/05, 14 April 2009.  
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Along with negative measures to silence dissenting views, positive reinforcements have also been 
introduced. Support by the electorate is enhanced through emotionalism, revolutionary rhetoric, catch 
phrases such as ‘law and order’, ‘family’, ‘tradition’, ‘nation’, symbolic lawmaking, and identity politics 
in general. Emotionalism has a nationalistic connotation unifying an allegedly homogenous Hungarian 
nation along ethnic lines,160 and at the same time – by way of a negative definition – excluding from its 
members ‘others’ including unpopular minorities (for example suspects, convicts, homosexuals, drug 
users, Roma, the poor) or anyone diverging from the ‘ordinary’ (for example members of small churches 
or advocates of home birth).  
 
The friend/foe dichotomy is artificially created through ‘punitive populism’, scapegoating and 
removing protections, sanctioning, criminalising or aggravating criminal sanctions on the ‘foe’ 
categories, partially through building on pre-existing prejudices, partially by creating new enemies, 
such as multinational companies, or persons challenging Hungarian unorthodoxy on the international 
scene. Positive reinforcements are also applied vis-à-vis the institutions: important posts are filled with 
‘friends’ whose long-term appointments guarantee their continuous support. The concept of the 
political becomes the existential basis for any other domain that reaches the level of politics trumping 
state policies’ moral, aesthetic or economic dimensions, and it also becomes the basic element of 
identity.161  
 
Very similar events took place in Poland in recent months, curbing the powers and balanced 
constellation of the Constitutional Tribunal, and jeopardising the independence of the management and 
supervisory boards of the Polish public television broadcaster and public radio broadcaster. 
 
Two weeks before the general elections for the Sejm in October 2015, the outgoing legislature nominated 
five judges for the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, to be appointed by the President of the Republic. It 
was foreseen that three judges would take seats vacated during the mandate of the outgoing legislature, 
while two would take seats that became vacated after the elections. The newly elected legislature, in an 
accelerated procedure, amended the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, so as to open the way for 
annulling the judicial nominations made before the elections by the previous legislature and to 
nominate five new judges. The five new judges were nominated in December 2015.  
 
The amendment at the same time considerably shortened the terms of office for the President and Vice-
President of the Constitutional Tribunal from nine to three years, meaning that their term of office 
expired three months after the amendment’s adoption.  
 
The Constitutional Tribunal delivered two judgments on the appointment of judges in December 2015. 
In the first judgment the Court ruled that the previous legislature was entitled to nominate three judges 
for seats vacated during its mandate but should not have made nominations for the seats vacated during 
the term of the new legislature. In the second judgment the Court ruled that the new legislature was not 
entitled to annul the nominations for the three appointments under the previous legislature. The 
Tribunal also held the shortening of the terms of office of the Tribunal’s President and Vice-President 
to be unconstitutional. As a result of these judgments the President of the Republic was obliged to 
                                                        
160 Zs. Körtvélyesi, ‘From “We the People” to “We the Nation”,’ in: G.A. Tóth (ed.), Constitution for a Disunited 
Nation: On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law, Budapest: CEU Press, 2012, 111–140. 
161 That is difficult to grasp for someone outside the scope of this paradigm. See Neelie Kroes rushing out of the 
room after a Hungarian politician broke his promise made a few minutes before they jointly addressed the public. 
‘Kroes threatens nuclear option against Hungary’, 9 February 2012, http://euobserver.com/justice/115209; Francis 
Fukuyama was equally puzzled when a Hungarian State Secretary turned to the editors of the journal publishing 
his piece concerning some factual mistakes that did not have any influence on the message he tried to convey. F. 
Fukuyama, ‘What’s Wrong with Hungary?’ The American Interest 6 February 2012, http://blogs.the-american-
interest.com/fukuyama/2012/02/06/whats-wrong-with-hungary/. 
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appoint the three judges nominated by the previous legislature. However, the President of the Republic 
already appointed all five judges nominated by the new legislature.  
 
Once the Tribunal was thus filled with the new judges the new legislature preferred, the legislature took 
another step to weaken the possibility of government criticism by way of constitutionality checks. It 
rendered the conditions under which the Tribunal may review the constitutionality of newly passed 
laws more burdensome, by increasing the number of judges hearing cases and raising the majority 
needed in the Tribunal to hand down judgments from simple to two-thirds.  
 
Another form of internal government criticism was weakened when the Polish Senate adopted a media 
law on the management and supervisory boards of the Polish public television broadcaster and public 
radio broadcaster, putting these formerly independent boards under the control of the Treasury 
Minister. The new law also paved the way for the immediate dismissal of the existing management and 
supervisory boards. 
 
The value of European integration lies in upholding the foundational European values and legal 
principles that were fought for over centuries, sometimes at great cost, and in not permitting Member 
States to abandon them, even if all internal checks and balances fail. 
 
The Hungarian case is long overdue for an Article 7 TEU procedure, and there are good reasons to 
believe that the Polish case is ripe, too. Political forces, alliances and scholars propagated the use of the 
so-called ‘nuclear option’, and a Citizens’ Initiative to launch procedures against Hungary for alleged 
violations of the EU’s fundamental values was started by the European Humanist Federation.162 The 
initiative was successfully registered by the Commission.163 Due to political considerations and the 
practical difficulties of launching a high-threshold Article 7 procedure, no steps were taken vis-à-vis 
Hungary. 
 
The situation is different with regard to Poland. The first case where the new EU Framework to 
Strengthen the Rule of Law has been used in practice is against Poland.164 The main reasons behind this 
move were the composition of the Constitutional Tribunal, and the changes in the Law on Public Service 
Broadcasters. During his intervention before the European Parliament’s Plenary Session in Strasbourg 
on 19 January 2016, Vice-President of the European Commission Frans Timmermans made clear that in 
case “there is an issue of the rule of law, there is no hiding behind national sovereignty, because you 
(Member States) have agreed in the Treaty you have signed and ratified that these issues can be 
discussed at the European level.”165 Whereas these words cannot be contested, one wonders why he did 
not invoke the preventive arm of Article 7 instead of the EU rule of law framework. The answer may be 
found in Commissioner Timmermans’ speech in 2015 at Tilburg University: in his view Article 7 “is a 
                                                        
162 http://humanistfederation.eu/our-work.php?page=wake-up-europe-act-4-democracy, 
http://act4democracy.eu/index.html. 
163 European Commission Press release, Commission registers European Citizens’ Initiative on EU fundamental 
values in Hungary, Brussels, 30 November 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6189_en.htm. 
164 See Rule of law in Poland: Commission starts dialogue, 13 January 2016, 
http://ec.europa.eu/news/2016/01/20160113_en.htm, which states, “The College agreed to come back to the matter by 
mid-March, in close cooperation with the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. Echoing what President Juncker said 
last week, First Vice-President Timmermans underlined after the College meeting that this is not about accusations and 
polemics, but about finding solutions in a spirit of dialogue. He underlined his readiness to go to Warsaw in this context.” See 
also European Commission – Fact Sheet, College Orientation Debate on recent developments in Poland and the 
Rule of Law Framework: Questions & Answers, Brussels, 13 January 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-62_en.htm. 
165 Statement by First Vice-President Frans Timmermans and Commissioner Günther Oettinger – EP Plenary 
Session – Situation in Poland, Strasbourg, 19 January 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-
114_en.htm. 
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measure of last resort – not to be excluded, but I would hope that we never let a situation escalate to the 
stage that it would require its use. I believe that the case of Austria, with Jörg Haider’s party joining the 
government, has weakened the EU’s capacity to react in such a case. It was a political response which 
completely backfired at the time, and since then Member States have been reluctant to take issue with 
other Member States on this basis…Precisely to be able to address emerging threats to the rule of law 
before they escalate, the Commission has adopted a Rule of Law Framework.” 
 
Beyond the fact that the formulation of the pre-Article 7 procedure is yet another step in a two-decade-
long trend of watering down original Article 7, its application of this heavily problematic procedure 
raises even further questions. Triggering the Rule of Law Framework against one Member State but not 
another may call into question the objectivity and impartiality of the EU rule of law system, and the 
principle of equal treatment of all member countries.166 The case for criticising EU institutions is 
particularly strong since the problems in Hungary and Poland are very similar and closely interrelated; 
in fact, it seems as if the latter was mimicking the former. 
In light of years of inaction against a Hungarian government that has made many controversial 
decisions over years, starting the procedure against a Polish government that just started deconstructing 
the rule of law a couple of months ago creates an impresssion of treating Member States arbitrarily and 
in an unequal manner.167 It seems as if the Hungarian governing party Fidesz, which belongs to the 
large party family of the European Peoples’ Party, was given more leeway in departing from EU values 
than the Polish Law and Justice Party, which is affiliated with the less influential group of European 
Conservatives and Reformists.168 
 
Selectively initiating the Rule of Law Framework poses an additional difficulty: a scenario with not just 
one but two States violating European values was not foreseen by the drafters of Article 7(2). If more 
than one State is sliding down the slope, they will protect each other and veto the use of Article 7(2), 
which they can always do, since the provision requires unanimity.169 This is what happened when the 
Hungarian Prime Minister warned that the EU will never get Hungary’s vote in favour of applying 
sanctions against Poland.170 The only way to make Article 7 operational when more than one Member 
State violates the rule of law is to make use of Article 7(1). For an Article 7(1) procedure no unanimity 
is needed, so the EU could condemn all States in question, or all problematic States, except the one 
against which an Article 7(2) procedure is to be initiated. Then Member States could argue that no 
country undergoing any Article 7 procedure may vote on another Member State’s Article 7 case.171 (This 
                                                        
166 For immediate criticism see D. Kochenov, The Commission vs. Poland: The Sovereign State Is Winning 1-0, 25 
January 2016, http://verfassungsblog.de/the-commission-vs-poland-the-sovereign-state-is-winning-1-0/; G. 
Gotev, Tavares: Discussing rule of law in Poland separately from Hungary will lead ‘nowhere’, 13 January 2016, 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/tavares-discussing-rule-law-poland-separately-
hungary-will-lead. 
167 As Sophie In ´t Veld, ALDE Group first vice-president and European Parliament’s rapporteur for the 
establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights put it: “by choosing to 
intervene in Poland, but not in Hungary, the Commission appears to apply arbitrary standards and political 
considerations.” S. In ´t Veld, Poland dispute: EU needs annual Rule of Law “Health check”, 12 January 2016, 
http://www.sophieintveld.eu/poland-dispute-eu-needs-annual-rule-of-law-health-check/. 
168 G. Gotev, Tavares: Discussing rule of law in Poland separately from Hungary will lead ‘nowhere’, 13 January 
2016, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/tavares-discussing-rule-law-poland-separately-
hungary-will-lead. 
169 Id. 
170 “The European Union should not think about applying any sort of sanctions against Poland, because that would 
require full unanimity and Hungary will never support any sort of sanctions against Poland”. G. Szakacs and C. 
Fernandez, Hungary PM flags veto of any EU sanctions against Poland, 8 January 2016, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-hungary-sanctions-idUSKBN0UM0L220160108. 
171 K.L. Scheppele, EU can still block Hungary’s veto on Polish sanctions, 11 January 2016, 
http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-can-still-block-hungarys-orban-veto-on-polish-pis-sanctions/. 
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method is only operational if less than one-fifth of the Member States still having voting rights are 
effected.) Stripping States of their voting rights will of course be challenged by the member countries 
under an Article 7 supervision, so ultimately the CJEU will need to decide whether such a reading 
excluding Member States that are undergoing Article 7 procedures from any other Article 7 procedure 
is correct. The Luxembourg Court could argue that finding otherwise would undermine the effet utile of 
the provision. 
 
Now that Poland has a chance to enter into a dialogue within the Rule of Law Framework, which can 
only be understood as a pre-Article 7 procedure,172 the Hungarian government will reasonably expect 
the same before an Article 7(1) procedure could be started against it. That will undoubtedly result in 
unnecessary prolongation of the process. Let us for a moment turn back to Commissioner Timmermans’ 
above-quoted forewarning that the EU institutions could fall into the trap of the Haider affair. The 
parallel drawn between the Austrian and Hungarian situations is misleading for numerous reasons. 
The most obvious point is that the institutions could not have made use of a yet non-existing preventive 
arm of the Article 7 procedure at the time the FPÖ entered the government, and there was no reason to 
make use of the provision as it then stood. Given the lack of a legally pre-defined preventive procedure, 
a political action was taken in the Haider case that need not be taken vis-à-vis Hungary in light of Article 
7. The political quarantine vis-à-vis Austria started right after the formation of the government, before 
those in power could have eroded European values, and once the situation was thoroughly 
investigated, the Three Wise Men commissioned with this task did not find a violation of EU values, 
and accordingly suggested lifting the political sanctions.173 Whereas it is understandable that EU 
politicians and Eurocrats do not wish to end up in such an embarrassing situation a second time, the 
Hungarian situation cannot be compared to the former Austrian one, since the former is long since in 
the state of constitutional capture, i.e. in the third scenario – a fact well documented in the literature. 
Finally, it is difficult to assess whether the treatment of Austria backfired, since it is impossible to 
second-guess what would have happened without the political reactions. Despite these criticisms 
Commissioner Timmermans’ words acknowledge the difficulty in drawing the line between a set of 
serious, but not necessarily interrelated, depreciations in European values, and their systemic erosion.174 
The EU Rule of Law Framework. according to this positive interpretation, could be understood to be 
inspired by the Hungarian case, which outgrew the framework by the time it was adopted, and when 
the pre-Article 7 procedure was adopted it long passed the stage where “emerging threats to the rule of 
law [could be halted] before they escalate”. Instead, an Article 7 procedure should be invoked. In order 
to reaffirm this benevolent reading the Commission should of course depart from its insistence that the 
Hungarian case was not yet ripe for Article 7.175  
  
                                                        
172 “The adopted Rule of Law mechanism is in fact a ‘pre-article 7 procedure’ and a diluted version of parliament’s 
proposal.” G. Gotev, Tavares: Discussing rule of law in Poland separately from Hungary will lead ‘nowhere’, 13 
January 2016, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/tavares-discussing-rule-law-poland-
separately-hungary-will-lead. 
173 M. Ahtisaari, J. Frowein and M. Oreja, ‘Report on the Austrian Government’s Commitment to the Common 
European Values, in Particular Concerning the Rights of Minorities, Refugees and Immigrants, and the Evolution 
of the Political Nature of the FPÖ’ (The Wise Men Report), 40 International legal materials: current documents 1, 102–
123 (2001). 
174 Cf. Renáta Uitz, ‘Can You Tell When and Illiberal Democracy Is in the Making? An Appeal to Comparative 
Constitutional Scholarship from Hungary’ (2015) 13 I-CON 279–300. 
175 Most recently stated by Commissioner Věra Jourová during an EP debate on 2 December 2015, on the “Situation 
in Hungary: follow-up to the European Parliament Resolution of 10 June 2015”. 
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2. Distilling general methodological issues to be tackled when 
developing an EU Scoreboard  
2.1 What is a Scoreboard?  
As a previous 2013 European Parliament study on the subject showed,176 there is already a multi-level 
and multi-actor European patchwork of mechanisms engaged to different degrees in the assessment of 
Member States’ compliance with Article 2 TEU principles. A typology was proposed in that study, 
which categorised these mechanisms into four main types of methods (i.e. monitoring, 
evaluation/benchmarking and supervision) in order to facilitate a better understanding of their scope, 
common features and divergences. This categorisation pays particular attention to the kinds of 
methodological features and assessment procedures used. 
 
As the analysis in Section 1.2 above of existing EU instruments assessing Member States’ compliance 
with the legal principles enshrined in Article 2 TEU reveals,177 there are a number of methodological 
challenges affecting the effectiveness in their usage and implementation.  
 
These relate first to their nature as ‘experimental governance techniques’ and ‘policy tools’, which 
constitute soft policy steering and coordination frameworks making use of benchmarking, exchange of 
‘good/best practices’ and mutual learning processes between Member States at EU level. European 
integration takes place and develops not only through the institutional and decision-making parameters 
designed in the EU Treaties, but also through a benchmarking logic consisting of the framing and 
diffusion of common challenges, indicators and standardisation, and best practices/solutions.  
 
They affect the rule-of-law features in the design of the EU inter-institutional balance, which has been 
granted to the so-called ‘Community method of cooperation’, and modify the ways in which EU 
decision-shaping and -making are supposed to take place according to the EU Treaties. Particular issues 
of concern include matters of democratic accountability and judicial control gaps, or the unbalanced 
way in which they handle scrutiny, and a lack of coherency/consistency with other existing EU 
legislative frameworks and policy agendas. Similar concerns have been raised concerning ongoing EU 
surveillance and monitoring systems in the field of economic policy coordination, in particular the 
European Semester for Economic Policy Coordination.  
 
The use of benchmarking and indicator-driven methodologies poses additional methodological 
challenges to the attempts to conduct a fully comprehensive qualitative assessment of Member States’ 
systems and their evolving domestic (context-specific) particularities in a reliable, accurate and objective 
manner. The use of benchmarking should therefore be limited and approached with great caution.  
 
At this point it might be beneficial to deconstruct the ‘triangle’ – democracy, the rule of law and 
fundamental rights – and differentiate between more fluid concepts and phenomena with more solid 
                                                        
176 S. Carrera, E. Guild and N. Hernanz, The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, Democracy and the 
Rule of Law in the EU, Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism, CEPS 2013, available at 
http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Fundamental%20Rights%20DemocracyandRoL.pdf, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/493031/IPOL-
LIBE_ET%282013%29493031_EN.pdf; G.N. Toggenburg and J. Grimheden, ‘The Rule of Law and the Role of 
Fundamental Rights: Seven Practical Pointers’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight 
in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
177 S. Carrera, E. Guild and N. Hernanz, The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, Democracy and the 
Rule of Law in the EU, Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism, CEPS 2013, available at 
http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Fundamental%20Rights%20DemocracyandRoL.pdf, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/493031/IPOL-
LIBE_ET%282013%29493031_EN.pdf. 
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definitions and legal foundations that are often constitutional entrenchments. The rule of law belongs 
to the former group, and there is no single ideal formula for achieving such a complex social 
phenomenon. It is very much context specific, and therefore, as Ginsburg noted in his authoritative 
paper on measuring the rule of law, “one-size-fits-all solutions and ‘best practices’ may simply be 
illusory…[I]ndividual components of the rule of law might not be absolute goods, but rather, goods for 
which we should think of in terms of optimal rather than absolute values” (emphasis in the original).178 
Fundamental rights, as described above, have a solid legal basis, its definitional elements have 
authoritative interpretations and therefore both measuring and benchmarking make more sense with 
regard to fundamental rights.  
 
Since the focus of the EU Scoreboard is on the overall status of the intertwined values of democracy, the 
rule of law and fundamental rights, the benchmarking logic should preferably be abandoned. Instead, 
an EU Scoreboard shall be defined as a ‘process’ encompassing a multi-actor and multi-method cycle. 
2.2 Benchmarking: political challenges, neutrality and impartiality 
The foundational added value of a supranational approach to monitoring and enforcing democracy, the 
rule of law and fundamental rights would be in its contribution to the militant democracy concept 
taking root at the supranational level, and in granting additional protection to individuals and societies 
against abuses of state power, arbitrariness and violations of fundamental rights, when other channels 
of limited government become non-operational.179 Those in power will inevitably argue against the 
validity of the criticism or challenge the legitimacy of the critic. Yet it has been persuasively argued that 
the Council of Europe and the EU would act precisely as a ‘guarantor’ of democracy and the rule of 
European organisations in the countries of central and eastern Europe.180 
 
In order to ensure objectivity, techniques that are not neutral shall be disregarded. This is the main 
reason for being cautious with benchmarking techniques using indicators, as suggested above. What do 
‘indicators’ indicate? As Sergio Carrera (2008) explained, “[B]enchmarking is not neutral. It needs to be 
understood as carrying implications for strong political action through the setting of norms for 
disciplining national politics, policies and eventually laws. European integration takes place not only 
through norms, but also on the basis of figures, graphs and matrices presented as unquestionable, 
whose nature may actually justify any sort of purported strategy or politics.”181 The challenge lies less 
in what indicators to select – and indeed there is a wide range to select from – than in which standards 
to be complied with. “The indicators are used as a measuring tool to pinpoint a specific issue related to 
a policy or law and to examine whether that policy or law is in compliance with the approach set by 
‘the ideal standard’”, or the principle guiding the evaluation.182  
 
The degree of criticism of course depends on conceptualisation and the theoretical framework used, 
which always underlies any set of standards. But one should not fall into the trap of accepting the 
argument of those who are criticised and thus frame the tensions along ideological lines, as happened 
in Hungary. Initially, deliberately mixing liberalism with the concept of liberal democracy, the 
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180 W. Sadurski, Constitutionalism and the Enlargement of Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
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Hungarian government claimed that criticism was influenced by party politics and the liberal school of 
thought,183 and, going a step further, equated liberalism with “unfettered capitalism and full freedom 
of choice in personal lifestyles”.184  
 
Similar objections have been made by the current rulers of Poland in the face of the Commission’s 
criticism.185 This is certainly a misinterpretation of the situation, as the Hungarian and Polish cases do 
not fit any – let alone their own self-proclaimed majoritarian or conservative – ideological tradition: 
whereas they claim their authority from the majority, they do not respond to the will of the people but 
often engage in an elitist approach that either patronises the majority against its will or falsely claims a 
certain minority’s opinion to be the majority’s desire. Acknowledging the antagonistic nature of these 
tensions and the impossibility of associating the novel legal institutions and procedures with 
conservative ideology, or with majoritarianism, the government claimed to realise “unorthodox” 
policies.186 Later, gaining strength and self-confidence, the government even questioned the validity of 
liberal democracies and claimed to build an illiberal democracy,187 rejecting the idea of open society.188 
It is not the objective of the present Research Paper to second-guess the reasons behind the Hungarian 
unorthodoxy or the Polish changes. Whatever the objectives, on the path to achieving them, ingredients 
of the rule of law, basic democratic principles and respect for fundamental rights, i.e. foundational 
European values, were lost. 
 
A related attempt to delegitimise the rule of law mechanism disguises the tensions as European 
diversity189 or a clash of constitutional identities.190 When a state departs from the rule of law, it is hardly 
ever a case of an alternative constitutional identity. Deconstruction of the rule of law is typically a 
project of the governing elite as opposed to mirroring the wish of the people. The dividing line is thus 
not between constitutional identities – as is often contended by illiberal forces – but is still – as in 1941 
when Altiero Spinelli authored his Manifesto – between “those who conceive the essential purpose and 
goal of struggle as being the ancient one, the conquest of national political power, and who, albeit 
involuntarily, play into the hands of reactionary forces, letting the incandescent lava of popular passions 
set in the old moulds, and thus allowing old absurdities to arise once again, and those who see the main 
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purpose as the creation of a solid international State, who will direct popular forces towards this goal, 
and who, even if they were to win national power, would use it first and foremost as an instrument for 
achieving international unity.”191 It is therefore indispensable to bear in mind that attempts to 
undermine the rule of law typically go against the social consensus of the national state in question. 
 
Diversity and tolerance are two of the core strengths of Europe, but clear lines shall be drawn as to 
which differences can be celebrated, which differences must be tolerated, and what are the European 
core values in relation to which disagreement cannot be accepted without putting the European project 
in danger.192 As First Vice-President Frans Timmermans stated in his address to the European 
Parliament, “There is no such thing as an illiberal democracy. Our Union is built on a break from the 
past; on the principle that societies should be free and open, sheltered from arbitrariness and force. This 
great leap – that is what Europe stands for.”193  
 
Should the illiberal state government not be able to call into question the validity of the criticism, it may 
question the legitimacy of the critic – in this case international organisations, or more particularly their 
institutions and bodies – by claiming it acted ultra vires, without a mandate, or in violation of the vertical 
separation of powers. Therefore, there should be a particularly strong emphasis on solid treaty bases, 
legitimacy and accountability. (For such challenges against the EU and EU institutions see Chapter 3.2.) 
 
Finally, not only the neutrality and power of the institution concerned, but the individuals assessing 
respect for European values might become subject to criticism. The importance of ensuring the 
provision of independent academic knowledge is central to the legitimacy and trustworthiness of any 
evaluation and supervisory methods. Any new interdisciplinary platform of academics with proven 
expertise on rule of law aspects which would issue an annual scientific report on the situation of 
fundamental rights, democracy and rule of law in the EU would need to be independent from the 
political and EU inter-institutional arenas.  
 
2.3 Links to other rule of law instruments: synergies and avoiding duplication 
Section 1.2 above showed that several of the currently existing EU instruments assessing Union Member 
States’ compliance with rule of law-related aspects post-accession make use of and often rely heavily 
on already existing data and evaluation instruments in the context of the Council of Europe and the 
UN.  
 
This is the case, for example, of the EU Justice Scoreboard, which has been implemented through a 
methodology based on externalising the analysis to the non-EU actors, chiefly the CoE CEPEJ, and using 
its model of evaluation/benchmarking and its resulting findings covering EU Member States. Similarly, 
the EU Anti-Corruption Report makes use of already existing assessment (non-EU specific) sources of 
information and analysis, in particular the GRECO model and its findings in measuring EU Member 
States’ performance on specific anti-corruption policies.  
 
                                                        
191 A. Spinelli, For a Free and United Europe – A Draft Manifesto, Ventotene (1941). 
192 Cf. the talk of MEP Frank Engel at the ALDE conference on the EU Democratic Governance Pact, 4 February 
2015, http://www.sophieintveld.eu/alde-presents-eu-democratic-governance-pact/. 
193 Speech of First Vice-President Frans Timmermans to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 12 February 2015, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-4402_en.htm. It does not take away from the validity of his 
argument that in the political science literature and historically there is and there used to be such as a thing as 
illiberal democracy. J.-W. Müller, The Problem With “Illiberal Democracy”, 21 January 2016, https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/the-problem-with-illiberal-democracy-by-jan-werner-mueller-2016-
01#6ouqJhI9PLfjVf1V.99. 
AN EU MECHANISM ON DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS | 51 
 
A widespread concern when discussing furthering or deepening EU action in assessing Member States’ 
compliance with Article 2 rule of law legal principles and developing a ‘Scoreboard’ is the wide array 
of information which already exists in other international and regional fora. There is a large consensus, 
often emphasised in EU official documents, about the need to avoid ‘duplication’ with these same 
sources and actors. A case in point has been the work of the CoE and its different bodies in monitoring 
compliance by State parties to the ECHR and other CoE legal instruments and standards.  
 
These concerns have important merits. Synergies and cross-fertilisation with already existing 
monitoring and evaluation instruments and actors in the CoE and UN are a sine qua non when 
considering the value added and design of a future EU Scoreboard. That notwithstanding, relying on 
non-EU specific sources and actors may pose fundamental questions from the perspective of the 
autonomy and specificities characterising the EU legal system and its common Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice “in pursuing its own specific objectives”.  
 
This challenge has been clearly highlighted by the much criticised CJEU Opinion 2/13 of December 
2014194 on EU accession to the ECHR. The CJEU held in its Opinion, “The autonomy enjoyed by EU law in 
relation to the laws of the Member States and in relation to international law requires that the interpretation of 
those fundamental rights be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the EU”,195 thereby 
potentially denying the synergies outlined above and undermining the rule of law architecture of the 
EU.196  
 
The lack of an EU-specific monitoring and evaluation system or ‘Scoreboard’ may cause difficulties 
when ensuring “consistency and uniformity”, not so much as regards the data gathered by EU Member 
States but rather in the actual interpretation of EU Member States’ compliance with EU legal founding 
principles and “the specific characteristics of EU law”. This is particularly so when reading or 
considering the implications of threats or challenges to EU general principles and legal standards and 
rights envisaged in European secondary legislation. 
 
This consistency challenge, coupled with an imperative obligation to respect the Council of Europe 
standards and the potential disagreement in the reading or interpretation of monitoring data covering 
EU Member States’ compliance with rule of law, may become particularly pertinent in those domains 
of European law living upon the so-called ‘principle of mutual recognition’ and the principle of mutual 
trust which are indeed of fundamental importance in domains like EU asylum and criminal justice 
cooperation legislation. The development of an EU rule of law Scoreboard could provide further 
guarantees and strengthen the practical viability of the mutual trust principle in AFJS policies. 
2.4 Theoretical framework 
Drawing up a Scoreboard is a complex interdisciplinary task of lawyers engaged in legal theory and 
dogma, and statisticians aware of methodological issues of data selection and handling. Without 
entering into the details of designing indices on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, 
critical foundational issues will be tackled in what follows. An agreement on these questions is the sine 
qua non of a functional Scoreboard. Vital issues include conceptualisation of the values to be measured; 
interpretation and comparison of data; and recognising the uses and acknowledging the limits of 
various forms of mechanisms to assess compliance with democracy, the rule of law and fundamental 
rights. 
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2.4.1 The need for the triangular approach 
In the following the relationship among the three key interrelated principles – the protection of rule of 
law, democracy and fundamental rights – will be discussed, along with the challenges that arise in 
reflecting on ways to strengthen EU mechanisms to ensure the primacy of all three of these principles. 
The cross-cutting challenges affecting their uses, effective implementation and practical operability are 
a central point of analysis. The three criteria are inherently and indivisibly interconnected, and 
interdependent on each of the others, and they cannot be separated without inflicting profound damage 
on the whole and changing its essential shape and configuration.  
2.4.2 Democracy 
The EU’s democratic deficit is proverbial,197 but active steps are being taken to bridge the gap between 
the daily practice of democracy in the Union and the stated value of Article 2 TEU. The European 
Parliament is endowed with new powers at every Treaty revision, and scholarly investigations lead to 
the EU’s reconceptualisation as a working democracy and even as a ‘Republic’.198 The EU rather 
functions as a demoicracy, in Kalypso Nicolaïdis’ useful characterisation.199 Yes, the institutional 
structure is quite atypical, but the EU is definitely the most democratic among all the international 
organisations of its kind and, probably more important, commands more trust than the national 
governments in a handful of the Member States.200  
 
One can state that the EU has taken this aspect of the triangular relationship of democracy, rule of law, 
and fundamental rights on board in first accepting that the Council, although comprised of 
democratically elected representatives of the Member States, does not secure democracy at the EU level. 
The distance between a national election and the EU legislator was too great to satisfy the demands of 
civil society in the EU for properly functioning democratic institutions in the EU which are subject to 
direct election. From the transformation of the Assembly into the European Parliament, as well as from 
the granting of direct EP elections in the 1970s, the struggle for democracy in the EU has taken a very 
specific ‘governance’ form.201  
 
The accumulation of power to the European Parliament to which the Lisbon Treaty added yet another 
step is a telling example of the governance demoicracy in action: it is a democracy of means, as the 
objectives to be reached are set in stone in the Treaties.202 The struggle to find the appropriate balance 
of democratic representation at the supranational level is thus ongoing. The importance to the European 
Parliament of rule of law is self-evident – direct elections subject to rule of law requirements of the 
franchise is only the starting point. The struggles for transparency as essential to rule of law and 
democracy together are part of this relationship. The efforts of the European Parliament to reach out to 
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national parliaments to ensure their voice is heard and respected in the governance of the EU have also 
been key in this regard.  
 
However, rule of law without democracy can be a hollow and totalitarian principle. Rule by rules can 
be used equally by dictatorships and absolute rulers as well as by liberal democracies. Democracy may 
become substandard without the two other foundational values in the triangular relationship 
mentioned above. “Elections, open, free and fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua 
non. Governments produced by elections may be inefficient, corrupt, short-sighted, irresponsible, 
dominated by special interests, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good. These 
qualities make such governments undesirable but they do not make them undemocratic. Democracy is 
one public virtue, not the only one, and the relation of democracy to other public virtues and vices can 
only be understood if democracy is clearly distinguished from other characteristics of political 
systems.”203 These tensions and the understanding of the rule of law making up for the efficiencies of 
the majority rule are apparent in the rule of law debate discussed infra. 
2.4.3 Rule of law 
All three Article 2 values, the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, are value-laden 
constructions, and therefore one cannot have a wide consensus on all or even the majority of definitional 
elements. A challenge facing any rule-of-law debate at EU level relates to its conceptual vagueness. The 
notion of rule of law is an elusive and controversial one. The thematic contributions composing the 
CEPS report on “The triangular relationship between Fundamental rights, Democracy and Rule of law 
in the EU – Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism” revealed that there is an ‘embeddedness’ of this 
term with specific national historical diversities of a political, institutional, legal and imaginary nature. 
Indeed, legal theory distinguishes between multiple concepts.  
 
The proliferation of detailed definitions of the rule of law notwithstanding, it is necessary to realize that 
defining it in the best possible way cannot cancel the nature of the rule of law, which is an essentially 
contested concept.204 It is thus necessary to keep in mind that even the most detailed definition, to be 
true to the idea of the rule of law, has to contain a share of vagueness in order to accommodate rule of 
law’s very nature. This requirement of vagueness plays strongly against any Quichotean attempts to 
turn the rule of law into a shopping list of elements, even if some examples of relatively good lists are 
known. Eliminating vagueness entirely, on such a reading, profoundly undermines the usefulness of 
the concept itself.205 
 
There are some uncontroversial common elements of the rule of law, though. Both the thin and thick 
concepts of the rule of law require more than rules created by the elected majority.206 In other words, 
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the rule of law necessarily presupposes a balance between gubernaculum – the day-to-day law-making 
and application of the law by the sovereign – and jurisdictio – the checks on the law, which lie beyond 
the sovereign’s reach.207 Even the thinnest understanding claiming that any law that a democratically 
elected Parliament passes can be the foundation of a rule of law presupposes a minimum element: that 
people retain the right of expressing their discontent at least at the next democratic, i.e. free and fair, 
elections.208 Besides, the observance of fundamental rights standards as well as the norms of 
international law cannot be departed from, thus providing a ‘natural’ check on any sovereign 
authority.209 Raz prescribes “(1) that people should be ruled by the law and obey it, and (2) that the law 
should be such that people will be able to be guided by it.”210 Fuller identifies a number of principles, 
such as generality, publicity, prospectivity, clarity, consistency, possibility of compliance, constancy 
and faithful administration of the law.211 Before going on with further potential constituent elements, 
Krygier’s warning shall be remembered: it is impossible to list the prerequisites of a rule of law in 
anatomical terms; instead it shall be seen as a teleological notion.212  
 
Weber brings us closer to the desired objective: although they have good chances to survive, neither 
traditional nor charismatic authority will render a system legitimate without adhering to some 
minimum element of rationality,213 which is often formulated as salus populi suprema lex esto,214 the good 
of the people as the supreme law. A social contract can never be rewritten in a way that does not respect 
at least this minimum requirement.215 Dworkin straightforwardly rejects the value of majoritarianism 
as a legitimising force,216 and searches for the substantive value behind the majority rule, which he traces 
to political equality.217 Along these lines he argues for an alternative concept of democracy, which he 
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calls the partnership conception,218 meaning “government by the people as a whole acting as partners 
in a joint-venture of self-government.” In the same vein, Sajó argues219 that the majority – and even more 
so the supermajority – of MPs in so-called representative democracies might subvert a rule of law first 
by not representing the majority voters as opposed to their mandate220 and second by becoming too 
responsive to popular wishes, denying the rule of law to the powerless, i.e. those who do not have a 
mandate. Crucially, however complex the legal-philosophical notion, it is the tention between 
gubernaculum and jurisdictio that lies at the core of the meaning of the rule of law emerging, as theorised 
by Gianluigi Palombella, as an institutional ideal.221 
 
Lord Bingham’s eight principles of the rule of law are highly authoritative in the quest for the elements 
of the concept. These include that the law must be accessible, intelligible, clear and predictable; 
questions of legal right and liability should as a main rule be resolved by application of the law and not 
the exercise of discretion; equality before the law, except and to the extent that objective differences 
justify differentiation; public officers shall exercise the powers conferred on them in good faith, fairly, 
for the purpose for which the powers were conferred, not ultra vires and not unreasonably; protection 
of fundamental human rights shall be guaranteed; means shall be provided for resolving without 
prohibitive cost or inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes; adjudicative procedures shall be fair; the 
state shall comply with its obligations in international law and domestic law.222 
 
The notion of EU rule of law is a more elusive and controversial one than the rough characterisation 
above might indicate. This is particularly the case when rule of law is considered from a bottom-up 
approach. The CoE European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) has 
provided one of the few more widely accepted conceptual frameworks for rule of law in Europe, and it 
represents a helpful starting point. The ‘embeddedness’ of this term has multiple specific national 
historical diversities of a political, institutional and legal nature. Concepts such as, for instance, 
Rechtsstaat in Germany, État de droit in France, rule of law in the UK, stato di diritto in Italy, or правова 
държава in Bulgaria are far from being synonymous and present distinctive features, including their 
relationships to the other notions of democracy and fundamental rights.223 The material scoping of rule 
of law in Member States’ arenas, and its linkages with the other two criteria, also remain shifting and 
are difficult to capture from a normative viewpoint, which necessarily affects possible EU-level 
understandings, where the emerging ideal of the rule of law is, in the wise words of Laurent Pech, 
“hollystic”,224 which does not detract from its relative clarity.225 Since the path-breaking work by Bebr 
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at least, the EU has been a rule of law community, all the difficulties of defining the term 
notwithstanding.226 
 
In a rule of law emerging as an institutional ideal, built-in correction mechanisms compensate for the 
deficiencies of a majoritarian government: in the first scenario these mechanisms engender healthy 
consequences upon departing from identity politics, whereas in the second they compensate for the 
weaknesses of identity politics, either by granting participation to those groups who have been 
excluded from ‘we, the people’ or by representing their interests while being excluded. In this sense 
international correction mechanisms can be seen as means of militant democracy227 operating along the 
lines of mature constitutionalism implying the existence of robust precautionary measures into 
democratic systems to protect them against a future potential government acquiring and retaining 
powers at all costs, i.e. by superseding constitutional government by autocratic government.228 
 
Rule of law is officially recognised as the primary tool of EU governance in all its forms, even if doubts 
are emerging as to whether the rule of law – a Treaty value and principle – actually amounts to the 
institutional ideal of the European Union, the EU’s self-congratulatory rhetoric notwithstanding.229 EU 
activities are officially based on a profound respect for rule of law230 – the law-making activities which 
engage most of the EU actors either as part of the EU legislator or in the adoption of secondary 
legislation. The Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties is based on the principle of rule of law, 
which is the foundation for its powers of enforcement and infringement proceedings. The primacy of 
the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as the sole legitimate source of 
interpretation of EU law is perhaps the most striking of the rule of the law tools of EU governance. Its 
power to sanction the recalcitrant backsliding Member State, which got somewhat diversified with the 
Lisbon revision of the Treaties, reveals the extraordinary importance which the EU ascribes to rule of 
law.  
 
In this sense it matters little how sceptical of the EU’s rule of law and democratic credentials one can 
eventually be: by supplying an additional level of checks on Member State governments, the EU, along 
Dworkinian lines, can only play a positive role in terms of monitoring and addressing rule of law 
backsliding in the Member States, turning itself into a vital supranational element of militant 
democracy.231 
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2.4.4 Fundamental rights 
The third principle – fundamental rights – has been something of a late comer in the EU’s triangular 
relationship. As European history testifies, democracy is not infallible. Democratic States have and 
continued to adopt intolerant laws and failed to respect fundamental rights in their enforcement 
(respecting the principle of rule of law). This sad truth underlies the Council of Europe’s European 
Convention on Human Rights of 1950. The fact that no State can be a member of the Council of Europe 
without ratifying the ECHR and accepting the principle of individual application and adjudication by 
the European Court of Human Rights is a reflection of this relationship of necessity.  
 
For the EU, however, the long story of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has revealed just how 
reluctant some Member States are of further embedding in the EU fundamental rights even when they 
go no further than those by which the Member States had already been bound in other texts, preventing 
the growth of supranational human rights jurisdiction.232 Unwittingly, the CJEU, previously pushed to 
constitutionalise fundamental rights in a (then even more) rights blind Community by the decisive 
actions of the Italian Corte costituzionale and the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, failed to take the 
Treaty obligation spelled out by the Herren der Verträge in the most unequivocal way to heart, securing 
a setback for the EU’s track record and provoking scholarly criticism of a one-sided Opinion it 
delivered.233  
 
The Lisbon Treaty’s transformation of the Charter from a persuasive document into a legally binding 
one is critical in this development, even though the Charter became binding following yet another 
watering down of its scope.234 The Charter, the rich CJEU case law on the matter, and the EU’s upcoming 
accession to the ECHR235 completes the triangle requiring all activities of the EU and its Member States 
acting within the scope of EU law to be consistent with the EU’s goals and in line with the nascent 
fundamental rights policy.236 Due to the fact that fundamental rights have a solid legal foundation and 
an attached European case law developed over decades, the definitional elements and the tools for 
measuring rights are easier to use than the elements and tools related to the triangle’s other two 
concepts.  
 
One might characterise current EU rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights (in the form of 
fundamental rights in the Charter and the obligation to respect fundamental rights as contained in the 
ECHR) as the profound architecture of the EU. It is for this reason that sound EU supervisory 
mechanisms to ensure that all three principles are fully respected is critical to the success of the 
European integration project as a whole.  
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2.5 Contextual, qualitative assessment 
It is critical that all assessments of the compliance of Member States and their actors with rule of law, 
democracy and fundamental rights are fully objective, academically sound and carried out in a manner 
consistent with the highest standards of scientific rigour. This will require investment of substantial 
resources in the analytical process to ensure that the interpretation of all the information which is 
included in the Scoreboard fulfils the above requirements. We will highlight the most relevant 
methodological pitfalls of a scientifically sound, objective and methodologically correct interpretation 
of indices. 
 
Evaluating the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights cannot be an automated exercise on 
either the input or the output side. On the input side, the identification of standards and accordingly 
the acquisition of data are a challenge. On the output side, indicators “are tools for obtaining a diagnosis, 
not the diagnosis per se.”237 A uniform approach of interpretation with rigid numerical indicators might 
well result in substandard outcomes.  
 
The first issue is ‘what’ quantitative indicators and statistics can actually capture. Most often, they 
mirror the laws, i.e. States’ commitments to achieving certain goals and ideals, but benchmarking cannot 
cover and mirror ‘sociologies of law’. This is also reflected in the attempts of the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights – and on that basis the Fundamental Rights Agency – to capture not 
only laws, institutions (structures) and policies (processes), but also, and most important, the situation 
on the ground (outcome).238 A pilot study conducted by the Fundamental Rights Agency with the 
participation of three Member States, Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands, in three areas, namely hate 
crime, access to justice and discrimination and independence of non-judicial bodies, showed the 
difficulties in agreeing on standards and accordingly on indicators. Whereas member countries could 
come to an agreement on indicators on the laws, and to some extent also on processes, it was close to 
impossible to reach an agreement with regard to the outcomes.239 
 
Once this fundamental problem is tackled, interrelations between data and the causalities behind them 
need to be interpreted, and they can be interpreted in multiple ways. Most important, data shall be 
contextualised, instead of only quantifying the problem.240 Context-specific qualitative evaluations are 
difficult to automatise, and therefore there shall be a heavy reliance on expert knowledge.  
 
Case study: hate crimes 
The lack of data on a certain type of criminality may indicate the lack of that particular type of criminality, 
but it may also indicate high latency. Hate crime statistics are illustrative in this regard. As the Fundamental 
Rights Agency and national studies have proven, hate crime provisions often remain inoperational or become 
counterproductive. This has been shown through the yawning gap between victims’ surveys and the number 
of court files in the Member States.  
 
According to FRA victim surveys up to a third of Jewish people personally experienced verbal or physical 
anti-Semitic violence. Between 16% and 32% of Roma and between 19% and 32% of persons of African origin 
were victims of assault, threat or serious harassment with a perceived racist motive in the 12 months before 
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the research. A quarter of the 93,000 LGBT people, and one-third of transgender people surveyed in the EU 
experienced violence in the five years preceding the survey.241 Official statistical data show, however, that 
most of the crimes do not reach the investigation stage, and even those that do are halted, suspended, or 
poorly investigated, or, if they reach the judicial phase of criminal procedure, the bias motive often cannot be 
proven. The number of hate crime cases in the Member States annually varies between a dozen and some 
200, which is a small fraction of the actual criminality. The European Union classified the official data 
collection mechanisms of the Member States pertaining to hate crimes and only four can be labelled as 
comprehensive data providers. Most of them (14) are providing limited or no data; some of them (9) are good 
data providers.242 Moreover, all the relevant supranational law notwithstanding, the case law on the matter 
is virtually non-existent.243 
 
Longitudinal research data are again subject to interpretation. Certain data are relatively constant, and 
may only have an impact in extreme cases, such as the effects of the judiciary’s budget on its 
independence. Changes in trends also need context-specific interpretation. Rising figures in criminality 
may be explained by the growing tendency of criminality, the strengthening of criminal policy, or the 
lowering of the age of criminal culpability. Also, decreasing figures might be explained by 
decriminalisation of certain types of human behaviour or their classification as petty or non-recordable 
offences instead of crimes. The same can be said for the number of perpetrators registered: decreasing 
numbers may be explained by lesser crimes; or the willingness of parties to turn to restorative justice 
methods, victim-offender mediation, or other out-of-court dispute settlement that the domestic law 
allows; or an emphasis on the principle of opportunity instead of the principle of legality, i.e. 
prosecutors may get a wider leeway to press on with the charges or not; but even the defect or failure 
of investigation might be behind the decreasing numbers. And vice versa.  
 
Oftentimes, it is impossible to say even whether a trend is positive or negative, without context-specific 
interpretation of figures and data. For example, an increase in lost cases against a given country before 
regional human rights tribunals may indicate the deterioration of the fundamental rights situation in 
that country but may also show that individuals are more aware of their rights or that legal 
professionals’ training in the admissibility criteria has been successful.  
 
Again due to the context-specific nature of any evaluation, cross-country comparative analyses on the 
basis of indices entail substantial dangers. Some even argue against any attempt to engage in cross-
country comparisons. They contend that during the process of comparison, context is inevitably lost, 
and the over-generalisation renders the comparison meaningless, if not distorting, giving governments 
inclined to violate EU values pretexts to attempt to justify their corrupt institutional designs, which 
would not emerge as problematic in out-of-context comparisons.244 Therefore, rule of law benchmarking 
and cross-country comparisons should be used sparingly, and in the latter case only similarly situation 
countries should be compared.245  
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Case study: conviction rates  
A typical example is the indicator showing whether those charged with an offence are ultimately convicted. 
Such indicators are often invoked to measure the success of public prosecutors,246 whereas high figures may 
not only indicate prosecutions’ efficiency, but also a biased or overburdened judiciary or a young and 
inexperienced democracy, where judges take the easy way out and – without questioning and double-
checking the correctness of prosecutors’ assessment of the case – copy and paste charges and prosecutors’ 
reasoning into the judgments. 
 
Whereas conviction rates show the importance of context-specific interpretation of causalities, here the 
differences with cross-country comparisons will be highlighted. At the same time it may show the 
preparedness of the prosecutors. In a 2005 research paper Raghav, Ramseyer and Rasmusen studied the 
difference between the conviction rates in the US, where prosecutors win 87-88% of federal cases and 85% of 
state cases, and Japan, where 99.9% of those charged are sentenced.247 If basic conceptual issues are tackled 
(such as whether the first instance decisions or final judgments are taken into account, or whether the person 
charged needs to be guilty on all accounts, or it suffices if he or she is liable on at least one of them) and data 
become comparable, one might draw conclusions with regard to the reasons behind the differences and the 
high percentage in Japan. Some contended that it must be the lack of independence of Japanese judges or an 
informal pressure to make parties settle cases out of court. Before jumping to unjustified conclusions, it is 
worth looking at the number of prosecutors. In Japan there are 1,200 prosecutors, whereas in the US, a country 
with double the population, there are 32,000 prosecutors – 25 times more prosecutors for only twice as many 
people. In the US there are 14 million arrests per year, meaning 438 cases per persecutor, whereas in Japan 
the number of arrests is one-tenth of that in the US, but due to the small number of prosecutors there are only 
1,166 prosecutions per year. Of course, these data are also difficult to compare due to the fact that different 
behaviours qualify as crimes and as grounds for arrest, but the numbers are sufficient to understand that, 
most likely, Japanese prosecutors will not ‘waste’ their time on cases where they do not have absolutely solid 
evidence. Such indicators do not tell us anything about the quality of justice and adherence to procedural 
guarantees. Without contextualisation and detailed qualitative descriptions, it is impossible to derive any 
methodologically sound and valid conclusions from indices. This is even truer for cross-country analyses. 
 
2.6 Quality versus speed  
The efficiency of a Scoreboard depends on the quality of the information which informs it and that of 
the outcome’s interpretation. The higher the quality of the data and its assessment, the more efficient 
the Scoreboard will be in achieving its objective of providing a clear and comprehensive view of the 
field. The poorer the quality of the data and the corresponding interpretation, the less efficient the 
Scoreboard for the purposes of EU compliance with rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights. 
However, excellence in data collection and interpretation also has a price in terms of speed.  
 
A particularly burdensome collection system and lengthy data analysis method have three 
disadvantages. First, by the time the potentially negative assessment is published, the State scrutinised 
might have changed its laws or practices, triggering another measurement and interpretation of 
outcomes. The new laws adopted or practices introduced may be equally substandard, and continue to 
do harm until yet another assessment becomes public. Second, legal consequences attached to a negative 
assessment may lose their impact over time. Criminal lawyers and criminologists are well aware of the 
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fact248 that it is not the gravity of the criminal sanction but its inevitability and proximity to the crime 
committed that have deterrent effect. The same applies to States. Applying this wisdom to the situation 
at hand, it is regrettable that the EU has a relatively slow mechanism for responding to violations of its 
own foundational principles. Third, the often irreversible and severe harm done in the meantime shall 
also be taken into account with regard to the speed of the response, potentially allowing for interim 
evaluations and measures. 
 
The greater the demand for speed, the more corners are likely to be cut on quality and the more subject 
to challenge any Scoreboard is likely to be. There will always be some compromises necessary in getting 
this relationship right.249 The temptation to use ‘tick box’ approaches in order to speed up the 
completion of what must be a periodic and regular task should be avoided. Such approaches, which 
simplify comparability, provide profoundly distorted views of the actual state of affairs regarding the 
subject matter.  
 
Comparability should never compromise the accuracy of the information or the scientific analysis of 
interpretation of data in the Scoreboard. This may mean that more expertise is needed to analyse and 
understand the data, but this is a reasonable cost in light of the importance of the project. If the objective 
is to ensure that the three principles are fully respected in the EU by all Member States and at all levels 
of governance, then the investment in accurate and up-to-date information and methodologically 
sound, context-specific interpretations of indices cannot be underestimated.  
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3. Addressing objections to the supranational tackling of the issue by 
the EU 
3.1 The need for an EU approach 
The EU received its core values at its inception: achieving peace and prosperity, the immediate goals of 
the Union still with us since the times of the Schuman declaration, had a strong implied liberty 
component. Dictatorships and any countries which were not ‘free’ were not welcome to join the 
Union.250 Notwithstanding the fact that democracy and the rule of law were not part of the black letter 
law of the Communities for a long time, both have clearly been regarded as important unwritten 
principles, which became codified thanks to the pre-accession strategy in the context of the preparation 
of the ‘big-bang’ enlargement to the east of the continent.251 It is this process, alongside the political 
initiatives of the institutions and the obiter dicta in the case law of the CJEU, that resulted in the 
distillation of the core elements of the principle of the rule of law in the context of EU 
constitutionalism.252 
 
The development of the written law on principles has been uneven, if not sloppy. ‘Principles’ would be 
the established way of referring to the foundational, enforceable and legally meaningful assumptions 
informing every aspect of the functioning of a given legal system – which unquestionably places rule of 
law and democracy among the principles of EU law.253 Yet, for the first time in EU history, the Lisbon 
Treaty expressly refers to some among the established legal principles as ‘values’, introducing a double 
confusion in what is now Article 2 TEU.254 The first confusion is terminological, given that the rule of 
law is clearly a ‘principle’ in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which has the power of primary law 
of the EU. Moreover, it has been a principle at least since the oft-cited ECJ decision in Les Verts.255 The 
second confusion is theoretical: legal scholarship shows clear differences between values, which are 
desirable ideals, and principles with a more solid binding force. In the context of the Lisbon Treaty, 
however, “values” is a misnomer that results in an erroneous synonymisation of the two words.  
 
It is clear, however, as Laurent Pech has persuasively argued, that the unfortunate wording of Article 2 
TEU does not deprive the rule of law of a legal value of a core legal principle in the context of EU law.256 
Read in conjunction with the rule of law in the Charter and the case law of the Court as well as drawing 
                                                        
250 D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-Accession Conditionality in the Fields of Democracy 
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of the International Legal Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 108–129. 
254 For an analysis, see L. Pech, ‘“A Union Founded on the Rule of Law”: Meaning and Reality of the Rule of Law 
as a Constitutional Principle of EU Law’, 6 European Constitutional Law Review 359–396 (2010). 
255 Case 294/83 Partie Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, 23. See also Opinion 1/91 EEA Agreement 
[1991] ECR 6097. 
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on the rich history of the rule of law as a constitutional principle of the EU, Article 2 TEU thus means 
that the EU based on the rule of law is a Wertegemeinschaft,257 a community based on common values. 
This should not undermine the legal significance of the rule of law in the edifice of EU law. The EU 
views the rule of law as one of its raisons d’être, inspiring its internal and external action, and recognises 
the rule of law as being one of the interrelated trinity of concepts already referred to above.258  
 
Within the scope of the acquis these values were reinforced by the entry into force of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, while outside the scope of the acquis Article 7 TEU is the usual approach to 
enforcing the same values.259 Most important, the fundamental nature of European values referred to 
in Article 2 TEU strongly resonates with the peoples of Europe. When asked about the most important 
values that characterise the European Union, they most often cite peace, human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law. For European individuals personally, peace, human rights and respect for human life 
are the values that matter most.260 
 
All the above notwithstanding, the EU remains vulnerable as far as its values are concerned: problems 
exist at both the supranational and national levels. Firstly, the EU’s own understanding of its values is 
atypical, when approached from the traditional constitutionalism standpoint,261 allowing for a 
theoretical possibility of certain principles of its law, particularly the principle of autonomy of EU law, 
to trump the substance of values, which has been overwhelmingly criticised in the literature.262 The 
concept of autonomy can be traced back to the seminal Costa v ENEL case,263 where the ECJ completed 
a line of argument it started to develop a year earlier in Van Gend and Loos,264 famously proclaiming that 
Community law may have direct effect. As the ECJ argued, direct effect may not be meaningul, should 
national courts be able to overwrite it, as argued earlier by the Italian constitutional court, and therefore 
European laws shall enjoy supremacy over domestic ones. At this point of the reasoning the principle 
of autonomy kicked in. In the ECJ’s view, laws based on the Treaties constitute an autonomous legal 
order [une source autonome], which must not be overwritten by national rules, however these latter are 
formulated. Thus, “according to the ECJ, the EU forms a unified, self-referential legal order, with its 
own internal claim to validity, which, at a minimum, is no longer part of the mainstream of international 
law.”265 As presented by the Union, this is all about the exercise of its competences.266 Approaching this 
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262 P. Eeckhout, ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue – Autonomy or Autarky?’, 38 
Fordham International Law Journal 4, 955–992 (2015); G. Palombella, ‘Beyond Legality – before Democracy: Rule of 
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the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
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critically, however, we are dealing with a recurrent claim by the Union that its power should be 
unchecked externally, based on the strength of an ‘autonomy’ argument.267 Secondly, the EU is lacking 
an evaluation process and enforcement mechanism of these foundational values at the national level, as 
has been demonstrated in Part I of this Research Paper. In other words, the values of Article 2 TEU are 
overwhelmingly procedural at the supranational level, where they need the substance the most, and 
absolutely toothless in the context of ensuring compliance at the national level, where the majority of 
violations – at least at this stage, when the EU itself is behaving well – is most likely to occur. 
 
This double vulnerability is behind the emergence of a particularly dangerous reality, where acting 
within the realm of the acquis, the Union can potentially diminish the national level of fundamental 
rights protection and the respect for the rule of law in the compliant States,268 while at the same time 
being apparently powerless to deal with the States where the rule of law is undermined. That plenty of 
rule of law and human rights-sensitive issues lie within the realm of EU competence to enforce mutual 
recognition is particularly dangerous in this respect: the Union can oblige Member States to honour 
each other’s decisions, even if this would lead to absurd results, while it is at the same time unable to 
affect the substantive build-up and the nature of the national legal systems that take the decisions the 
EU enforces.269  
 
This set-up of strong enforcement of mutual recognition without an ability to affect in all cases what is 
recognised, is potentially explosive and demonstrates the urgent need to tackle the two core drawbacks 
plaguing the functioning of the rule of law in the EU as a legal principle as soon as possible.270 In other 
words, it is impossible to solve the rule of law challenge merely by thinking in terms of enforcement of 
values at the national level in the Member States: an important part of the challenge lies firmly within 
the realm of supranational law and has to do with the EU’s own framing of the substance of its law as 
well as the reach of its powers. 
 
This being said, the challenges underlying enforcement lie in the familiar debate over the conferral of 
powers and national sovereignty, subsidiarity and proportionality, i.e. turning to enforcement sunsu 
stricto is to a large degree about the legal framing of the vertical separation of powers between the EU 
and its constitutive elements. With special regard to purely internal situations, the legitimacy of EU 
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interference is repeatedly questioned by Member States. But there would be something paradoxical 
about confining the Union’s possibilities of action to the areas covered by Union law and asking it to 
ignore serious breaches in areas of national jurisdiction. If a Member State breaches the fundamental 
values, this is likely to undermine the very foundations of the Union and the trust between its members, 
whatever the field in which the breach occurs.271 
 
Beyond harming nationals of a Member State, all Union citizens in that State will also be detrimentally 
affected. Lack of limits to illiberal practices272 may encourage other Member States’ governments to 
follow, and subject other countries’ citizens to abuse. In other words, rule of law violations – if no 
consequences occur – may become contagious.273 Moreover, all EU citizens will to some extent suffer 
due to the given State’s participation in the EU’s decision-making mechanism, or to say the least, the 
legitimacy of Union decision-making will be jeopardised. Therefore, a state’s departure from the rule of 
law standards and the European consensus will ultimately hamper the exercise of rights of individuals 
EU-wide.  
 
As anticipated in Section 2.3 above, we shall also address an important specificity of EU law, namely 
the nature and future faith of instruments covering the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.274 As long 
as fundamental rights are not enforced in a uniform manner throughout the Union, and as long as a 
member country cannot take judicial independence in another State for granted, mutual trust- and 
mutual recognition-based instruments in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice will be 
jeopardised.275 As long as Member States are worried about their citizens’ basic rights and respect for 
their procedural guarantees due to different fundamental rights standards, they leave short-cuts in their 
legislation so as not to enforce EU law and at the same time they interpret EU law in a restrictive way.276 
                                                        
271 European Commission, Communication on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union - Respect for and 
promotion of the values on which the Union is based, COM(2003) 606 final, 15 October 2003, 5; G.N. Toggenburg 
and J. Grimheden, ‘The Rule of Law and the Role of Fundamental Rights: Seven Practical Pointers’, in: C. Closa and 
D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
272 The term was coined long ago, but it gained practical relevance in the EU after the Hungarian Prime Minister 
praised such State structures in his speech given in Tusnádfürdő on 25 July 2014. The original speech is accessible 
in video format via https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PXP-6n1G8ls. Cf. Frans Timmermans’ speech: “there is 
no such thing as an illiberal democracy”. Frans Timmermans, “EU framework for democracy, rule of law and 
fundamental rights”, Speech to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, Speech/15/4402, 12 February 2015. 
273 ‘Viktor Orbán: The conservative subversive’, Politico 28, 2015, 12–15, 15. 
274 It goes without saying that problems can easily arise in a handful of other contexts, in particular with relation to 
the four freedoms, which imply the existence of well-functioning loyalty between the Member States and the Union. 
The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is most prone to providing an opening to the most atrocious violations 
of human rights which could be multiplied and amplified by the EU’s mutual recognition requirements, as 
described above. Cf.: M.P. Maduro, ‘So close yet so far: The paradoxes of mutual recognition’ 14  
Journal of European Public Policy 5, 814–825 (2007); K Nicolaïdis, ‘Trusting the Poles? Constructing Europe through 
mutual recognition’, 14 Journal of European Public Policy 5, 682–698 (2007).  
275 As the CJEU has recently stated, “…[T]he principle of mutual trust between the Member States is of fundamental 
importance in EU law, given that it allows an area without internal borders to be created and maintained. That 
principle requires, particularly with regard to the area of freedom, security and justice, each of those States, save in 
exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly 
with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law.” Opinion 2/13 (ECHR Accession II) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454 on the 
compatibility of the draft agreement on the EU accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) with the EU and TFEU Treaties of 13 December 2014, para. 191. 
276 V. Mitsilegas, ‘The symbolic relationship between mutual trust and fundamental rights in Europe’s Area of 
Criminal Justice’ 6 New Journal of European Criminal Law 4 (2015); V. Mitsilegas, ‘The limits of mutual trust in 
Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: From automatic inter-State cooperation to the slow emergence of 
the individual’, 31 Yearbook of European Law, 1, 319–372 (2012); G. Vermeulen, W. De Bondt, Ch. Ryckman (eds), 
Rethinking international cooperation in criminal matters in the EU. Moving beyond actors, bringing logic back, footed in 
reality, Antwerpen, Apeldoorn, Portland: Maklu, 2012, 269–270.  
66 | BÁRD, CARRERA, GUILD & KOCHENOV 
 
As long as the Member States – with or without good reason – have no confidence in each other’s human 
rights protection mechanisms, the administration of EU criminal justice will remain cumbersome and – 
what could potentially have fatal consequences for the EU legal system – the Member States may invoke 
the protection of basic human rights in order to permit exemptions from the principle of primacy of EU 
law.277  
 
The CJEU has accepted that the presumption of EU Member States’ compliance with fundamental rights 
may be rebuttable.278 However, in the eyes of both the academic literature279 and the European Court of 
Human Rights,280 the Court has not gone far enough in articulating the law on this issue, as the threshold 
for rebutting the presumption established by the CJEU is clearly much higher than the one the ECtHR 
would demand, thus potentially violating the standards of the Convention.281 If EU Member States 
cannot properly ensure an efficient, human rights-compliant and independent judiciary to carry out 
that test, how possibly could the principle of mutual recognition stand in EU JHA law?282 This 
constitutes also a direct challenge to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the role and attributed scrutiny 
functions of European institutions like the European Commission and European Parliament. The 
establishment of a uniform EU fundamental rights regime might be the answer to this challenge.  
 
The heads of States and governments reached the same conclusion in the 2010 Stockholm programme 
and were surprisingly honest regarding the principle of mutual recognition. The Stockholm programme 
expresses a straightforward criticism and intends to establish that mutual trust, which was the alleged 
cornerstone of several third pillar documents adopted after 11 September 2001, was in reality absent. In 
order to remedy the problem and create trust, the multi-annual programme proposes legal 
harmonisation. “The approximation, where necessary, of substantive and procedural law should 
facilitate mutual recognition.”283 By 2012 several important EU laws were passed to this effect, for 
instance laws on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, the right to 
information in criminal proceedings and the establishment of minimum standards on the rights, 
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support and protection of victims of crime – issues all covered in the Justice chapter of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.284  
 
The development of judicial cooperation as illustrated above supports the neo-functionalist explanation 
of the evolution of European integration. At the early stage of integration, Member States declined each 
and every rudimentary formal criminal cooperation, even if cooperation based on mutual recognition 
has been the cornerstone of EU law for decades before the principle entered the domain of criminal 
law.285 The free movement of persons in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, in addition 
to the formation of subjects of legal protection at Community level, necessitated common criminal 
investigation and cooperation in European decision-making (first spillover effect).286 The initially 
stalling criminal cooperation and Member States’ fear of losing a considerable part of their national 
criminal sovereignty resulted in the formation of norms that are highly influenced by politics, difficult 
to enforce and represent lower levels of cooperation: instead of legal harmonisation the adopted 
provisions comply with the principle of mutual recognition.  
 
However, in the absence of adequate, communautarised, enforceable minimum procedural guarantees 
and a fundamental rights mechanism, such provisions were not able to operate effectively. Currently, 
we are witnessing how due process guarantees complement existing provisions and how an EU 
criminal procedural law system evolves, as a second spillover effect, in order to maintain and promote 
an effective criminal cooperation. This is how minimum harmonisation of due process guarantees – or 
in other words, how making fundamental rights justiciable permits – the survival of mutual recognition-
based laws.  
 
Beyond the political costs of the democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights deficit exposed in the 
non-compliant Member States, the social and economic costs should also be mentioned.  
 
When discussing social costs, the point of departure should be the deficiency of democracies, which 
results in the depreciation of the other two values. The elected legislative branch can by necessity not 
represent the whole of the population, and oftentimes it does not even represent the interests of those 
who voted it into the parliament. There are a number of ways by which elected representatives 
misrepresent the people. Some voters may remain without representation due to the simple fact that 
their preferred candidates don’t make it into the parliament. Those candidates who are democratically 
elected might ignore the interests of the opposing candidate’s voters, but elected representatives might 
also turn against those who elected them by not fulfilling the promises made during the electoral 
campaign.  
 
Also – and most important for our purposes – certain groups of people are denied the chance of being 
represented right from the outset, by being excluded from exercising even a most foundational first 
generation human right, namely the right to vote. These are the groups that are traditionally called – 
depending on the jurisdiction in question – insular or vulnerable minorities, such as children, 
individuals living with mental disabilities, and certain groups of foreigners. Lacking political rights, 
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they are typically protected by the judiciary, first and foremost by apex courts.287 Depreciation of the 
rule of law therefore hits these individuals much harder than it hits those capable of influencing to some 
extent electoral processes.  
 
Finally, as proven in Annex 4 by Wim Marneffe, a state based on democracy, the rule of law and 
fundamental rights creates an institutional climate that is determinant for stable economic 
performance: “Rational law presents a necessary condition for economic transactions, and its 
application creates a sense of foreseeability and predictability on the part of economic agents. The latter 
is a necessary condition in order for rational economic actions to occur.” One of the most interesting 
studies in this research domain is Haggard & Tiede288 proving that control of private capture and 
corruption, institutional checks on government, protection of property rights and mitigation of violence 
are all in close correlation with economic performance. (For the details see Annex 4.) Especially in times 
of financial and economic crises solid State institutions based on commonly shared values play a key 
role in creating or restoring confidence and fostering growth.289  
 
In sum, as a result, partly, of the deficiencies of the Union’s own rule of law framing, Member States 
failing to comply with the values of Article 2 TEU undermine the very core of the Union, which can end 
up undermining the state of values in compliant Member States through a strict enforcement of mutual 
recognition in an atmosphere where it has no say concerning the substance of the rules enforced in a 
huge array of cases. In addition to intra-State concerns, rule of law backsliding and constitutional 
capture will thus harm nationals of the Member State in question, as well as EU citizens as a whole; 
erode mutual trust on which instruments in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice are based; incur 
economic, social and political costs for the EU; and diminish credibility in external affairs, especially 
when promoting democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights in third countries. Current 
initiatives by EU institutions shall therefore be welcome, as what is at stake is the rule of law, the 
foundational European value, the sine qua non of European integration, without the safeguarding and 
enforcement of which the EU as we currently know it would cease to exist.  
3.2 Sovereignty challenges of an EU approach  
It is the very constitutional structure of the EU – a multi-layered system of governance following a quasi 
federal model290 – which is based on the principle of conferral that makes the criticism of EU 
intervention possible. Indeed, unlike what would be the case with unitary states, for instance, the EU 
simply cannot intervene in the matters which are outside the scope of competences conferred to it by 
the Herren der Verträge – the Member States. The easiest way to describe it is to state that the Union, 
although a constitutional system, is an atypical one, as it does not possess Kompetenz Kompetenz. Playing 
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with this understanding, the governments of the Member States undermining the rule of law and other 
values of Article 2 TEU usually fall short of telling the full story of what conferral means and how it 
functions, focusing merely on the rule that powers not delegated to the EU rest with the Member States. 
 
The picture is in fact somewhat more complicated. Not only can the EU intervene to protect its 
constitutional core, which is, through the values, shared with those of the Member States. It is also 
unequivocally obliged by the Treaties to act. This obligation has both an internal component, reflected 
in Article 7 TEU, and an external component, articulated in, e.g. Article 3(1). Part of the legal confusion 
seemingly playing in favour of the abusive governments is that the values of Article 2 TEU occupy a 
somewhat atypical place in the body of EU primary law, since they cannot serve as a basis for legislation, 
providing a solemn restatement of the EU’s constitutional nature shared with the Member State. Not 
being part of ordinary acquis does not disqualify them as law, however. Moreover, their binding nature 
is crystal clear and unquestionably operates equally within and outside the scope of conferred EU 
competences, since conferral, as the very existence of a rule of law-abiding democratic system of 
supranational law protecting fundamental rights and also ensuring that the objectives of the Union are 
reached, would be profoundly undermined – indeed, made impossible – should any of the Member 
States of the Union fall seriously short of meeting the basic standards of the value-provisions in the 
Treaties.  
 
This explains why Article 7 TEU, put in place specifically to police the adherence of the Member States 
to the requirements of Article 2 TEU, does not contain any competence limitations. Indeed, it would be 
utterly unproductive to demand EU intervention only in the case of a falsified EP election, for instance, 
while leaving a falsified national election in a backsliding Member State unaffected. Rule of law 
examples stemming from the requirement of the proper functioning of a national court system are even 
more telling. National courts of the Member States act both as national courts sensu stricto and as 
enforcers of EU law or ‘European courts’. In this sense, they constantly enjoy a dual function within the 
Union. Should the interpretation of the narrow approach to the enforcement of values prevail – thus, 
wrongly, connecting them with the scope of competences where the EU can legislate – it would be 
necessary, in every individual case, to determine whether the judge raising an issue of EU law or sensing 
a preliminary question to the CJEU is sufficiently independent and properly appointed, while not 
looking at these issues if the judge sits in a purely national case. 
 
To make matters worse, the difference between purely national and EU-related can be so blurred, that 
even the experts are at times puzzled, making such determinations difficult if not almost impossible.291 
Such is the nature of the overlap of the layers in the European legal system: the Member States are 
responsible only for one layer, but are thereby able to affect the other every single minute. This is where 
the duty of loyalty and sincere cooperation kicks in, prohibiting the national (and also the EU) 
authorities from the obstruction of the achievement of the goals of integration as well as requiring each 
authority in the Union – be it national or supranational – to assist in the attainment of the Union’s 
objectives. In this context any departure by any national authority from the strict adherence to the values 
of Article 2 TEU generates an obligation for the EU to act, to ensure that the proper and uniform 
functioning of the Union legal system throughout the whole territory of all the Member States remains 
unobstructed. In other words, the scope of the acquis as such is necessarily much narrower than the 
scope of application of the values of Article 2 TEU. This discrepancy cannot convincingly be interpreted 
as potentially obstructing EU intervention with the aim of ensuring that the values of Article 2 TEU are 
complied with.  
 
It thus becomes clear that although Article 2 values, including, most importantly, democracy and the 
rule of law, are not within the scope of ordinary acquis in the sense that the Union cannot legislate based 
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on this provision, their inclusion within the broader ambit of EU law cannot be disputed, as underlined 
by scholars on numerous occasions.292 A most obvious sign of the crude legal nature of this provision is 
the existence of Article 7 TEU, which contains a specific enforcement mechanism. Besides, Article 2 
values are unquestionably part of the ‘Treaty’, which the Commission is empowered to protect with the 
help of the ordinary infringement procedures allowing it to bring recalcitrant Member States to court 
(Article 258 TFEU).293 
 
To explain why the values of Article 2 TEU enjoy such an atypical place within the context of EU law 
and do not follow the simple rules of the acquis, a brief turn to the history of the values’ articulation is 
useful. It demonstrates a gradual move from the presumption of compliance of the Member States with 
values toward the articulation of an enforced presumption via the introduction and constant amendments 
of Article 7 TEU.  
 
The democratic and rule of law-abiding nature of the Member States of the Union has always been 
presumed: the initial Communities were given neither powers nor legal tools to intervene in this field. 
This being said, as we already mentioned, the essential role democracy, the rule of law and other values 
play in the very construct of the Union is undeniable: the purpose of unification was ensuring peace, 
prosperity and liberty for the peoples of Europe, which was characterised both by limiting the range of 
national political as well as democratic choices.294 
 
That only democratic States with a strong rule of law and fundamental rights record could join the 
Union was not part of its black-letter law but has been assumed from the very beginning.295 The 
presumptions about the democratic maturity of the Member States survived several rounds of 
enlargement, including those extending membership of the bloc to the newly-democratised countries 
with no strong historical the rule of law record. The belief of the time seems to have been that the 
transformative power and the gains of integration and the internal market made any backsliding 
impossible. The Member States assembled in the Council always had the upper hand in enforcing the 
presumption, overruling the cautious assessment of the European Commission with regard to Greek 
membership, for instance.296 
 
By the time of the ‘big-bang’ enlargement to the east the problems related to this approach became 
apparent: not only did Greece cause problems within and outside of the scope of the acquis; there was 
no trust in the newly-democratised states emerging from behind the Iron Curtain. This is when 
democracy and the rule of law as requirements addressed to the Member States, as opposed to the 
Union itself,297 made it into EU law, first through enforceable political proclamations, then through the 
profound amendments of the Treaties’ provisions on the principles on which the Union and the Member 
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States were founded as well as changes in the EU enlargement procedure.298 The role of the Commission 
in this context was absolutely crucial, as this institution was de facto the only one entrusted with the 
monitoring of the candidate countries’ adherence to the ideals of democracy, the rule of law, and 
fundamental rights protection, through the implementation of the Copenhagen criteria of 1993.299 While 
a huge bulk of documents able to shed light on the emerging European consensus with regard to the 
meaning of the rule of law and its place in the context of modern constitutionalism was produced in the 
process, the ultimate results turned out to be both inconsistent and unreliable in terms of triggering 
transformation,300 and unstable in terms of guaranteeing lasting change, to which the backsliding in a 
number of the Member States testifies.301 The Commission is one of the key actors responsible for the 
failure of conditionality in the area of democracy and the rule of law. 
 
On the positive side, however, the pre-accession strategy, including the Commission’s engagement, 
resulted in three important developments. Each of these, just like the negative side which is one of the 
roots of the current crisis of the rule of law, inform the legal-political nature of the Union today. 
 
Firstly, the pre-accession engagement with the rule of law unquestionably contributed to the distillation 
of the meaning of this fundamental principle of law in the context of EU law, which, albeit broad and 
complex, is clear.302  
 
Secondly, the pre-accession engagement led to the articulation of the need to include the key principles 
promoted through the Copenhagen criteria among the written principles of EU law – a step forward 
following their embrace through the case law of the Court of Justice. In this sense, the pre-accession 
strategy played a crucial role and resulted in the reshaping of European constitutionalism as such, as 
Sadurski has clearly demonstrated.303 
 
As part of this process, thirdly, a special political provision – Article 7 TEU – was included in the Treaty 
of Amsterdam to enable the Union to act when the principles of the rule of law, democracy and 
fundamental rights protection are breached by one of the Member States.304 Although not deployed in 
the case of the public overreaction against the Austrian FPÖ coalition,305 this provision marked a 
definitive departure from dozens of years of constitutional practice and is of crucial importance. For the 
first time since the inception of the Communities, the Treaty of Amsterdam laid to rest the unworkable 
assumption that all the Member States will naturally adhere to democracy and the rule of law merely as 
a consequence of the membership of the Union as such. 
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The legal framing and articulation of the idea that the values of Article 2 TEU can and should be 
enforced created the current state of affairs, where EU legal tools are available for use only in this field. 
This enrichment of EU law made the legal system of the Union more complex, as the law now – and 
since the times of the pre-accession strategy at least – de facto and also de jure includes the acquis sensu 
stricto – the law created by the Union within its scope of competences – and the acquis on values, which 
does not have such competence limitations but, at the same time, lying in the realm of core constitutional 
importance for the EU and the Member States alike, makes formal legislation on its basis impossible. 
Enforcement is always a possibility, however.  
 
Subsidiarity, respecting the power of the lowest possible authority to act, should seemingly guide any 
action in this sensitive field. In other words, the EU is absolutely barred from encroaching on the 
constitutional essence of the Member States in situations where the adherence to values has not 
deteriorated beyond the thresholds established by Article 7 TEU. How to establish this?  
 
In order to ensure that the principle of subsidiarity and, by consequence, the sovereignty of the Member 
States is respected, it is indispensable for the Union to create reliable, permanent and periodic 
mechanisms of data collection, monitoring and exchange, to enable it to be always on top of the situation 
on the ground in all the Member States. Monitoring is of crucial importance to make sure that the limits 
of powers set in the Treaties are respected. The pre-Article 7 procedure of the Commission, initiated 
against Poland on January 13 this year, is a great example of a competence-sensitive and constructive 
approach to tackling the issue of vital knowledge. By designing a special procedure of information 
exchange with the Member State suspected of potentially falling short of Article 7 standards, the 
European Commission managed to establish a transparent and reliable procedure which is as 
constructive as it is forward-looking. Yet, and most unfortunately, it will most likely not be effective at 
all in reaching the goals it set for itself, as explained above. 
 
The European Parliament is as empowered as the Commission to step up its activity in this domain, as, 
just like other institutions, the EP is expected to play a role in the Article 7 procedures, once activated. 
To make sure that a meaningful role is played and the principle of the division of competences is 
safeguarded, it is absolutely necessary for the Parliament to be in possession of all the necessary 
information concerning the state of democracy and the rule of law on the ground in the Member State 
suspected of a violation. 
 
To sum up, it is necessary to state that although EU values do not make up part of the standard Union 
acquis by lying within the grey area in terms of competences, the departure from the presumption of 
compliance with the values of the EU by all the Member States brought about by the big-bang 
enlargement to the east and the introduction of the special procedures of the enforcement of values, 
changed the paradigm of EU engagement in this sensitive area, creating a new legal reality compared 
to, say, 30 years ago. Once the obligation to enforce and promote the values appeared in the Treaties, 
the Member States were barred from making any legally sound arguments tailored to preventing EU 
intervention in the area based on the lack of Kompetenz Kompetenz considerations. Quite on the contrary, 
in light of the obligation to uphold and promote the values of the Union as well as the duty of loyalty, 
one can expect each Member State to actively participate in the attempts of the Union to restore the 
adherence to the values in any part of the Union’s territory. 
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4. Specific suggestions for the elements of an EU Scoreboard  
European integration is based on core values: the EU’s watchdog function over the rule of law, liberal 
democracy and fundamental rights; upholding the heritage of enlightenment; allowing rationality to 
penetrate politics and law-making; and granting protection for individuals against the State or 
supranational entities. In the following, and based on the previous parts of this Research Paper – 
mapping the state of the art and existing mechanisms in the EU, CoE and UN contexts to assess 
democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, and highlighting general and EU-specific 
methodological issues – the main points to be taken into consideration when establishing an EU 
Scoreboard will be summarised. 
4.1 Annual cycle: an all-encompassing approach 
In its Resolution of 10 June 2015 the European Parliament called for an annual monitoring of compliance 
with democracy, the rule of law and the situation of fundamental rights in all Member States through a 
Scoreboard, to be established on the basis of common and objective indicators. The first issue to be 
tackled is ‘what’ a Scoreboard is, what methodology and what model it shall follow. A Scoreboard could 
be a combination of ‘discussion and dialogue’, ‘monitoring’, ‘measuring/evaluating and benchmarking’ 
and ‘supervision’, with various actors and methods channelled into one EU-specific system. In this 
sense a Scoreboard could be described as a ‘process’ encompassing a multi-actor and multi-method 
regular cycle.  
4.2 Conferral and subsidiarity 
Member States often claim European institutions act ultra vires when intruding into their purely 
domestic affairs. As it was shown in Section 3.2 above, not only can the EU intervene to protect its 
constitutional core, but it is also unequivocally obliged by the Treaties to act. Member Sates are 
interdependent in multiple areas, and depreciation of EU values will have EU-wide effects in all 
possible ways. Beyond harming nationals of a Member State, Union citizens residing in that State will 
also be detrimentally affected. Illiberal practices encourage other Member States’ governments to 
follow, and subject other countries’ citizens to abuse. All EU citizens will to some extent suffer due to 
the given State’s participation in the EU’s decision-making mechanism. Furthermore, the mutual trust 
underlying many European laws will be fundamentally undermined, jeopardising the Union’s legal 
system. To complicate matters further, the difference between national and EU-related can be blurred, 
so as to make reference to purely domestic matters meaningless.  
 
At the same time subsidiarity should guide any EU action in the field. In other words, the EU is 
absolutely barred from encroaching on the constitutional essence of the Member States in the situations 
where the adherence to values has not deteriorated beyond the thresholds established by Article 7 TEU. 
In order to ensure that the principle of subsidiarity and, by consequence, the sovereignty of the Member 
States are respected, it is indispensable for the Union to create reliable instruments of data collection 
and exchange, to enable it to be always on top of the situation on the ground in all the Member States. 
A Scoreboard instrument in this sense is not in contravention of the subsidiarity principle but, quite to 
the contrary, would contribute to making it operational.  
4.3 EU self-check and a Scoreboard mechanism for the Member States 
In the supranational context, in order to strengthen the EU’s position as a rule of law actor and to 
prevent hypocrisy, preferably both the supranational entity – in the case at hand, the EU – and its 
constitutive elements, i.e. the Member States, shall be scrutinised via a Scoreboard.  
 
How likely is a scenario where the EU would violate European principles? Let us here refer to the 
highest European authority, the main European guardian of fundamental rights, the ECtHR, which 
74 | BÁRD, CARRERA, GUILD & KOCHENOV 
 
found that the protection of fundamental rights by EU law could be considered “equivalent” to that of 
the Convention system.306 There might be pragmatic reasons behind the presumption – the ECtHR not 
wanting to engage in a direct conflict with the EU or with the Member States that might become 
inflexible and jeopardise enforcement if they found themselves between a rock and a hard place, i.e. 
either meet their obligations stemming from EU law or comply with the Convention.307 Still, that does 
not take away from the importance of the Bosphorus presumption, i.e. that EU law provides a system 
of fundamental rights protection similar to the Convention system. However, any such presumption 
can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the protection of 
Convention rights was manifestly deficient.308  
 
The sheer fact that the presumption is rebuttable shows that the EU’s adherence to European values 
cannot be taken for granted. Even more illustrative is the fact that in cases where the ECtHR refused to 
apply the Bosphorus test, pieces of EU laws – when scrutinised through the conventional test – were 
found to be in violation of the Convention.309 Whereas in a handful of cases the CJEU found EU 
instruments to be in violation of EU values,310 there are worrying instances when the Luxembourg Court 
did not draw the right balance between competing private and public interests – as we retrospectively 
know from ECtHR judgments.311 The number of such cases is only likely to grow after Opinion 2/13, 
which gave preference to vague structural considerations of EU federalism over the substance of the 
fundamental rights of EU citizens in a situation where there was no apparent conflict between the two, 
as Piet Eeckhout, among others, has demonstrated.312 That proves all too well the necessity to apply the 
Scoreboard vis-à-vis the EU including its laws and policies, and the actual realisation of goals to which 
the Union is committed, and not only its member countries. That will also enhance the EU’s internal 
and external legitimacy.  
 
At the same time European values not only influence European law-making on the supranational scene 
but also have an impact on national laws and policies, and vice versa; mutual trust among EU Member 
States and their respective legal systems is the foundation of the Union legal system. Therefore, it is of 
utmost importance to regularly check the way European values are implemented at the national level. 
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4.4 Possibilities and limits of borrowing from existing mechanisms  
There is a complex matrix of existing actors, methods and instruments monitoring, evaluating and to 
some extent supervising democracy, the rule of law and the protection of fundamental rights. There is 
a strong belief – also shared by interviewees – ‘not to reinvent the wheel’ but instead to rely on existing 
mechanisms, and if needed to complement existing systems and make them EU-specific. As has been 
shown in this Research Paper, this is already happening, with the EU Justice Scoreboard relying among 
others on the CoE CEPEJ model of evaluation/benchmarking, and the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
making use of the GRECO model. Borrowing may take place with regard to information, data, 
standards, structures and mechanisms.313  
 
One option is to bring together all existing data and analyses from the international scene under one 
umbrella, in a ‘one-stop shop’, like the European Fundamental Rights Information System within the 
frame of the Fundamental Rights Agency. EFRIS would not aggregate data or indices; instead it would 
allow for a sophisticated search to check in a coherent format all data and reports on a given Member 
State, in a given time frame on a given topic. It would enable gaps to be identified and allow additional 
data to be acquired and conclusions to be drawn. In addition annual reports could be drafted on the 
basis of available materials.314 This Study argues that already existing data and analyses on various ‘rule 
of law-related dimensions’ at the CoE and the UN should be taken in consideration during the EU Rule 
of Law Scoreboard.  
 
At the same time, bringing together data and analysing synergies, or even making comparisons as 
suggested in the literature, is an exercise that is close to impossible and more akin to ‘alchemy’. As 
shown in Chapters 1.2 and 1.3 of this Paper, standards, sources, data, data-handling methods and the 
interpretations of each of the various sets of tools are so different in nature and fundamentals, they 
necessitate a very tedious methodological exercise for making international mechanisms comparable 
and conclusions and findings meaningful.  
 
While relying on external sources and mechanisms, the EU element or specificity of the process shall 
always be kept. In other words, a rule of law mechanism shall never be ‘contracted out’ entirely to third 
parties, since non-EU actors fail to take due account of their relevance or links with existing European 
law and policies as well as general principles of European law, such as that of mutual recognition of 
judicial/administrative decisions. 
  
As the CJEU put it: “In so far as the ECHR would, in requiring the EU and the Member States to be 
considered Contracting Parties not only in their relations with Contracting Parties which are not 
Member States of the EU but also in their relations with each other, including where such relations are 
governed by EU law, require a Member State to check that another Member State has observed 
fundamental rights, even though EU law imposes an obligation of mutual trust between those Member 
States, accession is liable to upset the underlying balance of the EU and undermine the autonomy of EU 
law.”315 No external non-EU mechanism would put such a heavy emphasis on the specificities of the 
EU legal system and the autonomy, primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law. If the path taken by the 
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CJEU is to be followed, the EU shall not allow a third party to determine exclusively how European 
values shall be construed in the EU’s multi-level constitutional system.316 
 
The stance of the Court can of course be harshly criticised. Should the Court be „serious about its claim 
that the Union constitutes an entity with distinct constitutional features, it should be prepared to 
translate this into a policy of deference towards external norms. (...) Under a modern, liberal reading of 
the concept, more autonomy vis-à-vis international law in effect might mean less autonomy.“317 In the 
present context the sui generis constitutional character of EU law predestines it to the status of 
“domestic law” that could potentially be reviewed by the ECtHR. 
 
But there is a strong argument for respecting EU law autonomy: the EU shall be allowed to set higher 
standards than other international mechanisms. Take the example of a Member State found in violation 
of the European Convention on Human Rights due to its widespread overcrowding of prisons.318 Is the 
Member State free to refuse surrendering suspects or alternatively to make surrender conditional upon 
an assurance that minimum detention conditions are met in the issuing state?319  
 
And on what basis? In the N.S.320 case the Court of Justice – echoing the Strasbourg judgment in M.S.S.321 
– emphasised international reports. So does a requested State have to wait until a prisoner exhausts all 
domestic remedies and turns to the Strasbourg Court, which ultimately renders a decision? Or will it 
be accountable to make an assessment on a case-by-case basis, thereby overwriting the principle of 
mutual trust? Or somewhere in between, does it have to register a certain level of rights infringement 
in order to engage in an assessment of the merits of the case? Does it have to wait until it can rely on 
international documents, e.g. until the Council of Europe anti-torture Committee visits the issuing 
country and publishes a negative report? Instead of being at the mercy of external bodies, the EU could 
develop its own control mechanism and prevent mutual recognition work even before there was 
international condemnation for a human rights violation. As Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera and Elspeth 
Guild suggested, “[A] permanent EU assessment board could be established in order to carry out a 
constant monitoring of the quality of Member States’ criminal justice systems and verify whether they 
fulfil international and European standards on the rule of law.”322  
 
The EU Rule of Law Scoreboard could fit into the timetable of the European Semester and could be 
linked to the Cycle of Economic Governance. Beyond necessary overlaps in data collection however the 
EU Scoreboard shall be detached from other existing mechanism, with special regard to the latter’s 
weaknesses with regard to enforcement.323 In the former mechanism the low enforcement rate remains 
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45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13, and 64586/13, 10 March 2015. 
319 Questions soon to be answered by the CJEU in Case C-404/15 Aranyosi, request for a preliminary ruling lodged 
on 24 July 2015. See also Opinion of AG Bot in  C‑404/15 Aranyosi and C‑659/15 PPU Căldăraru, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:140. 
320 Cases C-411/10 N.S. v Secretary of State for Home Department [2010] OJ C 274/21; and C-493/10, M.E. v Refugee 
Applications Commissioner [2011] OJ C 13/18. 
321 ECtHR, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/09, 21 January 2011. 
322 D. Bigo, S. Carrera and E. Guild, The CHALLENGE Project: Final Policy Recommendations on the Changing 
Landscape of European Liberty and Security, 2009, http://aei.pitt.edu/12224/1/1905.pdf, 12. 
323 Darvas, Z. and Leandro, Á. ‘The Limitations of Policy Coordination in the Euro Area Under the European 
Semester, Brussels: Bruegel Institute‘, Policy Contribution 2015/19, November 2015 
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without much echo, whereas the essence of the proposed EU Scoreboard is enforcement of foundational 
EU values beyond monitoring. 
4.5 Contextual, qualitative assessment, little if no benchmarking 
A case-by-case approach would be needed, where assessment through numerical indicators could be 
an element, but it should not constitute the core of the new Scoreboard. Instead, emphasis shall be 
placed on a contextual, qualitative assessment of data and a country-specific list of key issues, in order 
to grasp interrelations between data and the causalities behind them.  
 
Limits of the Scoreboard should also be acknowledged: it would not be suitable to predict or prevent 
future trends; rank Member States according to who is performing ‘better’ or ‘worse’; or conduct 
simplistic cross-country comparative analyses.  
 
Fundamental rights to a lesser extent, but democracy and even more the rule of law are fluid concepts 
and phenomena, and there is no single ideal formula to achieve them. Rule of law is a contested concept, 
and even the most detailed definition, to be true to the idea of the rule of law, has to contain a share of 
vagueness in order to accommodate rule of law’s very nature. This requirement of vagueness plays 
strongly against any Quichotean attempts to turn the rule of law into a shopping list of elements, even 
if some examples of relatively good lists are known. Eliminating vagueness entirely, on such a reading, 
profoundly undermines the usefulness of the concept itself. Therefore we argue against designing the 
standards along indicators – a rather dubious exercise that can easily be attacked as politically or 
ideologically biased. It is suggested to carefully consider whether needed and sparingly use 
benchmarking methods and indicators.  
 
Lack of agreement on standards and a context-sensitive analysis is not only benefiting states, but at the 
same time it does not allow rule of law backsliders to hide their efforts by referencing other states and 
claiming that there was nothing unorthodox about their structures. Whereas it may be true that formally 
a state borrowed the existing legal solutions, institutions and practices from various other jurisdictions, 
it might well be a selection of ‘worst practices’ and taken as a whole, a “Frankenstate” may be in the 
making.324  
 
The contextualization of a rule of law assessment shall be a nuanced exercise and particular care shall 
be taken not to rely on a standardised benchmarking system that could potentially veil or blur problems 
in the subparts of EU values – thereby doing more harm than good, or even more harm than not having 
an EU Scoreboard at all. 
4.6 Three scenarios 
On a positive note, the ongoing rule of law debate shifted its focus from an Article 7 TEU emergency-
led context toward a discussion on shared European values and legal principles. Over time the scope of 
the discussion became broader, in at least two dimensions: emphasis shifted beyond supervision to the 
active promotion of EU values, and the material scope widened beyond the rule of law incorporating 
all aspects of the triangular relationship including also democracy and fundamental rights. This also 
means that very different scenarios are covered in the debate, and these shall be clearly distinguished, 
as they trigger different responses. We systemised possible stages of respect for European values and 
identified three scenarios.  
 
                                                        
324 K. L. Scheppele, ‘The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: Why Governance Checklists Do Not Work’, 26 Governance 
2013, 559. 
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In the first scenario, the boundaries of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are primarily 
set by national constitutional law and domestic bills of rights, whereas the enforcement of the values is 
first and foremost the task of the domestic courts. Acknowledging that decisions are made by fallible 
human beings, in-built guarantees emerged over history to remedy mistakes and biases, such as the 
requirement of an impartial and independent judiciary, the possibility of appeal, but broader concepts 
including separation of powers or checks and balances are also supposed to contribute to the 
enforcement of values. Therefore in a functioning democracy based on the rule of law respecting 
fundamental rights, an external mechanism is not vital. Still, it can have an added value, with special 
regard to the positive obligations of the EU to promote European values. (cf. Article 3 TEU) At the same 
time the only way to ensure co-ownership of the Scoreboard of Member States in general, is to have 
countries involved in the scoreboarding process and invite them to cooperate, irrespectively where they 
stand with the enforcement of European values. 
 
In a second scenario a Member State still adhering to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights 
might be in violation of certain individual rights, due to individual mistakes or structural and recurrent 
problems. In such cases as a general rule, if domestic mechanisms (such as a constitutional court, civil 
society or media pressure) are incapable of solving the problem, the national law will be overwritten by 
international law and deficiencies in application of the law will be remedied to some extent by 
international apex courts. That applies both to individual rights infringements and structural problems. 
In this second scenario international law is invoked vis-à-vis a democratic nation state based on the rule 
of law and respecting fundamental rights, where there necessarily emerge some law-making mistakes 
or anomalies in the application of the law. In other cases with a chronic lack of capacity to solve systemic 
problems such as corruption, international norms and fora cannot remedy the problems, but can point 
to them and contribute to the domestic efforts tackling them. In this second scenario emphasis shall be 
placed on the various sub-elements of European values; Member States should be warned if these are 
at risk, in what concerns specific issues or themes; they shall receive an in-depth analysis of key problem 
areas; and particular care shall be taken not to rely on a standardised benchmarking system that could 
potentially veil or blurred problems in the subparts of democracy, and the rule of law or fundamental 
rights.  
 
There is also a third scenario, which is qualitatively different from the situations described in the previous 
points. In this last scenario domestic checks, all channels of internal criticism failed; there is a systemic 
breach of separation of powers, constitutional adjudication; there is a failure of the ordinary judiciary 
and the ombudsman system; and neither civil society nor the media is capable of fulfilling their 
watchdog functions. In a state which is off the track of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental 
rights, only the control mechanism of international law including international courts protecting the 
rule of law is left.325 Accordingly we regard international norms and enforcement mechanisms as 
external tools of militant democracy whereby the unrepresented are granted protection against their 
substandard representatives, against arbitrary use of power and mass violations of individual rights 
and freedoms when all domestic channels of criticism have been silenced and all domestic safeguards 
of democracy became inoperational – in other words, when the rule of law has been efficiently 
deconstructed in the national setting, i.e. when a Member State is in a state of constitutional capture,326 
sometimes also referred to as constitutional overhaul,327 or if it is on its way towards such a state, also 
                                                        
325 Cf. “[I]n contemporary Europe, some of the most important institutional checks on power are those exercised 
by the EU and the broader international community, rather than anything within Hungary itself.” Francis 
Fukuyama, ‘Do Institutions Really Matter?’ The American Interest, 23 January 2012, http://blogs.the-american-
interest.com/fukuyama/2012/01/23/do-institutions-really-matter/#sthash.DOa5ys3f.dpuf. 
326 J.-W. Müller, Constitutional Patriotism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.  
327 Renata Uitz, ‘Can You Tell When and Illiberal Democracy Is in the Making? An Appeal to Comparative 
Constitutional Scholarship from Hungary’ (2015) 13 I-CON 279–300, 282. 
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referred to as rule of law backsliding.328 In such states no areas of social life remain intact and 
arbitrariness penetrates all state policies. 
 
Whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are singled out for the present analysis, the 
division of scenarios shall also be applicable to other European values, as well. The system developed 
could also include rule of law obstruction and weakening of the EU’s international presence through 
well-articulated actions preventing EU foreign policy from achieving its desired results.329  
 
Construction of an illiberal state cannot go unnoticed. It is quite apparent when a state departed from 
the concept of liberal democracies, especially when it openly propagates an alternative state structure. 
Even if it is not self-proclaimed, the steps taken clearly delineate the path towards an authoritarian 
regime. Still, an “I know it when I see it” approach is not viable,330 and will immediately be subject to 
criticism claiming the political and ideological nature of the attack. It is not easy to pinpoint the date 
and time when the line between the second and third scenarios has been crossed, and determine when 
an illiberal state is in the making. Benchmarking, indexing and an accordingly conducted “comparative 
analysis may overlook the building of a constitutional regime in which constitutional constraints on the 
exercise of political power evaporate, signs which point to clear departures from the global fold.”331  
 
Measuring the severity of the violation will not help either: whereas the depth of the violation may be 
indicative, it is not necessarily decisive as to a systemic threat or breach: however grave the 
infringement, if there is a commitment to foundational values by the supranational entity or the state, 
it is meaningful to engage in a dialogue and remedy the situation. (Scenario 2)332 Instead a 
methodologically sound, objective annual EU Scoreboard mechanism may be of help to draw the 
borderline between the second and the third scenarios, i.e. indicate when the breaches of European 
values become qualitatively different from a set of individual violations.  
 
                                                        
328 J.-W. Müller, ‘Safeguarding Democracy inside the EU: Brussels and the Future of Liberal Order’ (2013) Working 
Paper No. 3 (Washington, DC: Transatlantic Academy).  
329 E. Basheska and D. Kochenov, ‘Thanking the Greeks. The Crisis of the Rule of Law in EU Enlargement 
Regulation’, April 2015, 39 Southeastern Europe 92–414 (2015). 
330 Justice Steward first used this now colloquial expression in relation to hard-core pornography in Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), at 197, explaining why the material at issue was not obscene and therefore protected by 
freedom of expression: “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be 
embraced within that shorthand description [of ‘hard-core pornography’], and perhaps I could never succeed in 
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.” 
331 R. Uitz, ‘Can You Tell When and Illiberal Democracy Is in the Making? An Appeal to Comparative Constitutional 
Scholarship from Hungary’ 13 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1, 279–300. (2015). 
332 For an overview of the terms systemic threat, systemic violation and serious breach, see D. Kochenov and L. 
Pech, ‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality’, 11 European Constitutional 
Law Review, 512–540 (2015). 
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Figure 2. The three rule of law scenarios 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
4.7 Objectivity and equality 
A key challenge of any Scoreboard is how to preserve its autonomy and legitimacy when governments 
and the various EU institutions will accuse it of being ‘political’ and ‘non-neutral’.  
 
In particular a country in a constitutional capture will question the validity of or simply disregard 
external criticism, and/or challenge the legitimacy of the critic, by claiming it acted ultra vires, without 
a mandate, or in violation of the vertical separation of powers. Therefore there should be a particularly 
strong emphasis on solid treaty bases, legitimacy and accountability. 
 
The challenge is even greater, since supervisory mechanisms for states in a constitutional capture 
include the introduction of proportionate, dissuasive and effective sanctions – ultimately harsher 
measures than what Member States are used to in the arena of fluid European values, and therefore it 
is of utmost importance to be objective, not to apply double standards and establish institutions and 
procedures the legitimacy of which are beyond doubt.  
 
Examples for infringing single elements of European values as opposed to systemic threats and violations 
 
Display of insignia of totalitarian regimes 
 
Should a certain domestic legal institution contravene European standards, the rights of those effected may 
seriously be hampered. However if the rule of law is not systematically deconstructed, there will be 
mechanisms to remedy the situation. Remedies may include domestic ones, or if they fail, the individual 
steps of enforcement of ECtHR judgments through an impartial judiciary, and the general steps of 
enforcement through a lawmaker adhering to the rule of law, modifying black letter law. Vice versa, in a state 
where the rule of law is systematically deconstructed and is lacking an impartial judiciary the situation will 
not be remedied, and ECtHR judgments will not be properly enforced. This is no hypothetical scenario. 
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Whereas there are tensions between several domestic jurisdictions and the Convention system,333 the 
Hungarian state refused to enforce a Strasbourg decision in an unprecedented way. The basis of the dispute 
was the case of János Fratanoló, member of the “Workers’ Party 2006”, who was sentenced in a criminal 
proceeding for wearing a five pointed red star at the celebration organized on the occasion of Hungary’s EU 
accession and Workers’ Day.334 Based on its previous decision Vajnai v. Hungary with virtually the same fact 
pattern the ECtHR held Hungary to be in violation of Article 10 ECHR guaranteeing freedom of expression, 
for criminalizing wearing the red star. Had Hungary enforced Vajnai, the Fratanoló case would never have 
reached the Strasbourg court. But instead of enforcing the second judgment with the same findings, a 
Parliamentary Resolution disapproved of the Strasbourg judgment Fratanoló v. Hungary.335  
 
Resolution 58/2012 (VII.10) of the Hungarian Parliament pointed out that “the provision of the Criminal 
Code prohibiting the use of symbols of totalitarian regimes was adopted for the protection of the democratic 
social order, with a view to the country’s historical past, in line with principles which guarantee respect for 
human dignity and in compliance with the constitutional order. Therefore, Parliament disagreed with the 
judgment application No. 29459/10 finding Hungary in violation of the Convention, the opinion of the 
ECtHR and with the amendment of the Criminal Code”. The Resolution also stated that the amount of 
compensation Hungary will be obliged to pay in the future due to the application of the Criminal Code’s 
relevant provision should be paid from the parties’ budget. In a laconic reasoning336 Parliament made 
reference to the Constitutional Court’s decision passed a decade before the ECtHR judgments,337 which found 
the relevant provision of the Criminal Code to be in compliance with the Constitution. Without elaborating 
on the Resolution338 two comments need to be made here. First, the Vajnai and Fratanoló judgments do not 
suggest that the only way to guarantee compliance with the Convention is through the amendment of the 
Criminal Code. Instead the judgments give clear instructions on how the provision prohibiting the use of 
symbols of totalitarian regimes can be applied by the judiciary without infringing the Convention. Second, 
invoking the Constitutional Court’s decision rendered in the year 2000 as a justification for not amending the 
relevant provision of the Criminal Code is clearly mistaken because at the time it had no chance to take the 
later Vajnai and Fratanoló judgments into account. Indeed the Constitutional Court in 2013 reviewed its 
position and found – in heavy reliance to the the Strasbourg cases – that the criminal offense of using symbols 
of totalitarian regimes as formulated by the Criminal Code at the time violated the constitutional principle of 
legal certainty and freedom of expression.339 The invalidated provision was later replaced by introducing 
additional definitional elements: the use of symbols of totalitarian regimes in itself is insufficient to commit 
the crime, the display of symbols of totalitarian regimes is punishable only if done in a manner that is suitable 
for disturbing public peace, and in particular violates the dignity of victims or the memory of deceased 
victims of dictatorships.340 Despite the ending, the long saga of the Hungarian red star cases illustrates how 
states might attempt to delegitimize European supervisory mechanisms. 
 
 
                                                        
333 Ch. Grabenwarter, ‘Grundrechtsvielfalt und Grundrechtskonflikte im europäischen Mehrebenensystem – 
Wirkungen von EGMR-Urteilen und der Beurteilungsspielraum der Mitgliedstaaten’, 38 Europäische Grundrechte 
Zeitschrift 8, 229–232 (2011). 
334 ECtHR, Fratanoló v Hungary, Application no. 29459/10, 3 November 2011. 
335 10 July 2012 Parliamentary Resolution 58/2012 (VII.10.) stated that the Parliament “does not agree with the 
modification of the Criminal Code”. 
336 Proposal for a Parliamentary Resolution, H/6854.  
337 Hungarian Constitutional Court, Decision No. 14/2000 (V. 12.) 
338 For a detailed analysis of the legal, moral, and political implications of the nonenforcement of the Fratanoló 
judgment see P. Bárd, ‘The Non-enforcement of Strasbourg Decisions and Its Consequences’ ,in J. Busch and K. 
Lachmayer et al. (eds.), International Constitutional Law in Legal Education. Proceedings of the Erasmus IP NICLAS 2007–
2012, International and Comparative Public Law Series (Schriften zum Internationalen und Vergleichenden 
Öffentlichen Recht) (Vienna: Nomos, 2013), 8, or in greater detail P. Bárd, ‘Strasbourg v Hungary’, in: Kriminológiai 
Közlemények, Budapest: Magyar Kriminológiai Társaság, 2012, 145–204. 
339 Hungarian Constitutional Court, HCC Decision No. 4/2013 (II. 21.). 
340 See Act XLVIII of 2013 introducing Article 335 into the Criminal Code, i.e. Act C of 2012. 
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Life imprisonment cases 
 
Sometimes the questioning of the Convention’s and the ECtHR’s authority is more subtle. In a more recent 
case, the Hungarian system of life imprisonment without parole was challenged and held to be in violation 
of the Convention in Magyar v Hungary.341 In a series of relevant judgments the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court342 and the Supreme Court343 proved that they were neither capable of enforcing European standards, 
nor of complying with European review mechanisms. The former erfused to decide on the constitutionality 
of the Hungarian life imprisonment regime in the merits, and the latter instructed ordinary courts not to 
directly consider the Convention, but apply domestic law instead,344 even if in clear contradiction of 
Strasbourg tests.345 The Supreme Court insisted that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is 
allowed by international law, and that the ECtHR case law, the Hungarian Constitutional Court’sdecision or 
the above mentioned Magyar decision do not offer reasons to depart from domestic law. This statement is 
difficult to interpret, since the Constitutional Court did not pass a judgment in the merits, whereas the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence is in clear contradiction with the rules, even the ones that were adopted after the 
Magyar judgment was rendered by the ECtHR. 
 
Principles of objectivity, non-discrimination and equal treatment of the entities scrutinised is the 
foundation of every Scoreboard. Acting to the contrary and using double standards will delegitimise 
the efforts of any new EU rule of law scoreaboard. As the current pre-Article 7 TEU procedure against 
Poland, and inaction vis-à-vis Hungary proved, additional procedural difficulties arise, if rule of law 
backsliders multiply and backing up for each other prevent an Article 7(2) mechanism requiring 
unanimity to be triggered. (For the details see Chapter 1.6.) 
4.8 A EU Rule of Law Commission  
The institutional framework behind the Scoreboard shall reflect this objectivity. The proposal to 
establish a ‘EU Rule of Law Commission’ as an independent body of scholars should be seriously 
considered. The EU Rule of Law Commission could be placed at the centre of the EU Rule of Law 
Scoreboard. The FRA should not play that role due to its high degree of dependence on EU Member 
States and the high degree of politicization, which is linked to the performance of its tasks and activities 
in a context of contested legal competences between EU and domestic arenas. The selection and 
organizational model could follow the one currently utilized in actors like the Venice Commission and 
the CEPEJ. Yet particular attention should be paid to the academic and independent nature of the 
members.  
 
The EU Rule of Law Commission shall make a context-specific assessment in light of data available or 
call for the need to gather extra information on EU issue-specific questions. The possibility to conduct 
country visits (following the UN Special Rapporteurs model) could also be envisaged. As a FRA pilot 
study has shown, it is easier to agree on standards for laws, institutions (structures) and policies 
(processes), but it is close to impossible to agree on how to assess the situation on the ground 
                                                        
341 ECtHR, Magyar v Hungary, Application no. 73593/10, 20 May 2014. 
342 Hungarian Constitutional Court, HCC Resolution 3013/2015. (I. 27.) 
343 Resolution No. 3/2015 concerning the uniformity of criminal law. 
344 See Article 109 of Act LXXII of 2014, which inserted a new subtitle on the mandatory pardon proceeding of 
persons sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of conditional release, Articles 46/A-46/H into Act 
CCXL of 2013. 
345 For the saga see P. Bárd, The Hungarian life imprisonment regime in front of apex courts I. - The findings of the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional Court, 18 June 2015, 
http://jog.tk.mta.hu/blog/2015/06/the-hungarian-life-imprisonment-hu and P. Bárd, The Hungarian life 
imprisonment regime in front of apex courts II. - The findings of the Kúria (Supreme Court), 18 June 2015, 
http://jog.tk.mta.hu/blog/2015/06/the-hungarian-life-imp-hu. 
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(outcome).346 The malevolent interpretation is that standards on structures and processes are easier to 
comply with, whereas states do not wish to subject themselves to a scrutiny on the truly decisive issue, 
which is the translation of promises into practice. A more benevolent approach may acknowledge 
however that assessment of outcomes is context-specific to an extreme extent and therefore need a 
nuanced analysis that prevents the use of generalised standards. For this reason, the UN model of well-
established working relationships/close partnerships with national Human Rights Authorities and civil 
society organisations should be pursued.  
 
An EU Rule of Law Commission could draw up Annual (Country Specific) Reports on the basis of 
available and additional materials.347  
 
The Annual Report shall point to the strengths and weaknesses, and suggest specific ways to overcome 
them. This exercise would not ‘track’ or rank EU Member States, which is a typical method in 
benchmarking methodologies.348 Whereas it may make sense with regard to macroeconomics (even 
though one should be aware of the methodological traps and limitations even in an area, which is more 
comfortably operating with figures), the contextualization and standardization of a rule of law 
assessment shall be a much more nuanced exercise and particular care shall be taken not to rely on a 
standardised benchmarking system that could potentially veil or blur problems in the subparts of EU 
values. Democracy, and to a greater and lesser extent respectively the rule of law and fundamental 
rights, are fluid concepts and phenomena, and there is no single ideal formula for achieving them. 
Therefore, we argue against designing the standards according to indicators – a rather dubious exercise 
that can easily be attacked as politically or ideologically biased.  
4.9 Matching the tools to the needs: establishing a two-prong mechanism 
The EU Rule of Law Commission shall monitor EU laws, policies, institutions and bodies, and 
institutions shall make use of existing procedures, the CJEU having a final say.  
 
In the following we focus on Member States. Tools and institutional design shall be adjusted to the 
needs, and accordingly the Scoreboard shall establish a two-prong mechanism for Member States ‘on 
track’ and ‘off the track’ of the rule of law.  
 
In both the first and second scenarios described above, i.e. when international mechanisms are used for 
upholding and promoting European values, remedying some breaches of single elements of European 
values or reversing the trends in the deterioration of some sub-elements of democracy, the rule of law 
and fundamental rights, the Scoreboard mechanism may follow a “‘sunshine policy’, which engages 
and involves rather than paralyses and excludes”, and where value-control “is owned equally by all 
actors”.349  
 
                                                        
346 Promoting the rule of law in the European Union. FRA SYMPOSIUM REPORT, 4th Annual FRA Symposium, 
Vienna, 7 June 2013, http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2013-4th-annual-symposium-report.pdf; 
Presentation by Gabriel Toggenburg, Senior Legal Advisor, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights at 
the LIBE Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs meeting on 10/12/2015. 
347 Promoting the rule of law in the European Union. FRA SYMPOSIUM REPORT, 4th Annual FRA Symposium, 
Vienna, 7 June 2013, http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2013-4th-annual-symposium-report.pdf. 
348 It would therefore be different from MEP Sophie in ‘t Veld’s suggestion about a traffic light system 
‘scoreboarding’ Member States in a way similar to the European semester for the Eurozone. The difference lies 
exactly in the way of assessment, as we argued against relying on indicators and benchmarking exclusively. 
Seminar of 4 February 2015, ALDE presenting the EU Democratic Governance Pact. 
349 G.N. Toggenburg and J. Grimheden, ‘The Rule of Law and the Role of Fundamental Rights: Seven Practical 
Pointers’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
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More specifically, the first two scenarios could be distinguished. The first scenario may result in inaction 
of the institutions, whereas in the second scenario the FRA and/or the Commission could be the facilitators 
of such a debate on systemic problems with regard to European values in the second scenario, with the 
Council, the European Parliament and preferably national parliaments being given a role as well. That 
would on the one hand enhance the democratic legitimacy of the procedure and on the other hand be 
justified by a very profound reason for an inter-institutional arrangement: it is simply more difficult to 
‘trick’ more than one institution. In this second scenario, the Member States adhere to the rule of law, 
accept internal and external forms of criticism, and therefore respond well to concerns formulated by 
the EU. Not only at the end of the annual cycle, but also throughout the year, the EU Rule of Law 
Commission shall have the right to alert the Commission about a potential case for an infringement 
procedure. The current mechanism available seems to be sufficient if fully exploited (as suggested above 
in Chapter 1.4), and there is no need to insert another level in between or to create a novel process 
preceding the infringement proceeding. These are only needed – as a second best option – if there is no 
political will on the side of the Commission to exploit the potential in Articles 258 and 260 TFEU, and 
other Member States do not take over the role initially foreseen for the Commission.350  
 
In this second scenario, it may be useful to disentangle the interrelated values of democracy, the rule of 
law and fundamental rights. Whereas there are attempts to capture all European values including 
democracy and the rule of law in the rights language,351 there are skeptical voices with regard to an 
understanding of fundamental rights encompassing all values that could be associated with the good 
life.352 Maintaining the distinction is particularly useful at this point, since infringement in this second 
scenario typically affects fundamental rights, whereas other mechanisms exist in Europe to tackle 
fundamental rights problems. Apart from obvious and external fora, such as the EctHR, for example, in 
the EU setting national courts (ordinary and constitutional courts) and the Court of Justice of the EU shall 
play a decisive role, both with regard to interim measures and overall remedies.  
 
The third scenario – which is the trigger for the attempts to tackle the Copenhagen dilemma and also for 
the present Research Paper – is fundamentally different from the first two, and therefore the 
methodology of the Scoreboard shall introduce a second prong accordingly. When a State systematically 
undermines democracy, deconstructs the rule of law and engages in massive human right violations, 
there is no reason to presume the good intentions of those in power to engage in a sunshine approach 
involving a dialogue and soft measures in order to make the entity return to the concept of limited 
government – a notion that those in power wished to abandon in the first place.  
 
The first challenge lies in identifying the point when a Member State enters or is on the path towards 
the third phase, and to remedy the situation. It is under this Scenario that the systemic infringement 
proceedings, the EU Rule of Law Mechanism or Article 7 TEU would come in. All these procedures 
have – and we assume all future mechanisms will have – a discussion phase, where the Member State 
in question can present its views on its laws, policies and their realisation in practice. The Scoreboard 
could guide the discussion and make the process foreseeable and transparent. The discussion could still 
be led by an inter-institutional arrangement/agreement, with the FRA and/or the Commission taking the 
lead.  
 
                                                        
350 D. Kochenov, ‘Biting Intergovernmentalism: The Case for the Reinvention of Article 259 TFEU to Make It a 
Viable Rule of Law Enforcement Tool’, 7 The Hague Journal of the Rule of Law 2. 153–174 (2015), 153. 
351 G.N. Toggenburg and J. Grimheden, The Rule of Law and the Role of Fundamental Rights: Seven Practical 
Pointers, in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.) Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2016), forthcoming. 
352 Interviewees underlined this important point. See also C. Closa, D. Kochenov and J. H. H. Weiler, ‘Reinforcing 
the Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union’ (2014) RSCAS Working Paper No. 25/2014. 
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Once a case-by-case contextual assessment proves the need for a supervisory mechanism is established 
in the third scenario, a further challenge lies is the creation of mechanisms in addition to the only – and, 
as it presently stands, inefficient – one available: Article 7 TEU. Should there be no wilingness to make 
use of Article 7, the new mechanism should have both a preventive arm to prevent a State from taking 
the first step down a slippery slope and abandoning European values, and a sanctioning arm via 
proportionate, dissuasive and effective punishment of the ones which are already slipping to the 
bottom.353  
 
Finally, the mechanism’s speed of operation shall not be so great as to be a detriment to the quality of 
the assessment and monitoring; nevertheless, a timely response is necessary. As a main rule, the 
Scoreboard has an annual cycle, but steps may have to be taken at shorter intervals. Firm, immediate 
action is needed against rule of law backsliders, so as to prevent detrioration and also the phenomenon 
becoming contagious – and vice versa, tolerance towards or lack of consequences following the 
establishment of illiberal governments will encourage other Member States to follow. A speedy 
proceeding protects the individual against the State, so that the latter does not continue the violation, 
potentially resulting in greater or even irreversible harm. A speedy assessment proceeding also has 
pragmatic advantages: Member States will not have time to amend their problematic laws or change 
their practices and demand that the new situation shall trigger another mechanism, thereby gaining 
time to continue their practices in violation of EU values. 
 
Prisoners’ voting rights and the contagious nature of rule of law backsliding 
 
In trying the Hirst v the United Kingdom (No. 2) case,354 the ECtHR declared in its 2005 judgment that the 
indiscriminate stripping of voting rights for persons sentenced to prison violated Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 
to the Convention. The ECtHR laid down a number of criteria to be met when depriving prioners of their 
voting right: the decision on disenfranchisement should be taken by a judge; the judge shall consider the 
specific circumstances of the case; and there shall be a link between the crime committed and issues relating 
to elections and democratic institutions.  
 
Five years later, after Applicant complained of being denied he right to participate at the Europeany 
Parliamentary elections, in Greens and MT v the United Kingdom355 in a pilot judgment the ECtHR called upon 
the respondent state to make legislative amendments to comply with the Hirst judgment.  
 
Almost four years passed, until Firth and Others v. the United Kingdom356 was decided. Applicants were ten 
prisoners who, again as an automatic consequence of their convictions and sentences of imprisonment, were 
unable to vote in the 2009 European Parliamentary elections. Whereas the Court recognised the United 
Kingdom’s intention to comply with the Strasbourg court’s expectations in the form of a draft bill and the 
report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee appointed to examine the bill, the UK was again found to be in 
violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, given the fact that the case was identical to Greens and M.T. and the 
legislative environment did not change. 
 
                                                        
353 For a division between measures sanctioning and promoting the rule of law, see C. Hillion, ‘Overseeing the Rule 
of Law in the EU’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov, Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
354 ECtHR, Hirst v the United Kingdom, Application no. 74025/01, 6 October 2005 
355 ECtHR, Greens and MT v the United Kingdom, Applications nos. 60041/08 and 60054/08, 23 November 2010. 
356 ECtHR, Firth and Others v. the United Kingdom, Applications nos. 47784/09, 47806/09, 47812/09, 47818/09, 
47829/09, 49001/09, 49007/09, 49018/09, 49033/09 and 49036/09, 12 August 2014. 
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A few month later 1015 prisoners’ cases were decided in McHugh and Others v. the United Kingdom,357 who, as 
an automatic consequence of their convictions and detention pursuant to sentences of imprisonment, were 
unable to vote in elections. The ECtHR found the UK again to be in violation of the Convention. 
 
Most recently in December 2015 the Committee of Ministers adopted an Interim Resolution deciding to 
resume consideration of the United Kingdom’s prisoners’ voting rights cases in December 2016 the latest.358 
The contagious nature of human rights violations, especially if they remain without consequences is very 
apparent in the series of voting rights cases against other respondent states after the United Kingdom failed 
to enforce Hirst. Whereas “the [debated] principle of solidarity implies that the case-law of the Court forms 
part of the Convention, thus extending the legally binding force of the Convention erga omnes”,359 non-
enforcement works in the opposite direction, and instead of learning from each other’ mistakes, state parties 
will follow each other’s stance with regard to ECHR violations and non-enforcement of Strasbourg 
judgments. This may have disastrous consequences. As Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner Nils 
Muižnieks in his Observations for the Joint Committee on the UK Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill: 
“continued non-compliance would have far-reaching deleterious consequences; it would send a strong signal 
to other member states, some of which would probably follow the UK’s lead and also claim that compliance 
with certain judgments is not possible, necessary or expedient. That would probably be the beginning of the 
end of the ECHR system, which is at the core of the Council of Europe.”360 Acknowledging the fatal effects of 
non-compliance he went so far as to prefer withdrawal to non-execution: “I think that any member state 
should withdraw from the Council of Europe rather than defy the Court by not executing judgments.”  
 
Indeed, a series of cases show the disease spreading. In Frodl v. Austria,361 the ECtHR acknowledged that 
unlike UK legislation, the Austrian National Assembly Election Act is not depriving prisoners 
indiscriminately and automatically of their voting rights, still, the national law did not meet all criteria laid 
down in Hirst, and therefore Austria was also found to be in violation of the Convention. 
 
In Söyler v. Turkey362 the Applicant, a person convicted for unpaid cheques was not allowed to exercise his 
right to vote, neither while being detained in prison, nor after his conditional release. The ECtHR held Turkey 
to be in violation of th Convention, due to the automatic and indiscriminate nature of the rights limitation, 
where the legislation did not allow to take in account the nature or gravity of the offence, the length of the 
prison sentence or the prisoner’s individual conduct or circumstances.  
 
In Murat Vural v. Turkey363 the ECtHR repeated that the Turkish system did not comply with the requirements 
laid down in Hirst, furthermore it also observed that the Applicant’s deprivation of his right to vote continued 
after his conditional release from prison.  
 
Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia364 was different from the above cases in that deprivation of voting rights was 
constitutionally entrenched. The ECtHR again found a violation of the Convention, but due to the difficulty 
                                                        
357 ECtHR, McHugh and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 51987/08 and 1,014 others, 10 February 2015. 
358 Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2015)251 Execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights Hirst and three other cases against the United Kingdom, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 9 
December 2015 at the 1243rd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies.  
359 Parliamentary Assembly, Assembly debate on 28 September 2000 (30th Sitting) (see Doc. 8808, report of the 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, rapporteur: Mr Jurgens). Text adopted by the Assembly on 28 
September 2000 (30thSitting). 
360 N. Muižnieks, Memorandum – Observations for the Joint Committee on the Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) 
Bill, Strasbourg, 10 October 2013 
361 ECtHR, Frodl v. Austria, Application no. 20201/04, 8 April 2010 
362 ECtHR, Söyler v. Turkey, Application no. 29411/07, 17 September 2013 
363 ECtHR, Murat Vural v. Turkey, Application no. 9540/07, 21 October 2014 
364 ECtHR, Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia, Application no. 11157/04, 4 July 2013  
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of amending the Constitution, the Court held that Russia could enforce the judgment by way of some form 
of political process or by interpreting the Constitution in line with the Convention and the attached case-law. 
But the Russian legislator went further than just referring to the UK stance in prisoners’ voting rights cases,365 
and passed a law which allows the Russian Constitutional Court to declare rulings of international bodies – 
including the ECtHR or the UN Human Rights Committee – ‘impossible to implement’, in clear violation of 
Article 46 ECHR and rendering the Convention system meaningless.366 
 
Figure 3. The three rule of law scenarios and the institutional actors 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
                                                        
365 Ph. Leach and A. Donald, Russia Defies Strasbourg: Is Contagion Spreading?, EJIL Analysis, 19 December 19, 
2015, http://www.ejiltalk.org/russia-defies-strasbourg-is-contagion-spreading/.  
366 Id.; Putin signs law allowing Russia to overturn rulings of international rights courts, Reuters, 15 December 2015, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-court-putin-idUSKBN0TY17H20151215.  
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Table 8. The three rule of law scenarios and responding mechanisms  
Scenarios Type of measure Typology of instruments 
EU Rule of Law 
Commission’s 
output 
EU institutional actors Supranational procedures 
FIRST SCENARIO 
EU or Member States with 
no substantive problems 
(‘on track’) 
Sunshine approach, 
debate, dialogue, 
value co-ownership 
Debate, dialogue, 
monitoring, 
evaluation, 
benchmarking 
Annual Report  
n/a n/a 
SECOND SCENARIO 
Problems with regard to the 
sub-elements of EU values: 
typically but not exclusively 
fundamental rights  
(‘on track’ with need for 
improvement) 
Sunshine approach, 
debate, dialogue, 
value co-ownership 
Debate, dialogue, 
monitoring, 
evaluation, 
benchmarking 
Annual Report  
+ 
Suggestions to instigate 
Pre-Article 7 procedure  
+  
Suggestions to start 
infringement procedures 
FRA and/or the Commission as 
facilitators of such a debate on 
systemic problems, with the 
Council, the European Parliament 
and preferably national parliaments 
being given a role as well. 
With regard to rights 
infringements, national and 
European courts shall play a role 
Pre-Article 7 
+ 
Infringement procedures 
+ 
ECtHR proceedings 
THIRD SCENARIO 
Systemic domestic 
problems: typically but not 
exclusively rule of law 
problems 
(‘off track’) 
No dialogue Supervision 
Annual Report  
 
+ 
 
Suggestions to instigate 
Article 7 procedure  
 
+  
 
Suggestions to start 
systemic infringement 
procedures 
FRA and/or the Commission as 
facilitators of such a debate on 
systemic problems, with the 
Council, the European Parliament 
and preferably national parliaments 
being given a role as well. 
With regard to rights 
infringements, national and 
European courts shall play a role 
+ 
Article 7 TEU 
Article 7 
+ 
Systemic infringement procedures 
+ 
ECtHR proceedings 
Threat/risk 
(“rule of law backsliding”, 
i.e. “on the way to 
constitutional capture”) 
(Effective threat of 
an) efficient 
sanction to prevent 
Prevention, 
sanctioning 
  Article 7(1) procedure 
+ 
Systemic infringement procedures 
+ 
ECtHR proceedings 
Breach 
(“constitutional capture”) 
Efficient sanction 
to stop Sanctioning 
  Article 7(2)-(3) procedure 
+ 
Systemic infringement procedures 
+ 
ECtHR proceedings 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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4.10 Acquisition of information and data, reversal of the burden of proof  
While many pieces of information can be gathered via existing mechanisms, there might be additional 
information and data needed. One of the important ways to ensure that information and data which are 
provided by Member States regarding their compliance with rule of law, democracy and human rights 
is using appropriate mechanisms to test and challenge that information and data. One of the problems 
with all information assessment exercises is the difficulty of determining the accuracy of information 
provided by actors who have vested interests in certain outcomes. Often in good faith, State officials 
provide summaries of their compliance with international human rights commitments which miss 
important elements. This can happen as a result of a number of failings – oversight is of course one. 
There is also the need to be sufficiently succinct. Also, a State official might fail to understand or take 
seriously the gravity of the information which he or she is seeking for a report to a supervisory body. 
Another reason for incomplete data can be that other ministries have failed to respond or respond fully 
on a subject, or subsidiary levels of governance have failed to provide the necessary information. There 
is always the question of (in)action arising out of bad faith, but in such circumstances very strenuous 
mechanisms need to be in place to sanction such (in)action. 
 
One of the ways in which supervisory bodies are able to test the accuracy of information which State 
authorities provide is by soliciting information from a wide range of sources in order to assess whether 
there is a wide divergence between what, for instance, specialist civil society actors have to say about 
compliance with democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and what the State authorities have to 
say. A case in point are the UN Treaty bodies studied in Section 1.2 above.  
 
Among the methods available to supervisory bodies is checking information provided by the State 
against any related judicial proceedings. Often, State authorities’ legal services provide very detailed 
information to their courts in challenges regarding the key principles, which may be divergent from the 
information provided to supranational authorities. The European Court of Human Rights is very aware 
of this issue and requires all information provided to the lower courts be made available to it as well. 
Secondly, State authorities are not always consistent in the information which they provide to different 
supervisory bodies at the national, supranational and international levels. Any EU body should ensure 
that it peruses carefully all the submissions of State authorities to national, supranational and 
international supervisory bodies in the context of the issue in question.  
 
All EU Member States have official bodies responsible for fundamental rights protection. These include 
ombudspersons, mediators, fundamental rights protection supervisors, etc. All of these bodies should 
be consulted to ensure the accuracy of information and data provided by State authorities. A central 
role in this regard might be given to the FRA, which has a mandate in respect of fundamental rights. 
The EU Ombudsperson’s Office, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) and the Article 29 
Working Party should be closely associated with the project and have mandates to participate fully and 
make recommendations to the body. 
 
There any many international and national human rights civil society bodies which produce detailed 
reports on the condition of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the Member States. 
Due regard should be paid to these sources of information, which often provide an invaluable tool in 
making assessments.  
 
The existence of inconsistencies between information and data provided by State authorities and 
information and data gleaned from other sources must be subject to a rigorous evaluation standard. The 
EU is based on the principle of loyal cooperation between its Member States and its institutions and this 
duty of loyalty is central to the successful operation of the whole system. Thus identifying challenges 
and providing an instrument for Member States to respond to criticism and divergent information is 
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essential. The burden of proof in establishing the relevant facts in respect of any matter concerning 
democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights must be spelt out. Due respect for the loyalty of the 
Member States must be the starting principle, but where contradictory information is revealed, the 
Member State must be fulfil its duty to provide an explanation and that explanation must be subject to 
anxious scrutiny.  
 
The standard of proof to trigger a further investigation must also be set at the level of anxious scrutiny 
of the respect for democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights – a level which is substantially 
higher than a balance of probabilities and certainly the opposite of the criminal law standard. As soon 
as there is a reasonable doubt that the requirements have been fulfilled and that the information 
provided accurately reveals the correct situation, the burden of proof should – following the UN model 
– shift to the Member State authorities to satisfy the body that their actions are consistent with the 
principles. Such a shifting of burden of proof is common in EU law.367 Under this scenario the burden 
of proof would shift to the Member State(s) concerned.  
4.11 Follow-up mechanism and efficient sanctions  
There was a general agreement between interviewees that a follow-up mechanism was needed, such as 
the Committee of Ministers in the framework of the Council of Europe overseeing Strasbourg 
judgments. After problems – whether individual or systemic – have been identified, there shall be 
regular assessment and a special procedure on compliance and follow-up with recommendations. The 
supervisory prong of the Scoreboard would however need to go beyond that. 
 
Promotion of the rule of law as foreseen in the Treaties with respect to current368 and prospective 
Member States369 is in close correlation with the possibility of effective sanctioning of rule of law 
violations – especially if systemic, persistent or serious.370 As is apparent from the state of the art and 
the depreciation of rule of law values, enforcement is the weak side of the existing legal framework 
overseeing European values – including the Article 7 mechanism or general infringement procedures 
according to Articles 258-260 TFEU. Enforcement with effective sanctions is also the weak side of 
suggestions by EU institutions and academic proposals.371  
 
The highly probable failure of both naming and shaming, and also of a more positive discursive 
approach, shall be acknowledged: an illiberal State is unlikely to be persuaded to return to EU values 
by way of diplomatic attacks, political criticism, discussions and dialogue. Proposals “adding bite to the 
                                                        
367 See for instance Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin  and Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 
establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. Article 10 (1) and Article 8(1) 
state that Member States shall take such measures as are necessary, in accordance with their national judicial 
systems, to ensure that, when persons who consider themselves wronged because the principle of equal treatment 
has not been applied to them establish, before a court or other competent authority, facts from which it may be 
presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination, it shall be for the respondent to prove that there has 
been no breach of the principle of equal treatment. 
368 See especially Article 3 (1) TEU: “The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its 
peoples”; and Article 13 (1) TEU: “The Union shall have an institutional framework which shall aim to promote its 
values”. 
369 See Article 49(1) TEU. 
370 It shall be clarified whether or not the meanings of the different wordings in Article 7 TEU referring to a “serious 
and persistent breach”, in the Commission’s proposal addressing instances of “systemic threat to the rule of law”, 
and in Barroso’s reference to situations of “serious, systemic risks” to the rule of law are identical, and the extent 
to which they overlap. J.M.D. Barroso, State of the Union address 2013, European Parliament, 11 September 2013, 
Speech/13/684. 
371 D. Kochenov and L. Pech, ‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality’, 11 
European Constitutional Law Review, 512–540 (2015), 528. 
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bark”372 therefore typically point to the power of the purse, i.e. operate with quasi-economic sanctions, 
such as the suspension, withholding or deduction of EU funds, or pecuniary sanctions.373 Whereas 
pecuniary sanctions may be effective with regard to all Member States, for the time being the power of 
the purse could be particularly strong, as paradoxically the main rule of law backsliders are countries 
which are net beneficiaries of European integration. Freezing EU funds in their case would also put an 
end to the paradox of using EU money to build authoritarian regimes in denial of EU values. 
4.12 Legal basis  
Concerning the legal basis dilemma, we have several options under the current Treaty framework to 
set up an EU Rule of Law Commission as a consultative body. 
 
First, the option of an inter-institutional agreement without any further legal basis shall be considered. 
There is evidence to suggest that reviewing Member States from a rule of law perspective did not 
require a firm legal basis in the past. It is worth noting that the 'Wise Men' evaluating Austria back in 
2000 received their mandate on the basis of an addendum to the statement of the European Council in 
Feira dated 19-20 June 2000, on the basis of which then Council President and Portuguese Prime 
Minister António Guterres was given a mandate to request the President of the European Court of 
Human Rights, Luzius Wildhaber, to appoint three persons to carry out the task of drawing up a report 
on certain aspects of the situation in Austria.374 The obvious difference is that the Austrian scrutiny was 
conducted on an ad hoc basis, whereas the EU Rule of Law Commission shall be a permanent 
consultative entity, therefore the legal basis shall preferably be more solid. An interinstitutional 
agreement is one option. 
 
Second, Article 352 TFEU (former Article 308) constitutes the foundations for Regulation 168/2007 
establishing the FRA.375 There is therefore a precedent in its use. Article 352 TFEU can cover Union 
action "within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set 
out in the Treaties", with the exception of the common foreign and security policy. The procedure would 
however require unanimity in the Council, on a proposal by the Commission and the consent by the 
EP. 
 
                                                        
372 W. Sadurski, ‘Adding Bite to a Bark: The Story of Article 7, EU Enlargement, and Jörg Haider’ 16 Columbia Journal 
of European Law 3, 385–426 (2010). 
373 K.L. Scheppele, Enforcing the Basic Principles of EU Law through Systemic Infringement Procedures, in: C. 
Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016, forthcoming; K.L. Scheppele, ‘The EU Commission v. Hungary: The Case for the “Systemic 
Infringement Action,”’ Assizes de la Justice, European Commission, November 2013, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice-2013/files/contributions/ 
45.princetonuniversityscheppelesystemicinfringementactionbrusselsversion_en.pdf and K.L. Scheppele, ‘Making 
Infringement Procedures More Effective: A Comment on Commission v Hungary, Case C-288/12’ Eutopia, 29 April 
2014, http://eutopialaw.com/2014/04/29/making-infringement-procedures-more-effective-a-comment-on-
commission-v-hungary-case-c-28812-8-april-2014-grand-chamber/. Building on the above suggestions, see also J.-
W. Müller, Why the EU Needs a Democracy and Rule of Law Watchdog, Aspen Review 2/015, 
http://www.aspeninstitute.cz/en/article/2-2015-why-the-eu-needs-a-democracy-and-rule-of-law-watchdog/. 
374 The three persons appointed were (in alphabetical order) Martti Ahtisaari, former President of Finland, Professor 
Jochen Frowein, Director of the Max-Planck Institute at Heidelberg, former member and Vice-President of the 
European Commission of Human Rights, and Marcelino Oreja, former Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, former 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe, former member of the Commission of the European Communities. The 
three appointees reported directly to the State holding the Presidency of the European Union, in this case the French 
President Jacques Chirac. 
See e.g. W. Hummer, The End of EU Sanctions against Austria – A Precedent for New Sanctions Procedures?, The 
European Legal Forum, Issue 2-2000/1, 77–152; F. Schorkopf, Die Maßnahmen der XIV EU-Mitgliedstaaten gegen 
Österreich, Berlin: Springer, 2002; E. Busek, M. Schauer (Hrsg.), Die "Sanktionen" der Vierzehn gegen Österreich 
im Jahr 2000. Analysen und Kommentare, Wien, Köln, Weimer: Böhlau, 2003, 537. 
375 Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights. 
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It shall be noted that a Declaration was attached to the FRA mandate by the Council: "The Council 
considers that neither the Treaties nor the Regulation establishing the European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights precludes the possibility for the Council to seek the assistance of the future European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights when deciding to obtain from independent persons a report on the situation in a Member 
State within the meaning of Article 7 TEU when the Council decides that the conditions of Article 7 TEU are 
met."376 The mentioned ‘independence’ of the experts is the weak point of any FRA appointment. As 
argued in Chapter 4.7. for such a group to be truly independent these persons should be also independent 
from the FRA due to limitations in its current mandate and its dependency on EU Member States' 
governments.  
 
The FRA also counts with a research network FRANET,377 but they only provide 'data' or research under 
very specific terms of reference drafted by the FRA, and the results are later presented and assessed in 
line with the FRA’s discretionary wishes, i.e. not in a foreseeable, independent and objective process.  
 
The FRA's organisational structure also includes a Scientific Committee composed of eleven 
independent persons, highly qualified, whose terms of office is not renewable.  Members are 
appointed after responding to a transparent call and a selection procedure conducted by the FRA 
Management Board after having consulted the competent committee of the European Parliament. 
Candidates cannot serve on both the Management Board and the Scientific Committee at the same time, 
furthermore the Committee has to have a balanced geographical representation. These are 
prerequisities and rules ensuring the objectivity of the Committee.378 The Scientific Committee thus is 
a candidate for fulfilling the role of the EU Rule of Law Commission. However, there are strong reasons 
against entrusting the FRA or the FRA Scientific Committee with such a mandate. First, as argued in 
Chapter 4.7. autonomy and legitimacy of the entity can only be preserved, if governments and the 
various EU institutions cannot accuse it of being ‘political’ and ‘non-neutral’, and therefore any such 
body shall be detached from EU institutions and bodies. Second, whereas democracy, the rule of law 
and fundamental rights are closely interrelated, they cannot be used as synonyms, and shown in 
Chapter 4.9. there are strong benefits in keeping these apart. 
 
Third, alternatively, or in parallel, the implementation of Article 70 TFEU could also be used. This article 
would give a sound entry point in an area, which is specific to EU law, namely mutual recognition. As 
proven above in Chapter 3.1., the principle of mutual recognition will work deficiently or become 
inoperational, if its foundations in the EU legal system are not on based on solid grounds. For instance, 
the existence of independent national judicial authorities to carry out an assessment on the rebuttable 
presumption of 'mutual trust' set by the Luxembourg Court379 is a sine qua non of the system, and the 
existence of such fora needs to be checked. 
 
Article 70 TFEU would lead to a Council-driven evaluation procedure in collaboration with the 
Commission. As suggested by Mitsilegas, Carrera and Eisele the model to follow here could be the new 
evaluation system on Schengen adopted in October 2013, making use of Article 70 TFEU for the first 
time.380  
                                                        
376 Council of the European Union, Addendum to the draft minutes, 2781st meeting of the Council of the European 
Union (JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS), held in Brussels on 15 February 2007, 27 February 2007. 
377 http://fra.europa.eu/en/research/franet  
378 Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, Articles 12 and 14. 
379 Court of Justice of the European Union, C-411/10 N.S. v Secretary of State for Home Department [2010] OJ C 274/21; 
and C-493/10, M.E. v Refugee Applications Commissioner [2011] OJ C 13/18, 21 December 2011. 
380 “following the template provided by the new 2013 Schengen Evaluation Mechanism, in which the European 
Parliament has played a role in the decision-making and implementation. This template should be followed at 
times of implementing any future system for criminal justice cooperation.” 
V. Mitsilegas, S. Carrera and K. Eisele, The End of the Transitional Period for Police and Criminal Justice Measures 
Adopted before the Lisbon Treaty: Who monitors trust in the European Criminal Justice area?, CEPS Paper in Liberty 
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“The new Schengen evaluation mechanism foreseen in Regulation 1053/2013 provides a ‘template’ 
to be used in future implementation of Article 70 TFEU in the field of criminal justice cooperation, 
in particular when it comes to the increased involvement of the European Parliament in the decision-
making process of EU law instruments focused on evaluation, as well as regards its role in the 
evaluation system itself and its access to information and documents in respect of the (annual and 
multiannual) evaluation results of Member States’ practical implementation of EU law, including 
those cases where serious deficiencies have been identified. This includes the requirement by the 
European Commission to inform the European Parliament of follow-up and monitoring on regular 
basis as well as the adoption of any improvement measures. (…) Finally, the latter Regulation 
foresees an annual reporting by the Commission before the European Parliament.”381 (footnotes 
ommitted) 
 
In order to ensure objectivity and impartiality the EU Rule of Law Commission independent from the 
Council shall be set up feeding into the general evaluation mechanism via the EU Scoreboard. Moreover, 
following the wording of this provision, the EP and national parliaments would be informed of the 
content and results.  
 
Any new system could give priority to thematic areas where concerns or more important challenges 
have been so far identified. (…) Special attention should indeed be paid to issues such as pre-trial 
detention, the basis for the implementation of the Framework Decision on the cross-border execution 
of judgments in the EU involving deprivation of liberty (transfer of prisoners system), or the uneven 
and differentiated practical implementation of the rights of suspects in police detention and criminal 
proceedings across the Union. Another priority area should be better ensuring the 
quality/independence of justice (principle of separation of powers), for instance, in what concerns 
the existence of sufficient impartial controls over the necessity and proportionality of the decisions 
on the issuing and execution of EAWs.”382 (footnotes ommitted) 
 
Fourth, the Court of Justice could get involved, in particularly at times of determining what is a 
systematic rule of law deficiencies. The EU Rule of Law Framework Communication by the Commission 
on page 7 states that "The main purpose of the Framework is to address threats to the rule of law (as 
defined in Section 2) which are of a systemic nature".383 No definition of the notion systematic 
deficiencies is given. In footnote 18 in the same page it is confusingly stated that  
 
"With regard to the notion of "systemic deficiencies" in complying with fundamental rights when 
acting within the scope of EU law, see, for example, Joined Cases C-411/10 and 493/10, N.S., not 
yet published, para 94 and 106; and Case C-4/11, Germany v Kaveh Puid, not yet published, para 
36. With regard to the notion of "systemic" or "structural" in the context of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, see also the role of the European Court of Human rights in identifying 
underlying systemic problems, as defined in the Resolution Res(2004)3 of the Committee of 
Ministers of 12 May 2004, on Judgments Revealing an Underlying Systemic Problem, 
(https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=743257&Lang=fr)." 
 
If the EU Rule of Law Commission determines that there are systematic deficiencies, one could consider 
to call the Court to intervene and have a substantial assessment even before the context of Article 7 TEU, 
                                                        
and Security in Europe, No. 74 / December 2014, https://www.ceps.eu/publications/end-transitional-period-
police-and-criminal-justice-measures-adopted-lisbon-treaty-who, 3 and 34.  
Council of the European Union, Addendum to the draft minutes, 2781st meeting of the Council of the European 
Union (JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS), held in Brussels on 15 February 2007, 27 February 2007. 
381 Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and monitoring mechanism 
to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing the Decision of the Executive Committee of 16 
September 1998 setting up a Standing Committee on the evaluation and implementation of Schengen. 
382 Id. 
383 Council of the European Union, Commission’s Communication on a new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule 
of Law: Compatibility with the Treaties, Doc. 10296/14, Brussels, 27 May 2014, 7. 
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particularly when the deficiencies affect mutual recognition based EU policies and aspects where 
fundamental rights of people are at stake, for example in cases of detention.384 An option is to make use 
of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure laid down in CJEU Rules of Procedure.385 
 
Fifth, the EU Rule of Law Commission could follow a similar format than the Venice Commission.386 
An open question is who should appoint its members. In the Venice Commission it is the Member States. 
For the EU, prospective potential members should pass the test of the European Parliament before 
nomination, and they could be chosen from candidates proposed by Council and the Commission. 
 
 
                                                        
384 Questions soon to be answered by the CJEU in Case C-404/15 Aranyosi, request for a preliminary ruling lodged 
on 24 July 2015. See also Opinion of AG Bot in  C‑404/15 Aranyosi and C‑659/15 PPU Căldăraru, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:140. 
385 See Chapter 3 and in particular Article 107 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. 
386 Venice Commission, Adopting the Revised Statute of the European Commission for Democracy through Law, 
CDL(2002)027-e Resolution RES (2002) 3, Article 2. 
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ANNEX 1 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE387 
 WHAT WHO 
HOW 
Procedure Method Follow-up 
European Commission 
for Democracy 
Through Law (Venice 
Commission) 
The Venice Commission 
was established in 
1990.388 
Article 1 of the Statute389 
states:  
“Article 1.1: The 
European Commission 
for Democracy through 
Law shall be an 
independent 
consultative body which 
co-operates with the 
Member States of the 
Council of Europe, as 
well as with interested 
non-Member States and 
interested international 
organisations and 
bodies. Its own specific 
field of action shall be 
Article 2 of the Statute 
stipulates: 
1. The Commission 
shall be composed of 
independent experts 
who have achieved 
eminence through 
their experience in 
democratic 
institutions or by their 
contribution to the 
enhancement of law 
and political science. 
The members of the 
Commission shall 
serve in their 
individual capacity 
and shall not receive 
or accept any 
instructions.  
Article 3.1 of the Statute 
emphasises: Without 
prejudice to the 
competence of the organs 
of the Council of Europe, 
the Commission may 
carry out research on its 
own initiative and, where 
appropriate, may prepare 
studies and draft 
guidelines, laws and 
international agreements. 
Any proposal of the 
Commission can be 
discussed and adopted by 
the statutory organs of 
the Council of Europe. 
2. The Commission may 
supply, within its 
mandate, opinions upon 
Legal analysis of 
compliance with 
democracy, rule of 
law and fundamental 
rights standards and 
country visits are the 
main methods used 
when drafting the 
Opinion. It also 
includes studies and 
reports on topical 
issues. 
The Opinion is 
usually structured 
around the following 
sections: preliminary 
remarks (scope, 
background and 
specific legal 
process/context), 
There is no specific 
follow-up procedure 
envisaged. The 
Venice Commission 
offers facultative 
assistance to State 
parties to implement 
its Opinions and 
recommendations.  
As it is stated on its 
website: 
“A dialogue-based 
working method: 
The Commission 
does not seek to 
impose the solutions 
set out in its opinions. 
It adopts a non-
directive approach 
based on dialogue 
                                                        
387 Compilation as requested by the Directorate General for Parliamentary Research Services. 
388 It is composed by the following 11 sub-commissions: fundamental rights, federal State and regional state, international law, protection of minorities, judiciary, democratic 
institutions, working methods, Latin America, Mediterranean basin, rule of law and gender equality. Each sub-commission has one chairperson. 
389 Refer to Resolution(2002)3, Revised Statute of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 21 February 2002 at the 
784th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_01_Statute and 
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_01_Statute_old. 
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the guarantees offered 
by law in the service of 
democracy. It shall fulfil 
the following objectives:  
- strengthening the 
understanding of the 
legal systems of the 
participating states, 
notably with a view to 
bringing these systems 
closer; 
- promoting the rule of 
law and democracy ; 
- examining the 
problems raised by the 
working of democratic 
institutions and their 
reinforcement and 
development. 2. The 
Commission shall give 
priority to work 
concerning: 
a. the constitutional, 
legislative and 
administrative principles 
and techniques which 
serve the efficiency of 
democratic institutions 
2. There shall be one 
member and one 
substitute in respect of 
each member State of 
the Enlarged 
Agreement. 
3. Members shall hold 
office for a four-year 
term and may be 
reappointed.  
6. The European 
Community shall be 
entitled to participate 
in the work of the 
Commission. It may 
become a member of 
the Commission 
according to 
modalities agreed 
with the Committee of 
Ministers. 
 
The JCCJ is composed 
of members of the 
Commission and 
representatives from 
co-operation courts 
and associations. 
request submitted by the 
Committee of Ministers, 
the Parliamentary 
Assembly, the Congress 
of Local and Regional 
Authorities of Europe, 
the Secretary General, or 
by a state or international 
organisation or body 
participating in the work 
of the Commission. 
Where an opinion is 
requested by a state on a 
matter regarding another 
state, the Commission 
shall inform the state 
concerned and, unless the 
two states are in 
agreement, submit the 
issue to the Committee of 
Ministers. 
3. Any State which is not 
a member of the Enlarged 
Agreement may benefit 
from the activities of the 
Commission by making a 
request to the Committee 
of Ministers. 
followed by an 
analysis (general and 
specific remarks) and 
ending with 
conclusions 
(including 
outstanding issues, 
concerns and 
recommendations to 
the country 
concerned). 
An interesting 
example includes the 
recent request by the 
Polish government to 
the Venice 
Commission: 
833/2015 - 
Constitutional issues 
addressed in 
amendments to the 
Act on the 
Constitutional Court 
of 25 June 2015 of 
Poland. 
and shares Member 
States’ experience 
and practices. A 
working group visits 
the country 
concerned to meet the 
various stakeholders 
and to assess the 
situation as 
objectively as 
possible. The 
authorities are also 
able to submit 
comments on the 
draft opinions to the 
Commission. The 
opinions prepared 
are generally heeded 
by the countries 
concerned. 
International 
institutions, civil 
society and the media 
regularly refer to the 
Commission’s 
opinions.”403 
 
                                                        
403 Quoted from http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_activities&lang=EN. 
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and their strengthening, 
as well as the principle 
of the rule of law; 
b. fundamental rights 
and freedoms, notably 
those that involve the 
participation of citizens 
in public life; 
c. the contribution of 
local and regional self-
government to the 
enhancement of 
democracy.” 
“The Venice 
Commission’s key tasks 
is to assist states in the 
constitutional and 
legislative field so as to 
ensure the democratic 
functioning of their 
institutions and respect 
for fundamental 
rights.”390 
 
It has 60 State 
members,391 one 
associate member, five 
4. The Commission co-
operates with 
constitutional courts and 
courts of equivalent 
jurisdiction bilaterally 
and through associations 
representing these courts. 
In order to promote this 
co-operation, the 
Commission may set up a 
Joint Council on 
Constitutional Justice 
composed of members of 
the Commission and 
representatives from co-
operating courts and 
associations. 
5. Furthermore, the 
Commission may 
establish links with 
documentation, study 
and research institutes 
and centres. 
 
Its core task is to provide 
State parties with legal 
opinions/studies on draft 
                                                        
390 http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Const_Assistance. 
391 For a full overview of membership refer to http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/members/countries.aspx?lang=EN. 
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observers and three with 
special status (including 
the EU).392 
 
The Venice 
Commission’s areas of 
work are structured 
around three themes: 
First, democratic 
institutions and 
fundamental rights393; 
second, constitutional 
justice and ordinary 
justice394; and third, 
elections, referendums 
and political parties.395 
 
In respect of 
‘constitutional justice 
pieces of legislation or 
laws already in force 
which are brought to its 
examination. “Groups of 
members assisted by the 
secretariat prepare the 
draft opinions and 
studies, which are then 
discussed and adopted at 
the Committee’s plenary 
sessions.”401  
 
The following actors can 
request an Opinion from 
the Venice Commission: 
Member States, Council 
of Europe (Secretary 
General, Committee of 
Ministers, Parliamentary 
                                                        
392 On the EU see http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/members/countries.aspx?id=69. Refer for instance to http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-
AD(2003)022-e CDL-AD(2003)022-e, Opinion on the Implications of a Legally-binding EU Charter of fundamental rights on Human Rights Protection in Europe adopted by the 
Venice Commission, at its 57th Plenary Session (Venice, 12-13 December 2003). 
393 For an overview of the work of the Commission on fundamental rights refer to http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_Rights. 
394 See for instance on constitutional reform http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_Reforms&lang=EN and Report on Constitutional Amendment of 19 January 
2010 http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2010)001-e and COMPILATION OF VENICE COMMISSION OPINIONS 
CONCERNING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION of 22 December 2015, available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-PI(2015)023-e and the COMPILATION OF VENICE COMMISSION OPINIONS AND REPORTS CONCERNING 
COURTS AND JUDGES, available at http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-PI%282015%29001-e. 
395 On the Venice Commission activities refer to http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_activities&lang=EN. 
401 Id. 
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and ordinary justice’, 
since 2002 the Venice 
Commission has counted 
on the so-called ‘Joint 
Council on 
Constitutional Justice 
(JCCJ)’.396 The JCCJ is a 
steering body for the 
cooperation of the 
Venice Commission with 
the Constitutional 
Courts.397  
 
The Venice Commission 
has been active in the 
electoral field, in 
particular, through the 
adoption of opinions on 
draft electoral legislation 
and referendums. It also 
includes seminars, 
trainings and assistance 
missions.398 Here it 
cooperates closely with 
the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human 
Assembly and Congress 
of Local and Regional 
Authorities); and 
international 
organisations, including 
the European Union, 
OSCE/ODIHR, etc. 
 
Any constitutional court 
or the European Court of 
Human Rights may 
request the Venice 
Commission to provide 
amicus curiae on 
comparative law issues. It 
can also deliver amicus 
ombud opinions. 
 
The Venice Commission 
develops and shares 
‘standards’ and ‘best 
practices’. 
 
The procedure for 
preparing an Opinion is 
                                                        
396 For more information see http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Constitutional_Justice#Joint Council on Constitutional Justice. 
397 See also the World Conference on Constitutional Justice: http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_WCCJ&lang=EN. 
398 Refer to http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_seminars&lang=EN. 
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Rights 
(OSCE/ODIHR).399 
There is also a Council 
on Democratic Elections 
within the Venice 
Commission.400  
 
composed of the 
following steps: 
 
First, reference by 
national, international or 
regional body for 
assessing legislative 
initiative or existing legal 
instruments or 
constitutional provision. 
 
Second, a working group 
is set up comprising 
rapporteurs and experts 
who count on the 
assistance of the 
Commission’s secretariat. 
 
Third, issuing of a draft 
opinion on the 
compliance with the law 
with legal standards and 
suggestions for 
improvements.  
 
Fourth, country visit: 
meeting with relevant 
                                                        
399 For more information see http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Elections_and_Referendums. 
400 See http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_CED&lang=EN. 
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official and civil society 
actors. 
 
Fifth, issuing of final 
draft opinion.  
 
Sixth, final draft opinion 
is submitted to all 
members of the 
Commission before going 
to the Plenary Session. 
 
Seventh, option to hold a 
discussion between the 
Commission and the 
relevant State. 
 
Eight, debate and 
adoption of the Opinion 
in Plenary Session.402 
 
Ninth, the Opinion is 
submitted to the 
requesting actor and it is 
published on the Venice 
Commission’s website. 
 
                                                        
402 “The Commission ‘endorses’ a draft opinion prepared by the rapporteurs when two conditions are fulfilled: it wishes to express its agreement with the draft opinion prepared 
by the rapporteurs (as in the case of adoption); and but there are circumstances which make it appear unnecessary to go into detail, either because the text was already adopted 
or already abandoned.” See http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_activities&lang=EN. 
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Parliamentary 
Assembly (Monitoring 
Committee) 
 
Since 1997 the 
Parliamentary Assembly 
has a Committee focused 
on monitoring the 
obligations and 
commitments by 
Member States of the 
Council of Europe 
(Monitoring 
Committee).404 
Paragraph 5 of 
Resolution 1115(1997) 
states: “The Monitoring 
Committee is 
responsible for verifying 
the fulfilment of 
obligations assumed by 
member States under the 
terms of the Statute of 
the Council of Europe, 
the European 
Convention on Human 
Rights and all other 
Council of Europe 
Conventions to which 
they are parties, as well 
The Committee has 90 
members.405 
“Monitoring country 
reports are made in 
respect of each country 
separately. A report 
includes a draft 
resolution in which 
specific proposals are 
made for the 
improvement of the 
situation in the country 
under consideration, and 
possibly a draft 
recommendation for the 
attention of the 
Committee of Ministers. 
The Monitoring 
Committee is required to 
submit to the Assembly 
at least once every three 
years a report on each 
country being monitored 
(country report, see 
paragraph 14 of 
Resolution 1115). 
Parliamentary debates on 
monitoring are thus held 
“Two co-rapporteurs 
are appointed for a 
maximum duration of 
five years in respect of 
each member State, 
ensuring a strict 
political and regional 
balance. The code of 
conduct for co-
rapporteurs, 
approved by the 
Monitoring 
Committee in 2001 
(see Doc. 9198, 
Appendix H), and 
Resolution 1799 (2011) 
on the code of 
conduct for 
rapporteurs of the 
Parliamentary 
Assembly are aimed 
at preventing conflicts 
of interest and set out 
the rules which apply 
to rapporteurs of the 
Assembly such as, 
 
Paragraph 13 of 
Resolution 1115 states 
that the Assembly 
“may penalise 
persistent failure to 
honour obligations 
and commitments 
accepted, and lack of 
co-operation in its 
monitoring process, 
by adopting a 
resolution and/or a 
recommendation, by 
the non-ratification of 
the credentials of a 
national 
parliamentary 
delegation at the 
beginning of its next 
ordinary session or 
by the annulment of 
ratified credentials in 
the course of the 
same ordinary 
session in accordance 
                                                        
404 Resolution 1115 (1997), adopted by the Assembly on 29 January 1997. See http://website-pace.net/en_GB/web/as-mon/main. See also Committee on the Honouring of 
Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), the monitoring procedure of the Parliamentary Assembly, 
AS/Mon/Inf(2015)14rev 5 October 2015. 
405 http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/AssemblyList/AL-XML2HTML-EN.asp?lang=en&XmlID=Committee-Mon  
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as the honouring of 
commitments entered 
into by the authorities of 
member States upon 
accession to the Council 
of Europe”. 
in public. However, the 
monitoring procedure at 
the committee stage 
remains confidential”.406 
 
Within one year of the 
monitoring procedure’s 
conclusion, there is the 
possibility to establish a 
‘post-monitoring 
dialogue’ with a specific 
Member State. Moreover, 
the Committee reports to 
the Assembly on general 
progress of the 
monitoring procedures 
by submitting its 
progress report 
(Paragraph 14 of 
Resolution 1115). The 
Committee also performs 
periodic overviews of 
groups of countries, on a 
country-by-country basis, 
in accordance with its 
internal working 
methods. 
inter alia, the 
principle of neutrality, 
impartiality and 
objectivity, the 
obligation of 
discretion, the 
undertaking of 
availability, etc.”407 
 
Paragraph 3 of the 
Committee’s 
mandate: “An 
application to initiate 
a monitoring 
procedure may 
originate from: i. the 
general committees of 
the Assembly by 
reasoned written 
application to the 
Bureau; ii. the 
Monitoring 
Committee by a 
written opinion 
prepared by two co-
rapporteurs 
containing a draft 
with Rule 6 (now 
Rules 6 to 9) of the 
Rules of Procedure. 
Should the Member 
State continue not to 
respect its 
commitments, the 
Assembly may 
address a 
recommendation to 
the Committee of 
Ministers requesting 
it to take the 
appropriate action in 
accordance with 
Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Statute of the Council 
of Europe”: 
 
“Article 7: Any 
Member of the 
Council of Europe 
may withdraw by 
formally notifying the 
Secretary General of 
its intention to do so. 
Such withdrawal 
                                                        
406 http://website-pace.net/documents/19887/259543/Role_E.pdf/980181e7-bdb1-4b0e-ab1c-799bd2a9c560. 
407 http://website-pace.net/documents/19887/259543/Role_E.pdf/980181e7-bdb1-4b0e-ab1c-799bd2a9c560. 
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decision to open a 
monitoring 
procedure; iii. not less 
than 20 members of 
the Assembly 
representing at least 
six national 
delegations and two 
political groups, 
through the tabling of 
a motion for a 
resolution or 
recommendation; iv. 
the Bureau of the 
Assembly.” 
shall take effect at the 
end of the financial 
year in which it is 
notified, if the 
notification is given 
during the first nine 
months of that 
financial year. If the 
notification is given 
in the last three 
months of the 
financial year, it shall 
take effect at the end 
of the next financial 
year.  
 
Article 8: Any 
Member of the 
Council of Europe 
which has seriously 
violated Article 3 
may be suspended 
from its rights of 
representation and 
requested by the 
Committee of 
Ministers to 
withdraw under 
Article 7. If such 
Member does not 
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comply with this 
request, the 
Committee may 
decide that it has 
ceased to be a 
Member of the 
Council as from such 
date as the 
Committee may 
determine.” 
 
The Rules of 
Procedure of the 
Assembly explicitly 
refer to the 
“persistent failure to 
honour obligations 
and commitments 
and [to the] lack of 
co-operation with the 
Assembly’s 
monitoring 
procedure” as 
“substantial 
grounds” for which 
the unratified 
credentials of a 
national delegation 
may be challenged 
(Rule 8). 
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European Commission 
against Racism and 
Intolerance (ECRI) 
 
ECRI focuses on the 
examination of the 
situation concerning 
racism and intolerance in 
CoE Member States.  
The scope and tasks of 
ECRI are laid down in 
the statute adopted in 
Resolution 2002/8. 
According to Article 1 of 
the Statute, ECRI is “a 
body of the Council of 
Europe entrusted with 
the task of combating 
racism, racial 
discrimination, 
xenophobia, 
antisemitism and 
intolerance in greater 
Europe from the 
perspective of the 
protection of human 
rights, in the light of the 
European Convention on 
Human Rights, its 
additional protocols and 
related case-law. It shall 
ECRI has 47 
members.409 
Article 2(1) highlights: 
“One member of ECRI 
shall be appointed for 
each Member State of 
the Council of Europe; 
2. The members of 
ECRI shall have high 
moral authority and 
recognised expertise 
in dealing with 
racism, racial 
discrimination, 
xenophobia, 
antisemitism and 
intolerance; 3. The 
members of ECRI 
shall serve in their 
individual capacity, 
shall be independent 
and impartial in 
fulfilling their 
mandate. They shall 
not receive any 
instructions from their 
government”. 
Article 11(1): “In the 
framework of its country-
by-country approach, 
ECRI shall monitor 
phenomena of racism, 
racial discrimination, 
xenophobia, antisemitism 
and intolerance, by 
closely examining the 
situation in each of the 
Member States of the 
Council of Europe. ECRI 
shall draw up reports 
containing its factual 
analyses as well as 
suggestions and 
proposals as to how each 
country might deal with 
any problems identified. 
2. In the framework of its 
country-by-country 
monitoring, ECRI shall 
conduct, in cooperation 
with the national 
authorities, contact visits 
in the countries 
concerned. It shall 
ECRI drafts country 
reports, which during 
the fifth cycle focus on 
the following 
‘common topics’: 
legislative issues, hate 
speech, violence and 
integration policies.412 
Each country report 
has five sections: a. a 
summary of ECRI’s 
findings; b. a section 
dealing with the 
common topics; c. a 
section dealing with 
the country-specific 
topics; d. a section 
dealing with the 
fourth-cycle interim 
recommendations that 
were not – or not fully 
– implemented during 
the fourth monitoring 
cycle; and e. new 
interim 
recommendations. 
Country reports 
include information 
on Interim 
recommendations not 
implemented or 
partially 
implemented during 
the fourth monitoring 
cycle that will be 
followed up. 
                                                        
409 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/about/members_en.asp. 
412 Refer to Information document on the fifth monitoring cycle of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) (adopted by ECRI’s Bureau on 28 September 
2012, further to the decisions taken by ECRI at its 58th plenary meeting from 19 to 22 June 2012). 
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pursue the following 
objectives: - to review 
Member States’ 
legislation, policies and 
other measures to 
combat racism, 
xenophobia, 
antisemitism and 
intolerance, and their 
effectiveness; - to 
propose further action at 
local, national and 
European level; - to 
formulate general policy 
recommendations to 
Member States; - to 
study international legal 
instruments applicable 
in the matter with a view 
to their reinforcement 
where appropriate”.408 
Moreover, Article 3 of 
the statute states that 
they shall be 
appointed for a period 
of five years, which 
may be renewed 
twice. 
subsequently engage in a 
confidential dialogue 
with the said authorities 
in the course of which the 
latter may comment on 
the findings of ECRI. 3. 
ECRI’s country reports 
are published following 
their transmission to the 
national authorities, 
unless the latter expressly 
oppose such publication. 
These reports shall 
include appendices 
containing the viewpoints 
of the national 
authorities, where the 
latter deem it necessary”. 
 
“The country monitoring 
deals with all member 
States on an equal footing 
and takes place in five-
year cycles, covering 
nine/ten countries per 
year. ECRI’s fifth 
monitoring cycle has 
ECRI also issues 
General 
Recommendations on 
relevant themes.413 
 
Article 6 of the statute 
specifies the 
following: 
“ECRI may seek the 
assistance of 
rapporteurs or of 
consultants. 2. ECRI 
may organise 
consultations with 
interested parties. 3. 
ECRI may set up 
working parties on 
specific topics. 4. 
ECRI may be seized 
directly by non-
governmental 
organisations on any 
questions covered by 
its terms of reference. 
5. ECRI may seek the 
opinions and 
contributions of 
                                                        
408 Resolution Res(2002)8 on the statute of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 13 June 2002 at the 799th meeting 
of the Ministers’ Deputies. 
413 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/GeneralThemes_en.asp. 
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begun during the first 
semester of 2013.”410  
 
ECRI performs country 
visits and organises a 
confidential dialogue 
with the national 
authorities. Member 
States’ authorities are 
provided – for the 
purposes of the 
confidential dialogue – 
with a version of their 
country’s report 
provisionally adopted by 
ECRI (draft report).411 
 
Article 12: “ECRI’s work 
on general themes shall 
generally consist of the 
adoption of general 
policy recommendations 
addressed to 
governments of Member 
States and of the 
collection and 
dissemination of 
Council of Europe 
bodies concerned 
with its work. 6. ECRI 
shall periodically 
inform the Committee 
of Ministers on the 
results of its work.” 
 
 
                                                        
410 See http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/countrybycountry_en.asp  
411 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/Information%20document%20fifth%20monitoring%20cycle_en.pdf  
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examples of “good 
practices” in combating 
racism, racial 
discrimination, 
xenophobia, antisemitism 
and intolerance.” 
 
Commissioner for 
Human Rights 
 
Article 3 of the 
mandate414 states 
the Commissioner shall: 
“a. promote education in 
and awareness of human 
rights in the member 
States; 
b. contribute to the 
promotion of the 
effective observance and 
full enjoyment of human 
rights in the member 
States; 
c. provide advice and 
information on the 
protection of human 
rights and prevention of 
human rights violations. 
When dealing with the 
The Commissioner415 
Article 9: “1. The 
Commissioner shall be 
elected by the 
Parliamentary 
Assembly by a 
majority of votes cast 
from a list of three 
candidates drawn up 
by the Committee of 
Ministers. 2. Member 
States may submit 
candidatures by letter 
addressed to the 
Secretary General. 
Candidates must be 
nationals of a member 
State of the Council of 
Europe.” 
The Commissioner issues 
recommendations, 
opinions and reports 
(Article 8 of mandate). 
The most relevant 
documents which are 
published are activity 
reports, country work, 
issue papers, opinions, 
third-party interventions 
and other publications 
and recommendations.417 
Their publication may be 
authorised by the Council 
of Ministers. 
A key dimension of the 
Commissioner’s work is 
conducting country visits, 
which aim at ensuring “a 
Article 5 of the 
mandate stipulates 
that the 
Commissioner “may 
act on any 
information relevant 
to the Commissioner’s 
functions. This will 
notably include 
information 
addressed to the 
Commissioner by 
governments, national 
parliaments, national 
ombudsmen or 
similar institutions in 
the field of human 
rights, individuals 
and organisations”. 
 
 
 
                                                        
414 Resolution 99(50) on the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 7 May 1999. Available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=Res(99)50&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=COE. 
415 http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/the-commissioner. 
417 http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/documents. 
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public, the 
Commissioner shall, 
wherever possible, make 
use of and co-operate 
with human rights 
structures in the member 
States. Where such 
structures do not exist, 
the Commissioner will 
encourage their 
establishment; 
d. facilitate the activities 
of national ombudsmen 
or similar institutions in 
the field of human 
rights; 
e. identify possible 
shortcomings in the law 
and practice of member 
States concerning the 
compliance with human 
rights as embodied in 
the instruments of the 
Council of Europe, 
promote the effective 
implementation of these 
standards by member 
Article 10: “The 
candidates shall be 
eminent personalities 
of a high moral 
character having 
recognised expertise 
in the field of human 
rights, a public record 
of attachment to the 
values of the Council 
of Europe and the 
personal authority 
necessary to discharge 
the mission of the 
Commissioner 
effectively. During his 
or her term of office, 
the Commissioner 
shall not engage in 
any activity which is 
incompatible with the 
demands of a full-time 
office.” 
Article 11: “The 
Commissioner shall be 
elected for a non-
direct dialogue with the 
authorities and looking 
into one or several 
specific issues”.418 
There are a number of 
thematic areas where the 
Commissioner’s work is 
more focused, which 
include: children’s rights, 
terrorism, economic 
crisis, LGBTI, media 
freedom, migration, 
persons with disabilities, 
post-war justice, Roma 
and travellers, systematic 
human rights work.419 
 
The mandate 
expressly states that 
the gathering of 
information relevant 
to the Commissioner 
will not entail any 
formal reporting 
procedure for 
Member States. 
Member States are 
required to facilitate 
the work of the 
Commissioner, in 
particular “the 
Commissioner’s 
contacts, including 
travel, in the context 
of the mission of the 
Commissioner and 
provide in good time 
information requested 
by the Commissioner” 
(Article 6). 
 
 
                                                        
418 See http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/country-monitoring  
419 For an overview of the thematic work refer to http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/thematic-work. 
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States and assist them, 
with their agreement, in 
their efforts to remedy 
such shortcomings; 
f. address, whenever the 
Commissioner deems it 
appropriate, a report 
concerning a specific 
matter to the Committee 
of Ministers or to the 
Parliamentary Assembly 
and the Committee of 
Ministers; 
g. respond, in the 
manner the 
Commissioner deems 
appropriate, to requests 
made by the Committee 
of Ministers or the 
Parliamentary 
Assembly, in the context 
of their task of ensuring 
compliance with the 
human rights standards 
of the Council of Europe; 
h. submit an annual 
report to the Committee 
of Ministers and the 
renewable term of 
office of six years.” 
“The Commissioner is 
elected by the 
Parliamentary 
Assembly of the 
Council of Europe 
from a list of three 
candidates drawn up 
by the Committee of 
Ministers, and serves 
a non-renewable term 
of office of six 
years”.416  
                                                        
416 http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/mandate. 
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Parliamentary 
Assembly; 
i. co-operate with other 
international institutions 
for the promotion and 
protection of human 
rights while avoiding 
unnecessary duplication 
of activities.” 
European Committee 
for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman 
or Degrading 
Treatment or 
Punishment (CPT) 
 
Article 1 of the 1987 
European Convention 
for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment states: 
“There shall be 
established a European 
Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture 
and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (hereinafter 
It has 42 members.421 
The members come 
from a variety of 
backgrounds, 
including “a variety of 
backgrounds, 
including lawyers, 
medical doctors and 
specialists in prison or 
police matter”.422 
Article 4: “1 The 
Committee shall 
consist of a number of 
What does it do? “The 
CPT organises visits to 
places of detention to 
assess how persons 
deprived of their liberty 
are treated. These places 
include prisons, juvenile 
detention centres, police 
stations, holding centres 
for immigration 
detainees, psychiatric 
hospitals, social care 
homes, etc.423 
Country visit and 
elaboration of country 
report, including 
recommendations. 
Article 10 of the 
Convention clarifies 
that “1 After each 
visit, the Committee 
shall draw up a report 
on the facts found 
during the visit, 
taking account of any 
observations which 
Article 10.2 of the 
Convention states 
that  
“If the Party fails to 
co-operate or refuses 
to improve the 
situation in the light 
of the Committee’s 
recommendations, 
the Committee may 
decide, after the Party 
has had an 
opportunity to make 
                                                        
421 Refer to http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/members.htm. 
422 Explanatory Report of the Convention states, “It is clear that they do not have to be lawyers. It would be desirable that the Committee should include members who have 
experience in matters such as prison administration and the various medical fields relevant to the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty. This will make the dialogue 
between the Committee and the States more effective and facilitate concrete suggestions from the Committee.” See http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/documents/explanatory-
report.htm. 
423 Article 8.2 of the Convention states, “A Party shall provide the Committee with the following facilities to carry out its task: a access to its territory and the right to travel without restriction; 
b full information on the places where persons deprived of their liberty are being held; c unlimited access to any place where persons are deprived of their liberty, including the right to move inside 
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referred to as “the 
Committee”). The 
Committee shall, by 
means of visits, examine 
the treatment of persons 
deprived of their liberty 
with a view to 
strengthening, if 
necessary, the protection 
of such persons from 
torture and from 
inhuman or degrading 
treatment or 
punishment.”420 
 
 
members equal to that 
of the Parties. 
2 The members of the 
Committee shall be 
chosen from among 
persons of high moral 
character, known for 
their competence in 
the field of human 
rights or having 
professional 
experience in the areas 
covered by this 
Convention. 
3 No two members of 
the Committee may be 
nationals of the same 
State. 
4 The members shall 
serve in their 
individual capacity, 
shall be independent 
CPT delegations have 
unlimited access to places 
of detention, and the 
right to move inside such 
places without restriction. 
They interview persons 
deprived of their liberty 
in private, and 
communicate freely with 
anyone who can provide 
information. 
After each visit, the CPT 
sends a detailed report to 
the State concerned.424 
This report includes the 
CPT’s findings, and its 
recommendations, 
comments and requests 
for information. The CPT 
also requests a detailed 
response to the issues 
raised in its report. These 
may have been 
submitted by the 
Party concerned. It 
shall transmit to the 
latter its report 
containing any 
recommendations it 
considers necessary. 
The Committee may 
consult with the Party 
with a view to 
suggesting, if 
necessary, 
improvements in the 
protection of persons 
deprived of their 
liberty.” 
CPT has developed a 
set of thematic 
‘standards’ which 
constitute the 
substantive sections of 
known its views, by a 
majority of two-
thirds of its members 
to make a public 
statement on the 
matter.”427 
 
                                                        
such places without restriction; d other information available to the Party which is necessary for the Committee to carry out its task. In seeking such information, the Committee shall have regard 
to applicable rules of national law and professional ethics.” 
420 See http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/documents/ecpt.htm. 
424 Country reports are available here http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/states.htm. 
427 The Explanatory Report further adds that ““Given the importance of such a decision, it may only be taken by a qualified majority. Before using this remedy in the case of a State’s refusal 
to improve the situation, the Committee should pay full regard to any difficulties in the way of doing so. 75. The Committee will have a wide discretion in deciding what information to make 
public, but will have to take due account of the need to secure that information passed over in confidence is not revealed. It should also take into consideration the desirability of not revealing 
information in connection with pending investigations.” 
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and impartial, and 
shall be available to 
serve the Committee 
effectively.” 
Article 5 (1): “1 The 
members of the 
Committee shall be 
elected by the 
Committee of 
Ministers of the 
Council of Europe by 
an absolute majority 
of votes, from a list of 
names drawn up by 
the Bureau of the 
Consultative 
Assembly of the 
Council of Europe; 
each national 
delegation of the 
Parties in the 
Consultative 
Assembly shall put 
forward three 
candidates, of whom 
two at least shall be its 
nationals. 
reports and responses 
form part of the ongoing 
dialogue with the States 
concerned.”425 
Country visits, which are 
envisaged in Articles 7 to 
9 of the Convention, are 
usually carried out once 
every four years. There is 
also the possibility to 
conduct further ad hoc 
visits. The state 
concerned needs to be 
informed in advance.  
general reports.426 
These deal with: law 
enforcement agencies, 
prisons, psychiatric 
institutions, 
immigration 
detention, juveniles 
deprived of their 
liberty under criminal 
investigation, women 
deprived of their 
liberty, documenting 
and reporting medical 
evidence of ill-
treatment, combating 
impunity and 
electrical discharge 
weapons. 
                                                        
425 Quoted from http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/about.htm. 
426 CPT Standards, Substantive Sections of the CPT’s General Reports, CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 - Rev. 2015, http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/documents/eng-standards.pdf  
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Where a member is to 
be elected to the 
Committee in respect 
of a non-member State 
of the Council of 
Europe, the Bureau of 
the Consultative 
Assembly shall invite 
the Parliament of that 
State to put forward 
three candidates, of 
whom two at least 
shall be its nationals. 
The election by the 
Committee of 
Ministers shall take 
place after 
consultation with the 
Party concerned. 
2 The same procedure 
shall be followed in 
filling casual 
vacancies. 
3 The members of the 
Committee shall be 
elected for a period of 
four years. They may 
be re-elected twice. 
However, among the 
members elected at 
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the first election, the 
terms of three 
members shall expire 
at the end of two 
years. The members 
whose terms are to 
expire at the end of 
the initial period of 
two years shall be 
chosen by lot by the 
Secretary General of 
the Council of Europe 
immediately after the 
first election has been 
completed. 
4 In order to ensure 
that, as far as possible, 
one half of the 
membership of the 
Committee shall be 
renewed every two 
years, the Committee 
of Ministers may 
decide, before 
proceeding to any 
subsequent election, 
that the term or terms 
of office of one or 
more members to be 
elected shall be for a 
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period other than four 
years but not more 
than six and not less 
than two years.” 
 
The European 
Commission for the 
Efficiency of Justice 
(CEPEJ) 
 
CEPEJ exists since 
2002.428 Article 1 of the 
CEPEJ statute429 states 
that its aim is “(a) to 
improve the efficiency 
and the functioning of 
the justice system of 
Member States, with a 
view to ensuring that 
everyone within their 
jurisdiction can enforce 
their legal rights 
effectively, thereby 
generating increased 
confidence of the citizens 
in the justice system and 
(b) to enable a better 
implementation of the 
international legal 
instruments of the 
Article 5 – 
Composition of the 
CEPEJ:433 
“1. The CEPEJ shall 
be composed of 
experts who are 
best able to 
contribute to its 
aims and functions, 
and who have in 
particular an in-
depth knowledge 
of the 
administration, 
functioning and 
efficiency of civil, 
criminal and/or 
administrative 
justice. 
The evaluation of the 
judicial systems of the 
CoE’s members is 
coordinated by a 
Working Group on the 
evaluation of judicial 
systems (CEPEJ-GT-
EVAL). 
Article 2 of the Statute 
stipulates the following 
functions: 
“a. to examine the results 
achieved by the different 
judicial systems in the 
light of the principles 
referred to in the 
preamble to this 
resolution by using, 
amongst other things, 
common statistical 
The ‘principles’ 
against which the 
different judicial 
systems are examined 
are the following: I. 
Access to justice and 
proper and efficient 
functioning of courts; 
II. The status and role 
of the legal 
professionals; 
III. Administration of 
justice and 
management of 
courts; IV. Use of 
information and 
communication 
technologies. 
The methods used are 
common statistical 
 
                                                        
428 Resolution Res(2002)12 establishing the European Commission for the efficiency of justice (CEPEJ), (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 18 September 2002, at the 808th 
meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). See information leaflet http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/presentation/CEPEJ_depliant_en.pdf. 
429 See https://wcd.coe.int/ 
ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=Res(2002)12&Sector=secCM&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75. 
433 See http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/presentation/contacts_en.asp. 
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Council of Europe 
concerning efficiency 
and fairness of justice.” 
 
CEPEJ has different 
Working Groups: 
 
First, the Working 
Group on execution 
(CEPEJ-GT-EXE),430 
which enables a better 
implementation of 
relevant CoE standards 
concerning execution of 
court decisions in civil, 
commercial and 
administrative matters at 
national level. 
2. Each member 
State of the Council 
of Europe shall 
appoint an expert 
to the CEPEJ.” 
CEPEJ members are 
supported by 
networks of national 
experts enabling them 
to keep in touch with 
the situation in 
Europe’s judicial 
systems.434 
criteria and means of 
evaluation; 
b. to define problems and 
areas for possible 
improvements and to 
exchange views on the 
functioning of the judicial 
systems; 
c. to identify concrete 
ways to improve the 
measuring and 
functioning of the judicial 
systems of the member 
States, having regard to 
their specific needs; 
d. to provide assistance to 
one or more member 
States, at their request, 
criteria435 and other 
‘means of evaluation’. 
In particular, CEPEJ 
has developed an 
‘Evaluation 
Scheme’.436 The 
Scheme is based on a 
system of six general 
indicators:437 
 Demographic 
and economic 
data (including 
data on 
inhabitants, GDP, 
budget allocated 
to courts, etc.). 
                                                        
430 The composition of the working group is outlined here http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/Execution/GT-EXE-Composition.pdf. 
434 This includes “- a network of national correspondents responsible for co-ordinating the collection of relevant information for the evaluation of judicial systems; - a network of 
pilot courts allowing the CEPEJ to pursue its activities while taking account of the practical day-to-day operation of courts; - the Lisbon Network which is composed of 
representatives of national training institutions of the member States in charge of questions relating to training of judges and prosecutors, allowing the CEPEJ to develop European 
quality standards in the field of training”, quoted from https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/profiles/default_en.asp. 
435 Refer to CEPEJ Guidelines on Judicial Statistics (GOJUST), https://wcd.coe.int/ 
ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CEPEJ(2008)11&Language=lanEnglish&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864. 
436 European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Scheme for Evaluating Judicial Systems, 2014-2016 Cycle, CEPEJ(2015)1, Strasbourg 2 June 2015. Available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CEPEJ(2015)1&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FD
C864. See also Explanatory Note https://wcd.coe.int/ 
ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CEPEJ(2015)2&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864. 
437 CEPEJ, Scheme for Evaluating Judicial Systems: Key Judicial Indicators, 6 December 2007, CEPEJ(2007)27. See https://wcd.coe.int/ 
ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CEPEJ(2007)27&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=DGHL-CEPEJ&BackColorInternet=eff2fa&BackColorIntranet=eff2fa&BackColorLogged=c1cbe6  
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Second, the Working 
Group on quality of 
justice (CEPEJ-GT-
QUAL) which develops 
means of analysis and 
evaluation of the work 
done inside the courts. It 
aims at improving 
quality of the public 
service delivered by 
national justice systems, 
with special attention to 
the expectations of the 
justice practitioners.431 
 
Third, a centre for 
judicial time 
management (SATURN 
Centre – Study and 
Analysis of Judicial Time 
Use Research 
Network).432 
 
including assistance in 
complying with the 
standards of the Council 
of Europe; 
e. to suggest, if 
appropriate, areas in 
which the relevant 
steering committees of 
the Council of Europe, in 
particular the European 
Committee on Legal Co-
operation (CDCJ), may, if 
they consider it 
necessary, draft new 
international legal 
instruments or 
amendments to existing 
ones, for adoption by the 
Committee of Ministers.” 
 
CEPEJ may carry out its 
functions outlined in 
paragraphs a, b, c and e 
above on its own 
initiative. Tasks foreseen 
in d at the request of one 
or more Member States. 
 Legal aid (access 
to justice) 
(including 
number of legal 
aid cases).  
 Organisation of 
the court system 
and the public 
prosecution 
(including 
number of judges 
and prosecutors, 
level of computer 
facilities). 
 The performance 
and workload of 
courts and the 
public 
prosecution 
(including 
number of cases 
related to Article 
6 ECHR, number 
of civil and 
administrative 
law cases, 
number of cases 
                                                        
431 For more information refer to http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/quality/default_en.asp. 
432 See http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/Delais/default_en.asp. 
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Article 3 outlines the 
Working methods as 
follows: 
“a. identifying and 
developing indicators, 
collecting and analysing 
quantitative and 
qualitative data, and 
defining measures and 
means of evaluation; 
b. drawing up reports, 
statistics, best practice 
surveys, guidelines, 
action plans, opinions 
and general comments; 
c. establishing links with 
research institutes and 
documentation and study 
centres; 
d. inviting to participate 
in its work, on a case-by-
case basis, any qualified 
person, specialist or non-
governmental 
organisation active in its 
field of competence and 
capable of helping it in 
the fulfilment of its 
objectives, and holding 
hearings; 
e. creating networks of 
received and 
treated by public 
prosecutor, 
number of 
criminal cases). 
 Execution of 
court decisions. 
 Legal and judicial 
reforms (optional 
question). 
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professionals involved in 
the justice area.” 
States have the possibility 
to update some key data. 
Group of States against 
Corruption (GRECO)438 
Article 1 of GRECO 
Statute439 states that it 
aims “to improve the 
capacity of its members 
to fight corruption by 
following up, through a 
dynamic process of 
mutual evaluation and 
peer pressure, 
compliance with their 
undertakings in this 
field.” 
Article 2 foresees the 
functions of the GRECO 
as follows: “i. monitor 
the observance of the 
Guiding Principles for 
the Fight against 
Corruption as adopted 
by the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council 
of Europe on 6 
November 1997; and ii. 
monitor the 
Article 6 states the 
‘Composition of the 
GRECO’, in particular 
“1. Each member shall 
appoint a delegation 
to the GRECO 
consisting of not more 
than two 
representatives. One 
representative shall be 
appointed as head of 
the delegation.” 
The evaluation 
procedure and 
method relies on 
evaluation teams. 
Article 10.4 states: 
“Each member shall 
identify a maximum 
of 5 experts who 
would be able to 
undertake the tasks 
set out in Articles 12-
14.” 
GRECO monitoring 
comprises:  
First, a “horizontal” 
evaluation procedure (all 
members are evaluated 
within an Evaluation 
Round), which 
constitutes a system of 
‘mutual evaluation’.440 So 
far GRECO has launched 
four evaluation rounds. 
The evaluation procedure 
shall be based on the 
principle of mutual 
evaluation and peer 
pressure. 
The evaluation results in 
the issuing of 
recommendations aimed 
at furthering the 
necessary legislative, 
Article 10 deals with 
Evaluation procedure 
and states: “1. The 
GRECO shall conduct 
evaluation procedures 
in respect of each of 
its members in 
pursuance of Article 
2. 2. The evaluation 
shall be divided in 
rounds. An evaluation 
round is a period of 
time determined by 
the GRECO, during 
which an evaluation 
procedure shall be 
conducted to assess 
the compliance of 
members with 
selected provisions 
contained in the 
Guiding Principles 
and in other 
international legal 
“The assessment of 
whether a 
recommendation has 
been implemented 
satisfactorily, partly 
or has not been 
implemented, is 
based on a situation 
report, accompanied 
by supporting 
documents submitted 
by the member under 
scrutiny 18 months 
after the adoption of 
the evaluation report. 
In cases where not all 
recommendations 
have been complied 
with, GRECO will re-
examine outstanding 
recommendations 
within another 18 
                                                        
438 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/default_en.asp. 
439 Refer to Statute of the GRECO, Appendix to Resolution (99) 5, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/documents/statute_en.asp. 
440 See http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/intro_en.asp  
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 WHAT WHO 
HOW 
Procedure Method Follow-up 
implementation of 
international legal 
instruments to be 
adopted in pursuance of 
the Programme of 
Action against 
Corruption, in 
conformity with the 
provisions contained in 
such instruments”. 
 
 institutional and practical 
reforms.  
Second, a compliance 
procedure designed to 
assess the measures taken 
by its members to 
implement the 
recommendations.”441 
GRECO is currently 
conducting the fourth 
evaluation round which 
deals with “Prevention of 
corruption in respect of 
members of parliament, 
judges and prosecutors”.  
The evaluation starts with 
a questionnaire “for each 
evaluation round, which 
shall be addressed to all 
members concerned by 
the evaluation” (Article 
11 of Statute). There is a 
model of questionnaire 
which is used for this 
purpose.442 
According to GRECO 
Rules of Procedure (Title 
instruments adopted 
in pursuance of the 
Programme of Action 
against Corruption. 3. 
At the beginning of 
each round the 
GRECO shall select 
the specific provisions 
on which the 
evaluation procedure 
shall be based. 4. Each 
member shall identify 
a maximum of 5 
experts who would be 
able to undertake the 
tasks set out in 
Articles 12-14. 5. Each 
member shall ensure 
that its authorities co-
operate, to the fullest 
possible extent, in the 
evaluation procedure, 
within the limits of its 
national legislation.” 
Article 11 deals with 
the Questionnaire, 
and stipulates: “1. The 
GRECO shall adopt a 
questionnaire for each 
evaluation round, 
months. Compliance 
reports and the 
addenda thereto 
adopted by GRECO 
also contain an 
overall conclusion on 
the implementation 
of all the 
recommendations, 
the purpose of which 
is to decide whether 
to terminate the 
compliance 
procedure in respect 
of a particular 
member. Finally, the 
Rules of Procedure of 
GRECO foresee a 
special procedure, 
based on a graduated 
approach, for dealing 
with members whose 
response to GRECO’s 
recommendations has 
been found to 
                                                        
441 Quoted from http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/4.%20How%20does%20GRECO%20work_en.asp  
442 Available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round4/Greco%20(2012)%2022E%20Questionnaire%20Eval%20IV%20REVISED_EN.pdf. 
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 WHAT WHO 
HOW 
Procedure Method Follow-up 
II on Evaluation 
Procedure), Rule 24:443  
“1. The mutual 
evaluation questionnaire 
shall be sent to all 
members undergoing an 
evaluation. Unless 
otherwise decided by 
GRECO the replies to the 
questionnaire shall be 
returned to the Executive 
Secretary within the time 
limit set by GRECO. 2. 
The replies to the mutual 
evaluation questionnaire 
shall be detailed, answer 
all questions and contain 
all necessary appendices. 
Whenever a country visit 
is to be carried out, these 
documents shall be 
submitted to the 
Executive Secretary at 
least three months before 
the visit.” 
which shall be 
addressed to all 
members concerned 
by the evaluation. 2. 
The questionnaire 
shall provide the 
framework of the 
evaluation procedure. 
3. Members shall 
address their replies 
to the Secretariat 
within the time limits 
fixed by the GRECO.” 
Article 12 covers 
‘Evaluation teams’, 
and states: “1. The 
GRECO shall appoint, 
from the experts 
referred to in 
paragraph 4 of Article 
10, a team for the 
evaluation of each 
member (hereinafter 
referred to as “the 
team”). When the 
evaluation concerns 
the implementation of 
one of the 
international legal 
instruments adopted 
be globally 
unsatisfactory.”444 
 
Article 16 of the 
Statute deals with 
‘Public Statements’, 
and states: “1. The 
Statutory Committee 
may issue a public 
statement when it 
believes that a 
member remains 
passive or takes 
insufficient action in 
respect of the 
recommendations 
addressed to it as 
regards the 
application of the 
Guiding Principles. 
2. The Statutory 
Committee, in its 
composition 
restricted to the 
members who are 
parties to the 
instruments 
concerned, may issue 
a public statement 
                                                        
443 GRECO Rules of Procedure, 5 December 2011, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/documents/Greco(2011)20_RulesOfProcedure_EN.pdf. 
444 Quoted from http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/4.%20How%20does%20GRECO%20work_en.asp. 
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 WHAT WHO 
HOW 
Procedure Method Follow-up 
in pursuance of the 
Programme of Action 
against Corruption, 
the GRECO shall 
appoint teams 
composed exclusively 
of experts proposed 
by members who are 
Parties to the 
instrument concerned. 
2. The team shall 
examine the replies 
given to the 
questionnaire and 
may request, where 
appropriate, 
additional 
information from the 
member undergoing 
the evaluation, to be 
submitted either 
orally or in writing. 
Article 13 - Country 
visits foresees that “1. 
The GRECO may 
instruct the team to 
visit a member, for 
the purpose of 
seeking additional 
information 
concerning its law or 
practice, which is 
useful for the 
when it believes that 
a member remains 
passive or takes 
insufficient action in 
respect of the 
recommendations 
addressed to it as 
regards the 
implementation of an 
instrument adopted 
in pursuance of the 
Programme of Action 
against Corruption. 
3. The Statutory 
Committee shall 
inform the member 
concerned and 
provide an 
opportunity for the 
member to submit 
further comments 
before confirming its 
decision to issue a 
public statement 
referred to in 
paragraphs 1 and/or 
2 above.” 
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 WHAT WHO 
HOW 
Procedure Method Follow-up 
evaluation. 2. The 
GRECO shall give a 
minimum of two 
months’ notice to the 
member concerned of 
its intention to carry 
out the visit. 3. The 
visit shall be carried 
out in accordance 
with a programme 
arranged by the 
member concerned, 
taking into account 
the wishes expressed 
by the team. 4. The 
members of the team 
shall enjoy the 
privileges and 
immunities applicable 
under Article 2 of the 
Protocol to the 
General Agreement 
on Privileges and 
Immunities of the 
Council of Europe. 5. 
The budget of the 
Enlarged Partial 
Agreement shall bear 
the travel and 
subsistence expenses 
necessary for the 
carrying out country 
visits.” 
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 WHAT WHO 
HOW 
Procedure Method Follow-up 
Article 14 on 
Evaluation reports 
states: “1. On the basis 
of the information 
gathered, the team 
shall prepare a 
preliminary draft 
evaluation report on 
the state of the law 
and the practice in 
relation to the 
provisions selected 
for the evaluation 
round. 2. The 
preliminary draft 
report shall be 
transmitted to the 
member undergoing 
the evaluation for 
comments. These 
comments shall be 
taken into account by 
the team when 
finalising the draft 
report. 3. The draft 
report shall be 
submitted to the 
GRECO”. 
Evaluation Reports 
are confidential 
(Article 15.5 of the 
Statute). 
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 WHAT WHO 
HOW 
Procedure Method Follow-up 
European Committee 
on Crime Problems 
(CDPC)445 
Terms of Reference446     
Council for Penological 
Cooperation (PC– 
CP)447 
Terms of Reference448     
Committee of Experts 
on the Operation of 
European Conventions 
on Co-Operation in 
Criminal Matters (PC-
OC)449 
Terms of Reference450     
European Committee 
for Social Cohesion, 
Human Dignity and 
Equality451 
The CDDECS was set up 
by the Committee of 
Ministers under Article 
17 of the Statute of the 
Council of Europe and in 
accordance with 
Resolution 
CM/Res(2011)24 on 
intergovernmental 
“The CDDECS 
Committee consists of 
representatives from 
CoE Member States. 
The governments of 
each member State 
designate one 
representative of the 
highest possible rank 
and expertise in the 
Its work is divided into 
several Working Groups, 
and the results are 
discussed in Plenary 
Sessions.454 It issues 
country reports on recent 
developments at national 
level. 
  
                                                        
445 For general information on the Committee refer to http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/STANDARDSETTING/CDPC/default_en.asp. 
446 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cdpc/ToR%20CDPC%202014-2015.pdf. 
447 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/prisons/PCCP_en.asp. 
448 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/prisons/PCCP%20documents%202014/PC-CP%20Terms%20of%20Reference%202014-2015%20E.pdf. 
449 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/pc-oc/default_en.asp. 
450 http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/STANDARDSETTING/PC-OC/PCOC_documents/Documents%202015/PC-OC%20terms%20of%20reference%202016-2017.pdf. 
451 http://www.coe.int/en/web/cddecs/. 
454 http://www.coe.int/en/web/cddecs/plenary-sessions  
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 WHAT WHO 
HOW 
Procedure Method Follow-up 
committees and 
subordinate bodies.  
It oversees and 
coordinates the 
intergovernmental work 
of the CoE in the fields 
of social cohesion, 
human dignity, equality 
and anti-discrimination. 
It advises the Committee 
of Ministers on all 
questions within its area 
of competence. 
According to the Terms 
of Reference,452 its tasks 
include: 
First, oversee, promote 
and review the 
implementation of the 
Council of Europe 
Strategy and Action Plan 
for Social Cohesion 
(2010) and develop 
appropriate tools to 
promote social cohesion, 
combat discrimination, 
marginalisation, social 
exclusion and poverty.  
Second, support the 
implementation of the 
relevant fields. The 
representatives have 
responsibility at the 
national level for the 
planning, 
development and 
implementation of 
policies relevant to the 
work of the 
Committee and are 
appointed by their 
governments to co-
ordinate at national 
level all elements of 
government policy 
relevant to the work of 
the Committee. Each 
member of the 
committee has one 
vote. Where a 
government 
designates more than 
one member, only one 
of them is entitled to 
take part in the 
voting.”453 
The Terms of 
Reference state that 
the members will have 
the responsibility for 
                                                        
452 http://www.coe.int/en/web/cddecs/terms-of-reference. 
453 Quoted from http://www.coe.int/en/web/cddecs/committee. 
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 WHAT WHO 
HOW 
Procedure Method Follow-up 
Gender Equality 
transversal programme. 
Third, support the 
implementation of the 
transversal programme 
“Building a Europe for 
and with Children” and 
of the Council of Europe 
Strategy for the Rights of 
the Child 2012-15; 
support the preparation 
of the Strategy for 2016-
19; and promote 
measures to prevent and 
eliminate all forms of 
violence against children 
and to protect and 
support child victims of 
violence.  
Fourth, oversee the 
promotion, 
implementation, follow-
up and final review of 
the Council of Europe 
Disability Action Plan 
2006-15, as well as the 
development of the 
Council of Europe post-
2015 disability 
framework. 
Fifth, contribute, 
promote and support in 
its field of competence 
“the planning, 
development and 
implementation of 
policies relevant to the 
work of the 
Committee and 
appointed by their 
governments to co-
ordinate at national 
level all elements of 
government policy 
relevant to the work of 
the Committee. Each 
member of the 
committee shall have 
one vote. Where a 
government 
designates more than 
one member, only one 
of them is entitled to 
take part in the 
voting.” 
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 WHAT WHO 
HOW 
Procedure Method Follow-up 
the implementation of 
standards, in particular 
through the promotion 
of the relevant Council 
of Europe conventions 
and the work carried out 
by ECRI, supporting 
States in the exchange of 
good practice to address 
the problems 
highlighted by 
monitoring mechanisms, 
taking into account the 
activities of other 
international 
organisations, in 
particular the European 
Union, the United 
Nations and the OSCE. 
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ANNEX 2 
Status of ratification of Human Rights Instruments by EU Member States455 
(As of 13/02/2013) 
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Austria  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 Austria  
Belgium  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 1 1 1 Belgium  
Bulgaria  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Bulgaria  
Croatia 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 Croatia 
Cyprus  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 0 0 0 Cyprus  
Czech Republic 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Czech Republic 
Denmark  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Denmark  
Estonia  1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 Estonia  
Finland  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 0 0 0 0 0 Finland  
France  1 1 1 1 1 1 S 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 1 1 1 France  
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 1 0 0 Germany 
Greece  1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 Greece  
Hungary  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 Hungary  
Ireland  1 1 1 1 1 1 S 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ireland  
Italy  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 0 0 0 Italy  
Latvia  1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 Latvia  
Lithuania  1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 Lithuania  
                                                        
455 Compilation as requested by the Directorate General for Parliamentary Research Services. 
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Luxembourg  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 0 0 0 Luxembourg  
Malta  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 0 0 0 Malta  
Netherlands  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 Netherlands  
Poland  1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Poland  
Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 0 0 0 Portugal 
Romania  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 0 0 0 0 Romania  
Slovakia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 0 0 0 Slovakia 
Slovenia 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 0 0 0 Slovenia 
Spain  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 1 1 1 Spain  
Sweden  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 Sweden  
UK 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 UK 
  28 22 28 27 26 28 3 28 23 20 28 25 28 26 27 2 0 25 20 6 4 4 373 
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Source: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx. 
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ANNEX 3 
UNITED NATIONS456 
 WHAT WHO HOW 
Procedure Method Follow-up 
Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR)457 
Review of ‘the human 
rights record’ of UN 
members.458  
The UPR will assess 
the extent to which 
States respect their 
human rights 
obligations set out in: 
(1) the UN Charter; (2) 
the Universal 
Declaration of Human 
Rights; (3) human 
rights instruments to 
which the State is 
party (human rights 
treaties ratified by the 
State concerned); (4) 
voluntary pledges 
and commitments 
The reviews are 
conducted by the UPR 
Working Group. 
The Group is 
composed of 47 
members of the 
Council. 
Any UN Member 
State can take part in 
the 
discussion/dialogue 
with the reviewed 
States.  
Each State review is 
assisted by groups of 
three States, known as 
‘troikas’, which serve 
as rapporteurs. The 
selection of the troikas 
 “Following the review by the Working Group, a 
report is prepared by the troika with the 
involvement of the State under review and 
assistance from the OHCHR. This report, referred 
to as the “outcome report”, provides a summary 
of the actual discussion. It therefore consists of the 
questions, comments and recommendations made 
by States to the country under review, as well as 
the responses by the reviewed State.” 
It is a ‘state driven process’. 
The documents on which the reviews are based 
are:  
1) information provided by the State under 
review, which can take the form of a “national 
report”;  
2) information contained in the reports of 
independent human rights experts and groups, 
known as the Special Procedures (see below), 
The State has the primary 
responsibility to 
implement the 
recommendations 
contained in the final 
outcome. The UPR 
ensures that all countries 
are accountable for 
progress or failure in 
implementing these 
recommendations. 
During the second 
review the State is 
expected to provide 
information on what they 
have been doing to 
implement the 
recommendations made 
during the first review as 
                                                        
456 Compilation as requested by the Directorate General for Parliamentary Research Services. 
457 UN General Assembly on 15 March 2006 by resolution 60/251. See also the information of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, part of the UN Secretariat. 
mandated to support the work of all UN human rights mechanism. See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/WhoWeAre.aspx and 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/WhatWeDo.aspx. 
458 Refer to UN, Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General 
Human rights bodies and mechanisms, 29 January 2015. Retrievable from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx. See also 
http://spinternet.ohchr.org/_Layouts/SpecialProceduresInternet/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx?Type=TM. 
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made by the State 
(e.g. national human 
rights policies and/or 
programmes 
implemented); and, 
(5) applicable 
international 
humanitarian law. 
for each State is done 
through a drawing of 
lots following 
elections for the 
Council membership 
in the General 
Assembly. 
human rights treaty bodies, and other UN 
entities;  
3) information from other stakeholders including 
national human rights institutions and non-
governmental organisations. 
With the support of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), special procedures include country 
visits to analyse the human rights situation at the 
national level; act on individual cases and 
concerns of a broader, structural nature by 
sending communications to States and others in 
which they bring alleged violations or abuses to 
their attention; conduct thematic studies and 
convene expert consultations; contribute to the 
development of international human rights 
standards; engage in advocacy, raise public 
awareness, and provide advice for technical 
cooperation. Special procedures are reported 
annually to the Human Rights Council; the 
majority of the mandates also reports to the 
General Assembly.459 
All State parties are obliged to submit regular 
reports to the Committee on how the rights are 
being implemented. States must report initially 
one year after acceding to the Convention and 
then every two years. The Committee examines 
each report and addresses its concerns and 
recommendations to the State party in the form of 
“concluding observations”. 
well as on any 
developments in the field 
of human rights. The 
international community 
will assist in 
implementing the 
recommendations and 
conclusions regarding 
capacity-building and 
technical assistance, in 
consultation with the 
country concerned. If 
necessary, the Council 
will address cases where 
States are not 
cooperating. 
If the State does not 
cooperate, the Human 
Rights Council will 
decide on the measures it 
would need to take in 
case of persistent non-co-
operation by a State with 
the UPR. 
                                                        
459 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Introduction.aspx. 
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“In order to facilitate the work of the Committee, 
States parties are once again requested to ensure 
that the reports correspond strictly to the 
provisions of the Convention and that they are 
drafted in accordance with the guidelines 
adopted by the Committee. States parties are 
invited to submit reports that are as succinct and 
concise as possible.” 
The procedure is as follows:460 reports of State 
parties, presence of the delegations of State 
parties, introductory presentation of State party’s 
representative, action of country rapporteurs,461 
interventions by members of the Committee, 
reply of the State party’s representative, 
Committee’s concluding observations, written 
comments by State party. 
 
“In addition, the Convention establishes three 
other mechanisms through which the Committee 
performs its monitoring functions: the early-
warning procedure, the examination of inter-state 
complaints and the examination of individual 
complaints.” 
The Committee will be provided by the 
secretariat, well in advance of the session, with 
country presentations concerning the State parties 
whose periodic reports are due to be considered 
                                                        
460 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CERD/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx#A. 
461 “The country rapporteurs, in presentations that should also not exceed 30 minutes, must highlight aspects relevant to the fulfilment of the obligations arising under the 
Convention, and also those where shortcomings or deficiencies are apparent. They will also put questions aimed at supplementing the information received and ensuring greater 
clarity or precision with respect to the information received. These questions may be conveyed to the State party beforehand”, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CERD/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx#J. 
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by the Committee, or the State parties scheduled 
for examination under the review procedure. 
These presentations, to be treated as confidential 
documents, should contain a summary of the 
information available on the country in 
connection with the periodic reports.462 
The Committee can also carry out missions by 
members to States parties. “in order to assist 
where their presence would be useful in 
facilitating better implementation of the 
Convention. The Committee appoints one or 
more members to undertake such missions. When 
an invitation for a mission is received between 
meetings of the Committee, the Chairman will 
request one or more members to undertake the 
mission, after consulting the members of the 
Bureau. Members of the Committee participating 
in such a mission will report to the Committee at 
its next session.” 
There is first a pre-sessional working group which 
convenes five days before each of the 
Committee’s sessions. It is composed of five 
members of the Committee nominated by the 
Chairperson. 
The Group identifies the key issues or questions 
or list of issues (LOI) which will structure the 
dialogue with the State in question. 
As it is stated “24. It is generally accepted that the 
complex nature and diverse range of many of the 
                                                        
462 On methods refer to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CERD/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx.“Overview of the methods of work of the Committee”, of the report of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on its forty-eighth and forty-ninth sessions. Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 
18(A/51/18), paras. 587-627. 
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issues raised in connection with the 
implementation of the Covenant constitute a 
strong argument in favour of providing States 
parties with the possibility of preparing in 
advance to answer some of the principal 
questions arising out of their reports. Such an 
arrangement also enhances the likelihood that the 
State party will be able to provide precise and 
detailed information.”463 
Depending on the expertise of the member 
concerned, issues are allocated within the 
Working Group. They function as ‘country 
rapporteurs’ and the final version of the list is 
adopted by the entire group. 
The Secretariat provides the Working Group with 
a country analysis and other relevant documents. 
The list of issues is then sent to State members,464 
requesting them to provide in written their 
replies. 
As part of the Dialogue, representatives of the 
State concerned should be present at the meetings 
of the Committee.465 
                                                        
463 Quoted from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
464 This includes a note stating the following: “The list is not intended to be exhaustive and it should not be interpreted as limiting or in any other way prejudging the type and 
range of questions which members of the Committee might wish to ask. However, the Committee believes that the constructive dialogue which it wishes to have with the 
representatives of the State party is greatly facilitated by making the list available in advance of the Committee’s session. In order to improve the dialogue that the Committee 
seeks, it strongly urges each State party to provide in writing its replies to the list of issues and to do so sufficiently in advance of the session at which its report will be considered 
to enable the replies to be translated and made available to all members of the Committee.” 
465 The following procedure is followed: “[T]he representative of the State party is invited to introduce the report by making brief introductory comments and providing any new 
information that may be relevant to the dialogue. The Committee then considers the report by clusters of articles (usually articles 1–5, 6–9, 10–12 and 13–15), taking particular 
account of the replies furnished in response to the list of issues. The Chairperson will normally invite questions or comments from Committee members in relation to each issue 
and then invite the State party representatives to reply immediately to questions that do not require further reflection or research. Any remaining questions are taken up at a 
subsequent meeting or, if necessary, may be the subject of additional information provided to the Committee in writing. Members of the Committee are free to pursue specific 
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After the relevant procedure, the Committee 
drafts its ‘concluding observations’ with the 
following structure: introduction, positive 
aspects, principal subjects of concern and 
suggestions and recommendations. State parties 
can make comments to the concluding 
observations. 
Working Methods:466 “Once the State party has 
ratified the Covenant it should submit, one year 
after the Covenant enters into force, its initial 
report to the Committee. For periodic reports, it is 
the Bureau of the Committee, at the end of the 
session at which the State party report is 
examined, which decides the number of years 
after which the State party should present their 
next report.  
The general rule (ever since this system was 
started two years ago) is that State parties should 
present their periodic report to the Committee 
every four years. However, the Bureau can add or 
subtract one year to this four-year period 
depending on the level of compliance with the 
Covenant’s provisions by the State party.”467 
The Committee may call for a report three, five or 
six years after the submission of a periodic report, 
depending on the State party’s level of 
                                                        
issues in the light of the replies thus provided, although the Committee has urged them not to (a) raise issues outside the scope of the Covenant; (b) repeat questions already 
posed or answered; (c) add unduly to an already long list on a particular issue; or (d) speak for more than five minutes in any one intervention.” Quoted from 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
466 Refer to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx and the Guidelines are available at 
http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/doc/Implementing_Human_Rights/English/Reporting/UN%20Conventions/Guidelines/ICCPR.pdf. 
467 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
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compliance with the provisions of the Covenant, 
including its reporting record. Refer to Rules 66 
and 70, para. 1, of the rules of Procedure. 
‘Pre-Session Working Group’  
Country Report Tasks Forces (between four and 
six members) which identify in advance the 
questions which will constitute the principal 
focus of the dialogue with the representatives of 
the reporting State. One of these members is the 
country rapporteur who is overall responsible for 
the drafting of the list of issues. 
The working methods of the Country Report Task 
Force are as follows: First, the country rapporteur 
presents the draft list of issues for discussion to 
the Country Report Task Force. Once the 
members have made their observations, the list of 
issues is adopted by the Task Force as a whole. 
The Task Force then allocates to each of its 
members principal responsibility for a certain 
number of questions included in the list of issues, 
based in part on the areas of particular expertise 
or interest of the member concerned. Once the list 
of issues is adopted and edited, it is transmitted 
to the State party.468 
‘Constructive Dialogue’ 
It is the practice of the Committee, in accordance 
with Rule 68 of its Rules of Procedure, to examine 
reports in the presence of representatives of the 
reporting States. 
                                                        
468 “In preparation for the Country Report Task Force, the secretariat places at the disposal of its members a country analysis as well as all pertinent documents containing 
information relevant to each of the reports to be examined. For this purpose, the Committee invites all concerned individuals, bodies and non-governmental organizations to 
submit relevant and appropriate documentation to the secretariat.” 
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Procedure: The representative of the State party is 
invited to introduce the report by making brief 
introductory comments, followed by the replies to 
the first group of questions included in the list of 
issues.  
It should be noted that State parties are 
encouraged to use the list of issues to better 
prepare for a constructive discussion, but are not 
expected to submit written answers. After this 
intervention, the Committee members will 
provide comments or further questions in relation 
to the replies provided. Although all Committee 
members participate in this dialogue, the 
members of the Country Task Force who are 
responsible for a pre-assigned number of 
questions, will have priority when asking 
questions to the representatives of the State party. 
The representative of the State party is then 
invited to reply to the remaining questions on the 
list of issues, to which will again follow the 
comments and questions of the Committee. 
 
‘Concluding Observations/Comments’  
The final phase of the Committee’s examination 
of the State report is the drafting and adoption of 
its concluding observations. The country 
rapporteur prepares draft concluding 
observations for the consideration of the 
Committee.469 
                                                        
469 The agreed structure of the concluding observations is as follows: introduction; positive aspects; factors and difficulties impeding the implementation of the Covenant; principal 
subjects of concern and suggestions and recommendations. 
AN EU MECHANISM ON DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS | 141 
 
Reports by State parties to the Committee.470 So it 
is a ‘state driven process’. 
 
Documentation supplied by the Secretariat: The 
Committee will be provided with country files on 
the reporting State party. These files will include 
all material received by the secretariat, such as the 
official report, NGO and IGO information and 
other relevant documents. 
It also envisages cooperation with other 
specialised UN bodies and agencies, as well as 
NGOs and human rights organisations before the 
examination of a State report by the Committee.471 
State parties are obliged to submit regular reports 
to the Committee on how the rights of the 
Convention are implemented. During its sessions 
the Committee considers each State party report 
and addresses its concerns and recommendations 
to the State party in the form of concluding 
observations. 
In accordance with the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention, the Committee is mandated to: (1) 
receive communications from individuals or 
groups of individuals submitting claims of 
                                                        
470 On the simplified reporting procedure refer to UN ICCPR, Focused reports based on replies to ‘lists of issues prior to reporting’ (LOIPR): Implementation of the new optional 
reporting procedure (LOIPR procedure), 29 September 2010, so instead of a period report there is a so-called “focused report based on replies to a list of issues”. The LOPIR 
includes two sections: a first section on “General information on the national human rights situation, including new measures and developments relating to the implementation 
of the Covenant”; and a second section “where questions are organized according to clusters of provisions as in the standard list of issues, highlighting specific issues depending 
on the situation of the concerned State party and the information available to the Committee, in particular, the recommendations included in the last concluding observations 
addressed to the State party as well any follow-up information provided by the State.” 
471 The Committee, in its Annual Report (2002), stated that it reserved the right to determine, at a later stage, whether other briefings by non-governmental organisations should 
also become part of the Committee’s official record: (10) Paragraph 12, Annex III, Annual Report of the Human Rights Committee (2002), A/57/40 (Vol. I). 
142 | BÁRD, CARRERA, GUILD & KOCHENOV 
 
violations of rights protected under the 
Convention to the Committee and (2) 
initiate inquiries into situations of grave or 
systematic violations of women’s rights. These 
procedures are optional and are only available 
where the State concerned has accepted them. 
The Committee also formulates general 
recommendations and suggestions. General 
recommendations are directed to States and 
concern articles or themes in the Conventions. 
The procedure is also based on State reporting.472 
States are under the obligation to submit 
information regarding the ways in which they 
have or are implementing the Convention, as well 
as the ‘recommendations’ of the Committee.  
They will need to submit a report one year after 
the entry into force of the Convention, and then 
periodic reports every four years. It can also 
consider individual communications, adopting 
general comments and implement inquiries.473 
Similar to other treaty bodies, CATS has adopted 
guidelines for States’ initial and periodic reports, 
which includes a common core document to be 
used when submitting the report to the 
Committee. 
Special focus is paid in the reporting to the 
practical implementation of the Convention as 
well as challenges characterising this 
implementation.  
                                                        
472 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
473 CAT C/3/Rev 5, Rules of Procedure, 21 February 2011.  
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During the phase preceding the preparation of the 
reports by the States, the Committee consults with 
national human rights organisations as well as 
NGOs, which may provide information 
substantiating the work of the Committee.  
The Committee drafts a list of issues (LOI), which 
is sent to the State concerned.  
The States are under the obligation to respond to 
the LOI in writing, before the dialogue with the 
State’s delegation takes place. 
“The Committee holds two sessions annually, a 
four-week session in November and a four-week 
session in May, examining between 8 and 9 
reports per session; a delegation from each 
country is invited to be present during the 
dialogue.”474 
The assessment of the report occurs in the shape 
of a ‘dialogue’:  
“The aim of the dialogue is to enhance the 
Committee’s understanding of the situation in the 
State party as it pertains to the Convention and to 
provide advice on how to improve the 
implementation of the Convention provisions in 
the State party. The dialogue also provides an 
opportunity for the State party to further explain 
its efforts to enhance prevention of torture and ill-
treatment and to clarify the contents of its report 
to the members of the Committee. Exceptionally, 
the Committee may examine a report in the 
absence of representatives of the State party 
                                                        
474 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
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when, after being notified, they fail to appear 
without providing strong reasons.” 
 
How the meeting takes place is interesting. 
According to the CAT website: 
“Two public meetings, a half-day meeting on the 
first day and another half-day on the following 
day, are generally devoted to the examination of a 
report. The first meeting begins with a short 
presentation by the State party’s representatives, 
who usually update the information contained in 
the report and, if applicable, highlight the most 
relevant issues of the replies to the LOI previously 
sent in written to the Committee. Subsequently, 
the country rapporteurs and other Committee 
members make comments, ask questions and seek 
additional information related to issues that they 
consider require clarification. They can raise 
matters that had not been referred to in the LOI. 
On the following day, the second meeting will be 
devoted to the replies of the State party’s 
representatives to the questions posed by the 
members during the first meeting as well as to 
any follow-up issues that might be raised by the 
Committee. 
Individual members do not participate in any 
aspect of the examination of the reports of the 
States parties of which they are nationals. 
Press releases in English and French are issued 
immediately by the United Nations Information 
Service (www.unog.ch) regarding the meetings at 
which a State report is examined. Summary 
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records are also issued after the closure of the 
session in English or French.” 
So a key incentive for State parties to provide 
information is that the assessment will take in any 
case place if they don’t provide the report “and 
such review would be carried out on the basis of 
information that is available to the Committee, 
including sources from outside the United 
Nations.”475 
Following the examination the two rapporteurs 
draft ‘concluding observations’ are discussed and 
adopted in plenary of the Committee. The 
Conclusions follow a specific format, which after 
a brief introduction include a section on ‘positive 
aspects’ and another one on ‘subjects of concern 
and recommendations’. The State parties may 
provide any follow-up or mention 
complementary issues in light of the concluding 
observations. They can also elaborate comments. 
It foresees the possibility of simplified reporting 
procedures.476 
The LIOs are prepared by “two country 
rapporteurs on the basis of the information 
contained in the report, previous concluding 
observations addressed by the Committee to the 
State and information originating from other 
treaty bodies, special procedures and from the 
United Nations system as well from others 
                                                        
475 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/172/18/PDF/G1517218.pdf?OpenElement. 
476 See http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=HRI/MC/2014/4. 
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sources, including regional human rights 
mechanisms, NHRI and NGO and adopted by the 
Committee in plenary”.477 
 
It is the only Treaty body which does not require 
State parties to submit reports. The ICPPED does 
not require State parties to submit periodic 
reports. 
This body also constitutes an exception when it 
comes to ‘individual communications’. In 
comparison to the other bodies it is not possible 
for it to receive them. 
It has two main competences: 
First, visits to any place where a person may be 
deprived of liberty in State party territories.478 
There are four types of visits: SPT country visits, 
SPT country follow-up visits, NPM advisory visits 
and OPCAT advisory visits. 
Second, advice and assistance to State parties on 
the establishment of National Preventive 
Mechanisms (NPMs), independent national 
bodies for the prevention of torture.479 The setting 
up of NPMs constitutes a requirement for State 
parties to the Optional Protocol. 
It publishes an Annual Report480 which is 
presented before the CAT and the General 
Assembly.  
                                                        
477 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
478 For a list of visits see http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/CountryVisits.aspx. 
479 The Subcommittee has provided guidelines on the setting up of NPMs, see http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/OPCAT/Pages/NationalPreventiveMechanisms.aspx. 
480 For a full list refer to http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=12&DocTypeID=27. 
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According to the SPT website,481 “The SPT 
undertakes country visits during which a 
delegation of its members visits places where 
persons may be deprived of their liberty. During 
its visits, the SPT examines the conditions of their 
detention, their daily life, including the manner in 
which they are treated, the relevant legislative 
and institutional frameworks, and other questions 
that may be related to the prevention of torture 
and ill treatment. At the end of its visits, the SPT 
draws up a written report which contains 
recommendations and observations to the State, 
requesting a written response within six months 
of its receipt. This then triggers a further round of 
discussion regarding the implementation of the 
SPT’s recommendations, and thus begins the 
process of continual dialogue. The SPT visit 
reports are confidential, though State parties are 
encouraged to make them public documents, as 
permitted by the OPCAT. 
When undertaking NPM advisory visits, the SPT 
focuses on issues concerning the establishment 
and/or operation of the NPM in the country 
concerned. OPCAT advisory visits focus on high-
level discussions with the relevant authorities 
concerning a whole range of issues concerning 
OPCAT compliance. 
                                                        
481 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/OPCAT/Pages/OPCATIntro.aspx. 
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The working methods can be summarised as 
follows.482 
State parties undertake to submit to the 
Committee reports on the implementation of the 
Convention within two years of the entry into 
force of the Convention for the State party 
concerned and thereafter every five years (Article 
44.1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child). 
The Committee has issued guidelines for 
structuring and facilitating the dialogue with 
State parties.483 The agenda for the discussion 
takes place around the articles structuring the 
convention: 
(a) General measures of implementation (Arts. 4, 
42 and 44.6); (b) Definition of the child (Art. 1); (c) 
General principles (Arts. 2, 3, 6 and 12); (d) Civil 
rights and freedoms (Arts. 7, 8, 13-17 and 37a); (e) 
Family environment and alternative care (Arts. 5, 
18.1, 18.2, 9, 10, 27.4, 20, 21, 11, 19, 39 and 25); (f) 
Basic health and welfare (Arts. 6.2, 23, 24, 26, 18.3, 
27.1, 27.2 and 27.3); (g) Education, leisure and 
cultural activities (Arts. 28, 29 and 31); (h) Special 
protection measures:  
(i) Children in situations of emergency (Arts. 22, 
38 and 39); (ii) Children in conflict with the law 
(Arts. 40, 37 and 39); (iii) Children in situations of 
exploitation, including physical and 
psychological recovery and social reintegration 
(Arts. 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 39); (iv) Children 
                                                        
482 Refer to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
483 CRC/C/5 and CRC/C/58. 
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belonging to a minority or an indigenous group 
(Art. 30).  
 
Before the session in Committee where the report 
is assessed, there is a pre-sessional working 
group. The group organises a private meeting 
with UN agencies and bodies, NGOs, and other 
competent bodies such as National Human Rights 
Institutions and youth organisations. 
 
This pre-sessional working group leads to the 
enactment of a list of issues, whose purpose 
according to the Committee’s working methods 
follows:  
 
“The list of issues is intended to give the 
Government a preliminary indication of the issues 
which the Committee considers to be priorities for 
discussion. It also gives the Committee the 
opportunity to request additional or updated 
information in writing from the Government 
prior to the session. This approach gives 
Governments the opportunity better to prepare 
themselves for the discussion with the 
Committee, which usually takes place between 3 
and 4 months after the working group. In order to 
facilitate the efficiency of the dialogue, the 
Committee requests the State party to provide the 
answers to its List of Issues in writing and in 
advance of the session, in time for them to be 
translated into the working languages of the 
Committee. It also provides an opportunity to 
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consider questions relating to technical assistance 
and international cooperation.”  
The State party report is discussed in an open and 
public session of the Committee. The focus is on 
‘progress achieved’ and ‘factors and difficulties 
encountered’ when implementing the 
Convention, but also a more strategic discussion 
with the delegation representing the State 
concerned, so as to discuss ‘future goals and 
implementation priorities’. 
 
The discussions with the State are led by two 
country rapporteurs appointed between the 
members of the Committee. 
 
After the discussions the Committee will draft 
‘concluding observations’ which also contain 
recommendations and specific suggestions. After 
an introduction, the concluding observations 
provide a similar format or structure dealing with 
positive aspects (including progress achieved); 
factors and difficulties impeding the 
implementation; principal subjects for concern; 
suggestions and recommendations addressed to 
the State party.  
 
The observations are made public and sent to the 
State involved, and they are submitted to the 
United Nations General Assembly, through the 
Economic and Social Council, for its 
consideration, every two years. 
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“The secretariat prepares country files for the pre-
sessional working group, containing information 
relevant to each of the reports to be examined. 
These include country specific information 
submitted by United Nations bodies and 
specialized agencies, non governmental 
organizations and other competent bodies. The 
secretariat also prepares country briefs. Prior to 
the plenary session both file and country briefs 
are updated and made available to the Committee 
members during the sessions.”484 
 
The monitoring system is based on States’ 
reporting in light of Article 73 of the 
Convention.485 
 
Article 73 of the Convention states: “1. States 
Parties undertake to submit to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations for consideration 
by the Committee a report on the legislative, 
judicial, administrative and other measures they 
have taken to give effect to the provisions of the 
present Convention: 
 
(a) Within one year after the entry into force of the 
Convention for the State Party concerned; (b) 
Thereafter every five years and whenever the 
Committee so requests.” 
                                                        
484 Working Methods document retrievable from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. See also the Committee “Guidelines for the 
participation of partners (NGOs and individual experts) in the pre-sessional working group of the Committee on the Rights of the Child.” (CRC/C/90, Annex VIII.) 
485 See Rules of Procedure of the Committee, HRI/GEN/3/Rev.1/Add.1 7 May 2004. 
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The reports focus on ‘factors and difficulties’ 
affecting the implementation of the Convention. 
They will also include information on the 
characteristics of migration flows in the State 
concerned. 
 
Article 74.1 stipulates: “The Committee shall 
examine the reports submitted by each State Party 
and shall transmit such comments as it may 
consider appropriate to the State Party concerned. 
This State Party may submit to the Committee 
observations on any comment made by the 
Committee in accordance with the present article. 
The Committee may request supplementary 
information from States Parties when considering 
these reports.”486 
The Committee then presents an Annual Report 
before the General Assembly on the 
implementation of the Convention, which 
contains its own considerations and 
recommendations “based, in particular, on the 
examination of the reports and any observations 
presented by States Parties.” 
 
Article 76 provides signatories to recognise the 
competence of the Committee “to receive and 
consider communications to the effect that a State 
Party claims that another State Party is not 
                                                        
486 The same article states: “6. The Committee may invite representatives of other specialized agencies and organs of the United Nations, as well as of intergovernmental 
organizations, to be present and to be heard in its meetings whenever matters falling within their field of competence are considered.” 
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fulfilling its obligations under the present 
Convention.” 
 
And Article 77 “to receive and consider 
communications from or on behalf of individuals 
subject to its jurisdiction who claim that their 
individual rights as established by the present 
Convention have been violated by that State 
Party”. 
 
Similar to other Treaty bodies, the Committee 
identifies a set or list of issues prior to reporting 
(LoIPR) which are sent to the States concerned 
and which are aimed at structuring the periodic 
reporting procedures. On the basis of the reports 
by State parties, the Committee elaborates 
Concluding Remarks or observations.  
 
There is also a simplified reporting procedure.487  
The reporting by States follows the common set of 
harmonised guidelines on reporting under the 
human rights treaties.488 
The Working Methods can be summarised as 
follows:489 
It is a State reporting based model. Article 35, 
paragraph 1, of the Convention stipulates that 
State parties are obliged to submit to the 
Committee within two years of the ratification of 
                                                        
487 http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/OptionalReporting.aspx?TreatyID=7&Lang=En. 
488 United Nations, International Human Rights Instruments, HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6, 3 June 2009. 
489 UN, Working Methods of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities adopted at its fifth session (11-15 April 2011), CRPD/C/5/4, 2 September 2011. 
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the Convention, and every four years thereafter, a 
report on the implementation of the Convention. 
It is also based on a framework of ‘constructive 
dialogue’ between the Committee and the State. 
The dialogue starts on the basis of a list of issues, 
which according to the working methods 
document  
“5. On the basis of information at its disposal, the 
Committee will formulate in advance a list of 
issues for which supplementary information to 
that contained in the common-core and treaty-
specific documents is required. States parties will 
be requested to provide brief and precise replies 
in writing, not exceeding 30 pages. States parties 
may submit additional pages of statistical data, 
which will be made available to Committee 
members in their original format, as submitted.” 
The Committee nominates one or two country 
rapporteurs on each of the reports received by 
each country, and “The country rapporteur(s) 
shall prepare a draft list of issues on the State 
Party report for which they are responsible prior 
to the dialogue, and draft concluding 
observations following the constructive 
dialogue.”490 
The State reports are examined in a public 
hearing, where all the relevant stakeholders may 
attend. The States are represented by delegations 
who “comprise persons who possess the 
knowledge, competence and authority to explain 
                                                        
490 See http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRPD/C/5/4&Lang=en. 
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all aspects of the human rights situation of 
persons with disabilities in the reporting State”. 
Following the structured dialogue, the Committee 
will adopt the Concluding Observations which 
will be structured as follows: “Positive aspects • 
Factors and difficulties that impede the 
implementation of the Convention • Principal 
topics of concern • Suggestions and 
recommendations”. 
“Concluding observations will be made public on 
the last day of the session at which they were 
adopted, and posted on the website of the Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR).” 
There is also a simplified reporting procedure.491 
The Working Methods are outlined here.492 They 
are founded on the Convention and the 
Committee’s rules of procedures. 
The reporting is carried out following an article 
by article basis, and if necessary on 
complementary information. The focus is on the 
state of implementation and progress achieved 
and obstacle encountered.  
“The Committee encourages the involvement of 
families of victims’ organizations, human rights 
defenders working on the issue of enforced 
disappearance, non-governmental organizations 
and National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) 
in the process of consultations leading to the 
                                                        
491 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/Simplifiedreportingprocedure.aspx and 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/OptionalReporting.aspx?TreatyID=4&Lang=En. 
492 Refer to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CED/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
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preparation of reports. The Committee also 
encourages civil society stakeholders and NHRIs 
to directly provide to it information on the 
implementation of the provisions of the 
Convention at the national level.”493 
The Committee appoints two or more country 
rapporteurs by report, which carry out the 
review. They draft the list of issues and the 
concluding observations which are then validated 
by the Committee. 
After the report is received,  
“the Committee shall transmit a letter to the State 
party concerned notifying it of the dates, duration 
and venue of the session at which its report will 
be examined as well as a list of issues about which 
the Committee would like to receive additional 
information. The list of issues facilitates the 
preparation by the State party for the constructive 
dialogue; provide a focus for the constructive 
dialogue, without restricting it; and improve the 
efficiency of the reporting system.” 
Also, “In reviewing States Parties reports, the 
Committee may take into consideration 
information originating from other treaty bodies, 
special procedures, in particular the Working 
Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances, and from the United Nations 
system as well from others sources, including 
regional human rights mechanisms, civil society 
stakeholders and NHRIs.” 
                                                        
493 Point 6 of working methods, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CED/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
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The report is examined in the context of a 
‘constructive dialogue’ between the Committee 
and the delegation of the State party. 
 “Following the review by the Working Group, a 
report is prepared by the troika with the 
involvement of the State under review and 
assistance from the OHCHR. This report, referred 
to as the “outcome report”, provides a summary 
of the actual discussion. It therefore consists of the 
questions, comments and recommendations made 
by States to the country under review, as well as 
the responses by the reviewed State.” 
It is a ‘state driven process’. 
The documents on which the reviews are based 
are:  
1) information provided by the State under 
review, which can take the form of a “national 
report”;  
2) information contained in the reports of 
independent human rights experts and groups, 
known as the Special Procedures (see below), 
human rights treaty bodies, and other UN 
entities;  
3) information from other stakeholders including 
national human rights institutions and non-
governmental organisations. 
With the support of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), special procedures include country 
visits to analyse the human rights situation at the 
national level; act on individual cases and 
concerns of a broader, structural nature by 
Special procedures 
regularly make 
recommendations to 
countries and other 
stakeholders in their 
reports to the Human 
Rights Council. 
All recommendations 
contained in country visit 
reports by special 
procedures since 2006, as 
well as direct access to 
the reports in which the 
recommendations are 
included, are accessible 
through the Universal 
Human Rights Index.  
The database provides 
easy access to country-
specific human rights 
information emanating 
from 
international human 
rights mechanisms in the 
United Nations system: 
the Treaty Bodies, the 
Special Procedures and 
the Universal Periodic 
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sending communications to States and others in 
which they bring alleged violations or abuses to 
their attention; conduct thematic studies and 
convene expert consultations; contribute to the 
development of international human rights 
standards; engage in advocacy, raise public 
awareness, and provide advice for technical 
cooperation. Special procedures are reported 
annually to the Human Rights Council; the 
majority of the mandates also reports to the 
General Assembly.494 
All State parties are obliged to submit regular 
reports to the Committee on how the rights are 
being implemented. States must report initially 
one year after acceding to the Convention and 
then every two years. The Committee examines 
each report and addresses its concerns and 
recommendations to the State party in the form of 
“concluding observations”. 
“In order to facilitate the work of the Committee, 
States parties are once again requested to ensure 
that the reports correspond strictly to the 
provisions of the Convention and that they are 
drafted in accordance with the guidelines 
adopted by the Committee. States parties are 
invited to submit reports that are as succinct and 
concise as possible.” 
Review (UPR). Refer to 
http://uhri.ohchr.org/. 
These recommendations 
can be searched by topic, 
right, mandate, region or 
country. 
Follow-up529  
                                                        
494 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Introduction.aspx. 
529 For an overview on follow up by Treaty body refer to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/FollowUpProcedure.aspx  
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The procedure is as follows:495 reports of State 
parties, presence of the delegations of State 
parties, introductory presentation of State party’s 
representative, action of country rapporteurs,496 
interventions by members of the Committee, 
reply of the State party’s representative, 
Committee’s concluding observations, written 
comments by State party. 
 
“In addition, the Convention establishes three 
other mechanisms through which the Committee 
performs its monitoring functions: the early-
warning procedure, the examination of inter-state 
complaints and the examination of individual 
complaints.” 
The Committee will be provided by the 
secretariat, well in advance of the session, with 
country presentations concerning the State parties 
whose periodic reports are due to be considered 
by the Committee, or the State parties scheduled 
for examination under the review procedure. 
These presentations, to be treated as confidential 
documents, should contain a summary of the 
                                                        
495 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CERD/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx#A. 
496 “The country rapporteurs, in presentations that should also not exceed 30 minutes, must highlight aspects relevant to the fulfilment of the obligations arising under the 
Convention, and also those where shortcomings or deficiencies are apparent. They will also put questions aimed at supplementing the information received and ensuring greater 
clarity or precision with respect to the information received. These questions may be conveyed to the State party beforehand”, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CERD/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx#J. 
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information available on the country in 
connection with the periodic reports.497 
The Committee can also carry out missions by 
members to States parties. “in order to assist 
where their presence would be useful in 
facilitating better implementation of the 
Convention. The Committee appoints one or 
more members to undertake such missions. When 
an invitation for a mission is received between 
meetings of the Committee, the Chairman will 
request one or more members to undertake the 
mission, after consulting the members of the 
Bureau. Members of the Committee participating 
in such a mission will report to the Committee at 
its next session.” 
There is first a pre-sessional working group which 
convenes five days before each of the 
Committee’s sessions. It is composed of five 
members of the Committee nominated by the 
Chairperson. 
The Group identifies the key issues or questions 
or list of issues (LOI) which will structure the 
dialogue with the State in question. 
As it is stated “24. It is generally accepted that the 
complex nature and diverse range of many of the 
issues raised in connection with the 
implementation of the Covenant constitute a 
strong argument in favour of providing States 
parties with the possibility of preparing in 
                                                        
497 On methods refer to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CERD/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx.“Overview of the methods of work of the Committee”, of the report of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on its forty-eighth and forty-ninth sessions. Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 
18(A/51/18), paras. 587-627. 
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advance to answer some of the principal 
questions arising out of their reports. Such an 
arrangement also enhances the likelihood that the 
State party will be able to provide precise and 
detailed information.”498 
Depending on the expertise of the member 
concerned, issues are allocated within the 
Working Group. They function as ‘country 
rapporteurs’ and the final version of the list is 
adopted by the entire group. 
The Secretariat provides the Working Group with 
a country analysis and other relevant documents. 
The list of issues is then sent to State members,499 
requesting them to provide in written their 
replies. 
As part of the Dialogue, representatives of the 
State concerned should be present at the meetings 
of the Committee.500 
                                                        
498 Quoted from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
499 This includes a note stating the following: “The list is not intended to be exhaustive and it should not be interpreted as limiting or in any other way prejudging the type and 
range of questions which members of the Committee might wish to ask. However, the Committee believes that the constructive dialogue which it wishes to have with the 
representatives of the State party is greatly facilitated by making the list available in advance of the Committee’s session. In order to improve the dialogue that the Committee 
seeks, it strongly urges each State party to provide in writing its replies to the list of issues and to do so sufficiently in advance of the session at which its report will be considered 
to enable the replies to be translated and made available to all members of the Committee.” 
500 The following procedure is followed: “[T]he representative of the State party is invited to introduce the report by making brief introductory comments and providing any new 
information that may be relevant to the dialogue. The Committee then considers the report by clusters of articles (usually articles 1–5, 6–9, 10–12 and 13–15), taking particular 
account of the replies furnished in response to the list of issues. The Chairperson will normally invite questions or comments from Committee members in relation to each issue 
and then invite the State party representatives to reply immediately to questions that do not require further reflection or research. Any remaining questions are taken up at a 
subsequent meeting or, if necessary, may be the subject of additional information provided to the Committee in writing. Members of the Committee are free to pursue specific 
issues in the light of the replies thus provided, although the Committee has urged them not to (a) raise issues outside the scope of the Covenant; (b) repeat questions already 
posed or answered; (c) add unduly to an already long list on a particular issue; or (d) speak for more than five minutes in any one intervention.” Quoted from 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
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After the relevant procedure, the Committee 
drafts its ‘concluding observations’ with the 
following structure: introduction, positive 
aspects, principal subjects of concern and 
suggestions and recommendations. State parties 
can make comments to the concluding 
observations. 
Working Methods:501 “Once the State party has 
ratified the Covenant it should submit, one year 
after the Covenant enters into force, its initial 
report to the Committee. For periodic reports, it is 
the Bureau of the Committee, at the end of the 
session at which the State party report is 
examined, which decides the number of years 
after which the State party should present their 
next report.  
The general rule (ever since this system was 
started two years ago) is that State parties should 
present their periodic report to the Committee 
every four years. However, the Bureau can add or 
subtract one year to this four-year period 
depending on the level of compliance with the 
Covenant’s provisions by the State party.”502 
The Committee may call for a report three, five or 
six years after the submission of a periodic report, 
depending on the State party’s level of 
compliance with the provisions of the Covenant, 
including its reporting record. Refer to Rules 66 
and 70, para. 1, of the rules of Procedure. 
                                                        
501 Refer to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx and the Guidelines are available at 
http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/doc/Implementing_Human_Rights/English/Reporting/UN%20Conventions/Guidelines/ICCPR.pdf. 
502 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
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‘Pre-Session Working Group’  
Country Report Tasks Forces (between four and 
six members) which identify in advance the 
questions which will constitute the principal 
focus of the dialogue with the representatives of 
the reporting State. One of these members is the 
country rapporteur who is overall responsible for 
the drafting of the list of issues. 
The working methods of the Country Report Task 
Force are as follows: First, the country rapporteur 
presents the draft list of issues for discussion to 
the Country Report Task Force. Once the 
members have made their observations, the list of 
issues is adopted by the Task Force as a whole. 
The Task Force then allocates to each of its 
members principal responsibility for a certain 
number of questions included in the list of issues, 
based in part on the areas of particular expertise 
or interest of the member concerned. Once the list 
of issues is adopted and edited, it is transmitted 
to the State party.503 
‘Constructive Dialogue’ 
It is the practice of the Committee, in accordance 
with Rule 68 of its Rules of Procedure, to examine 
reports in the presence of representatives of the 
reporting States. 
Procedure: The representative of the State party is 
invited to introduce the report by making brief 
introductory comments, followed by the replies to 
                                                        
503 “In preparation for the Country Report Task Force, the secretariat places at the disposal of its members a country analysis as well as all pertinent documents containing 
information relevant to each of the reports to be examined. For this purpose, the Committee invites all concerned individuals, bodies and non-governmental organizations to 
submit relevant and appropriate documentation to the secretariat.” 
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the first group of questions included in the list of 
issues.  
It should be noted that State parties are 
encouraged to use the list of issues to better 
prepare for a constructive discussion, but are not 
expected to submit written answers. After this 
intervention, the Committee members will 
provide comments or further questions in relation 
to the replies provided. Although all Committee 
members participate in this dialogue, the 
members of the Country Task Force who are 
responsible for a pre-assigned number of 
questions, will have priority when asking 
questions to the representatives of the State party. 
The representative of the State party is then 
invited to reply to the remaining questions on the 
list of issues, to which will again follow the 
comments and questions of the Committee. 
 
‘Concluding Observations/Comments’  
The final phase of the Committee’s examination 
of the State report is the drafting and adoption of 
its concluding observations. The country 
rapporteur prepares draft concluding 
observations for the consideration of the 
Committee.504 
Reports by State parties to the Committee.505 So it 
is a ‘state driven process’. 
                                                        
504 The agreed structure of the concluding observations is as follows: introduction; positive aspects; factors and difficulties impeding the implementation of the Covenant; principal 
subjects of concern and suggestions and recommendations. 
505 On the simplified reporting procedure refer to UN ICCPR, Focused reports based on replies to ‘lists of issues prior to reporting’ (LOIPR): Implementation of the new optional 
reporting procedure (LOIPR procedure), 29 September 2010, so instead of a period report there is a so-called “focused report based on replies to a list of issues”. The LOPIR 
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Documentation supplied by the Secretariat: The 
Committee will be provided with country files on 
the reporting State party. These files will include 
all material received by the secretariat, such as the 
official report, NGO and IGO information and 
other relevant documents. 
It also envisages cooperation with other 
specialised UN bodies and agencies, as well as 
NGOs and human rights organisations before the 
examination of a State report by the Committee.506 
State parties are obliged to submit regular reports 
to the Committee on how the rights of the 
Convention are implemented. During its sessions 
the Committee considers each State party report 
and addresses its concerns and recommendations 
to the State party in the form of concluding 
observations. 
In accordance with the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention, the Committee is mandated to: (1) 
receive communications from individuals or 
groups of individuals submitting claims of 
violations of rights protected under the 
Convention to the Committee and (2) 
initiate inquiries into situations of grave or 
                                                        
includes two sections: a first section on “General information on the national human rights situation, including new measures and developments relating to the implementation 
of the Covenant”; and a second section “where questions are organized according to clusters of provisions as in the standard list of issues, highlighting specific issues depending 
on the situation of the concerned State party and the information available to the Committee, in particular, the recommendations included in the last concluding observations 
addressed to the State party as well any follow-up information provided by the State.” 
506 The Committee, in its Annual Report (2002), stated that it reserved the right to determine, at a later stage, whether other briefings by non-governmental organisations should 
also become part of the Committee’s official record: (10) Paragraph 12, Annex III, Annual Report of the Human Rights Committee (2002), A/57/40 (Vol. I). 
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systematic violations of women’s rights. These 
procedures are optional and are only available 
where the State concerned has accepted them. 
The Committee also formulates general 
recommendations and suggestions. General 
recommendations are directed to States and 
concern articles or themes in the Conventions. 
The procedure is also based on State reporting.507 
States are under the obligation to submit 
information regarding the ways in which they 
have or are implementing the Convention, as well 
as the ‘recommendations’ of the Committee.  
They will need to submit a report one year after 
the entry into force of the Convention, and then 
periodic reports every four years. It can also 
consider individual communications, adopting 
general comments and implement inquiries.508 
Similar to other treaty bodies, CATS has adopted 
guidelines for States’ initial and periodic reports, 
which includes a common core document to be 
used when submitting the report to the 
Committee. 
Special focus is paid in the reporting to the 
practical implementation of the Convention as 
well as challenges characterising this 
implementation.  
During the phase preceding the preparation of the 
reports by the States, the Committee consults with 
national human rights organisations as well as 
                                                        
507 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
508 CAT C/3/Rev 5, Rules of Procedure, 21 February 2011.  
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NGOs, which may provide information 
substantiating the work of the Committee.  
The Committee drafts a list of issues (LOI), which 
is sent to the State concerned.  
The States are under the obligation to respond to 
the LOI in writing, before the dialogue with the 
State’s delegation takes place. 
“The Committee holds two sessions annually, a 
four-week session in November and a four-week 
session in May, examining between 8 and 9 
reports per session; a delegation from each 
country is invited to be present during the 
dialogue.”509 
The assessment of the report occurs in the shape 
of a ‘dialogue’:  
“The aim of the dialogue is to enhance the 
Committee’s understanding of the situation in the 
State party as it pertains to the Convention and to 
provide advice on how to improve the 
implementation of the Convention provisions in 
the State party. The dialogue also provides an 
opportunity for the State party to further explain 
its efforts to enhance prevention of torture and ill-
treatment and to clarify the contents of its report 
to the members of the Committee. Exceptionally, 
the Committee may examine a report in the 
absence of representatives of the State party 
when, after being notified, they fail to appear 
without providing strong reasons.” 
 
                                                        
509 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
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How the meeting takes place is interesting. 
According to the CAT website: 
 
“Two public meetings, a half-day meeting on the 
first day and another half-day on the following 
day, are generally devoted to the examination of a 
report. The first meeting begins with a short 
presentation by the State party’s representatives, 
who usually update the information contained in 
the report and, if applicable, highlight the most 
relevant issues of the replies to the LOI previously 
sent in written to the Committee. Subsequently, 
the country rapporteurs and other Committee 
members make comments, ask questions and seek 
additional information related to issues that they 
consider require clarification. They can raise 
matters that had not been referred to in the LOI. 
On the following day, the second meeting will be 
devoted to the replies of the State party’s 
representatives to the questions posed by the 
members during the first meeting as well as to 
any follow-up issues that might be raised by the 
Committee. 
 
Individual members do not participate in any 
aspect of the examination of the reports of the 
States parties of which they are nationals. 
Press releases in English and French are issued 
immediately by the United Nations Information 
Service (www.unog.ch) regarding the meetings at 
which a State report is examined. Summary 
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records are also issued after the closure of the 
session in English or French.” 
So a key incentive for State parties to provide 
information is that the assessment will take in any 
case place if they don’t provide the report “and 
such review would be carried out on the basis of 
information that is available to the Committee, 
including sources from outside the United 
Nations.”510 
Following the examination the two rapporteurs 
draft ‘concluding observations’ are discussed and 
adopted in plenary of the Committee. The 
Conclusions follow a specific format, which after 
a brief introduction include a section on ‘positive 
aspects’ and another one on ‘subjects of concern 
and recommendations’. The State parties may 
provide any follow-up or mention 
complementary issues in light of the concluding 
observations. They can also elaborate comments. 
It foresees the possibility of simplified reporting 
procedures.511 
The LIOs are prepared by “two country 
rapporteurs on the basis of the information 
contained in the report, previous concluding 
observations addressed by the Committee to the 
State and information originating from other 
treaty bodies, special procedures and from the 
United Nations system as well from others 
                                                        
510 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/172/18/PDF/G1517218.pdf?OpenElement. 
511 See http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=HRI/MC/2014/4. 
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sources, including regional human rights 
mechanisms, NHRI and NGO and adopted by the 
Committee in plenary”.512 
 
It is the only Treaty body which does not require 
State parties to submit reports. The ICPPED does 
not require State parties to submit periodic 
reports. 
This body also constitutes an exception when it 
comes to ‘individual communications’. In 
comparison to the other bodies it is not possible 
for it to receive them. 
It has two main competences: 
First, visits to any place where a person may be 
deprived of liberty in State party territories.513 
There are four types of visits: SPT country visits, 
SPT country follow-up visits, NPM advisory visits 
and OPCAT advisory visits. 
Second, advice and assistance to State parties on 
the establishment of National Preventive 
Mechanisms (NPMs), independent national 
bodies for the prevention of torture.514 The setting 
up of NPMs constitutes a requirement for State 
parties to the Optional Protocol. 
It publishes an Annual Report515 which is 
presented before the CAT and the General 
Assembly.  
                                                        
512 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
513 For a list of visits see http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/CountryVisits.aspx. 
514 The Subcommittee has provided guidelines on the setting up of NPMs, see http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/OPCAT/Pages/NationalPreventiveMechanisms.aspx. 
515 For a full list refer to http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=12&DocTypeID=27. 
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According to the SPT website,516 “The SPT 
undertakes country visits during which a 
delegation of its members visits places where 
persons may be deprived of their liberty. During 
its visits, the SPT examines the conditions of their 
detention, their daily life, including the manner in 
which they are treated, the relevant legislative 
and institutional frameworks, and other questions 
that may be related to the prevention of torture 
and ill treatment. At the end of its visits, the SPT 
draws up a written report which contains 
recommendations and observations to the State, 
requesting a written response within six months 
of its receipt. This then triggers a further round of 
discussion regarding the implementation of the 
SPT’s recommendations, and thus begins the 
process of continual dialogue. The SPT visit 
reports are confidential, though State parties are 
encouraged to make them public documents, as 
permitted by the OPCAT. 
When undertaking NPM advisory visits, the SPT 
focuses on issues concerning the establishment 
and/or operation of the NPM in the country 
concerned. OPCAT advisory visits focus on high-
level discussions with the relevant authorities 
concerning a whole range of issues concerning 
OPCAT compliance. 
                                                        
516 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/OPCAT/Pages/OPCATIntro.aspx. 
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The working methods can be summarised as 
follows.517 
State parties undertake to submit to the 
Committee reports on the implementation of the 
Convention within two years of the entry into 
force of the Convention for the State party 
concerned and thereafter every five years (Article 
44.1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child). 
The Committee has issued guidelines for 
structuring and facilitating the dialogue with 
State parties.518 The agenda for the discussion 
takes place around the articles structuring the 
convention: 
(a) General measures of implementation (Arts. 4, 
42 and 44.6); (b) Definition of the child (Art. 1); (c) 
General principles (Arts. 2, 3, 6 and 12); (d) Civil 
rights and freedoms (Arts. 7, 8, 13-17 and 37a); (e) 
Family environment and alternative care (Arts. 5, 
18.1, 18.2, 9, 10, 27.4, 20, 21, 11, 19, 39 and 25); (f) 
Basic health and welfare (Arts. 6.2, 23, 24, 26, 18.3, 
27.1, 27.2 and 27.3); (g) Education, leisure and 
cultural activities (Arts. 28, 29 and 31); (h) Special 
protection measures:  
(i) Children in situations of emergency (Arts. 22, 
38 and 39); (ii) Children in conflict with the law 
(Arts. 40, 37 and 39); (iii) Children in situations of 
exploitation, including physical and 
psychological recovery and social reintegration 
(Arts. 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 39); (iv) Children 
                                                        
517 Refer to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
518 CRC/C/5 and CRC/C/58. 
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belonging to a minority or an indigenous group 
(Art. 30).  
 
Before the session in Committee where the report 
is assessed, there is a pre-sessional working 
group. The group organises a private meeting 
with UN agencies and bodies, NGOs, and other 
competent bodies such as National Human Rights 
Institutions and youth organisations. 
 
This pre-sessional working group leads to the 
enactment of a list of issues, whose purpose 
according to the Committee’s working methods 
follows:  
 
“The list of issues is intended to give the 
Government a preliminary indication of the issues 
which the Committee considers to be priorities for 
discussion. It also gives the Committee the 
opportunity to request additional or updated 
information in writing from the Government 
prior to the session. This approach gives 
Governments the opportunity better to prepare 
themselves for the discussion with the 
Committee, which usually takes place between 3 
and 4 months after the working group. In order to 
facilitate the efficiency of the dialogue, the 
Committee requests the State party to provide the 
answers to its List of Issues in writing and in 
advance of the session, in time for them to be 
translated into the working languages of the 
Committee. It also provides an opportunity to 
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consider questions relating to technical assistance 
and international cooperation.”  
The State party report is discussed in an open and 
public session of the Committee. The focus is on 
‘progress achieved’ and ‘factors and difficulties 
encountered’ when implementing the 
Convention, but also a more strategic discussion 
with the delegation representing the State 
concerned, so as to discuss ‘future goals and 
implementation priorities’. 
 
The discussions with the State are led by two 
country rapporteurs appointed between the 
members of the Committee. 
 
After the discussions the Committee will draft 
‘concluding observations’ which also contain 
recommendations and specific suggestions. After 
an introduction, the concluding observations 
provide a similar format or structure dealing with 
positive aspects (including progress achieved); 
factors and difficulties impeding the 
implementation; principal subjects for concern; 
suggestions and recommendations addressed to 
the State party.  
 
The observations are made public and sent to the 
State involved, and they are submitted to the 
United Nations General Assembly, through the 
Economic and Social Council, for its 
consideration, every two years. 
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“The secretariat prepares country files for the pre-
sessional working group, containing information 
relevant to each of the reports to be examined. 
These include country specific information 
submitted by United Nations bodies and 
specialized agencies, non governmental 
organizations and other competent bodies. The 
secretariat also prepares country briefs. Prior to 
the plenary session both file and country briefs 
are updated and made available to the Committee 
members during the sessions.”519 
 
The monitoring system is based on States’ 
reporting in light of Article 73 of the 
Convention.520 
Article 73 of the Convention states: “1. States 
Parties undertake to submit to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations for consideration 
by the Committee a report on the legislative, 
judicial, administrative and other measures they 
have taken to give effect to the provisions of the 
present Convention: 
(a) Within one year after the entry into force of the 
Convention for the State Party concerned; (b) 
Thereafter every five years and whenever the 
Committee so requests.” 
                                                        
519 Working Methods document retrievable from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. See also the Committee “Guidelines for the 
participation of partners (NGOs and individual experts) in the pre-sessional working group of the Committee on the Rights of the Child.” (CRC/C/90, Annex VIII.) 
520 See Rules of Procedure of the Committee, HRI/GEN/3/Rev.1/Add.1 7 May 2004. 
176 | BÁRD, CARRERA, GUILD & KOCHENOV 
 
The reports focus on ‘factors and difficulties’ 
affecting the implementation of the Convention. 
They will also include information on the 
characteristics of migration flows in the State 
concerned. 
Article 74.1 stipulates: “The Committee shall 
examine the reports submitted by each State Party 
and shall transmit such comments as it may 
consider appropriate to the State Party concerned. 
This State Party may submit to the Committee 
observations on any comment made by the 
Committee in accordance with the present article. 
The Committee may request supplementary 
information from States Parties when considering 
these reports.”521 
The Committee then presents an Annual Report 
before the General Assembly on the 
implementation of the Convention, which 
contains its own considerations and 
recommendations “based, in particular, on the 
examination of the reports and any observations 
presented by States Parties.” 
Article 76 provides signatories to recognise the 
competence of the Committee “to receive and 
consider communications to the effect that a State 
Party claims that another State Party is not 
                                                        
521 The same article states: “6. The Committee may invite representatives of other specialized agencies and organs of the United Nations, as well as of intergovernmental 
organizations, to be present and to be heard in its meetings whenever matters falling within their field of competence are considered.” 
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fulfilling its obligations under the present 
Convention.” 
And Article 77 “to receive and consider 
communications from or on behalf of individuals 
subject to its jurisdiction who claim that their 
individual rights as established by the present 
Convention have been violated by that State 
Party”. 
Similar to other Treaty bodies, the Committee 
identifies a set or list of issues prior to reporting 
(LoIPR) which are sent to the States concerned 
and which are aimed at structuring the periodic 
reporting procedures. On the basis of the reports 
by State parties, the Committee elaborates 
Concluding Remarks or observations.  
 
There is also a simplified reporting procedure.522  
The reporting by States follows the common set of 
harmonised guidelines on reporting under the 
human rights treaties.523 
The Working Methods can be summarised as 
follows:524 
It is a State reporting based model. Article 35, 
paragraph 1, of the Convention stipulates that 
State parties are obliged to submit to the 
Committee within two years of the ratification of 
the Convention, and every four years thereafter, a 
report on the implementation of the Convention. 
                                                        
522 http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/OptionalReporting.aspx?TreatyID=7&Lang=En. 
523 United Nations, International Human Rights Instruments, HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6, 3 June 2009. 
524 UN, Working Methods of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities adopted at its fifth session (11-15 April 2011), CRPD/C/5/4, 2 September 2011. 
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It is also based on a framework of ‘constructive 
dialogue’ between the Committee and the State. 
The dialogue starts on the basis of a list of issues, 
which according to the working methods 
document  
“5. On the basis of information at its disposal, the 
Committee will formulate in advance a list of 
issues for which supplementary information to 
that contained in the common-core and treaty-
specific documents is required. States parties will 
be requested to provide brief and precise replies 
in writing, not exceeding 30 pages. States parties 
may submit additional pages of statistical data, 
which will be made available to Committee 
members in their original format, as submitted.” 
The Committee nominates one or two country 
rapporteurs on each of the reports received by 
each country, and “The country rapporteur(s) 
shall prepare a draft list of issues on the State 
Party report for which they are responsible prior 
to the dialogue, and draft concluding 
observations following the constructive 
dialogue.”525 
The State reports are examined in a public 
hearing, where all the relevant stakeholders may 
attend. The States are represented by delegations 
who “comprise persons who possess the 
knowledge, competence and authority to explain 
all aspects of the human rights situation of 
persons with disabilities in the reporting State”. 
                                                        
525 See http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRPD/C/5/4&Lang=en. 
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Following the structured dialogue, the Committee 
will adopt the Concluding Observations which 
will be structured as follows: “Positive aspects • 
Factors and difficulties that impede the 
implementation of the Convention • Principal 
topics of concern • Suggestions and 
recommendations”. 
“Concluding observations will be made public on 
the last day of the session at which they were 
adopted, and posted on the website of the Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR).” 
There is also a simplified reporting procedure.526 
The Working Methods are outlined here.527 They 
are founded on the Convention and the 
Committee’s rules of procedures. 
The reporting is carried out following an article 
by article basis, and if necessary on 
complementary information. The focus is on the 
state of implementation and progress achieved 
and obstacle encountered.  
“The Committee encourages the involvement of 
families of victims’ organizations, human rights 
defenders working on the issue of enforced 
disappearance, non-governmental organizations 
and National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) 
in the process of consultations leading to the 
preparation of reports. The Committee also 
encourages civil society stakeholders and NHRIs 
                                                        
526 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/Simplifiedreportingprocedure.aspx and 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/OptionalReporting.aspx?TreatyID=4&Lang=En. 
527 Refer to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CED/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
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to directly provide to it information on the 
implementation of the provisions of the 
Convention at the national level.”528 
The Committee appoints two or more country 
rapporteurs by report, which carry out the 
review. They draft the list of issues and the 
concluding observations which are then validated 
by the Committee. 
After the report is received,  
“the Committee shall transmit a letter to the State 
party concerned notifying it of the dates, duration 
and venue of the session at which its report will 
be examined as well as a list of issues about which 
the Committee would like to receive additional 
information. The list of issues facilitates the 
preparation by the State party for the constructive 
dialogue; provide a focus for the constructive 
dialogue, without restricting it; and improve the 
efficiency of the reporting system.” 
Also, “In reviewing States Parties reports, the 
Committee may take into consideration 
information originating from other treaty bodies, 
special procedures, in particular the Working 
Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances, and from the United Nations 
system as well from others sources, including 
regional human rights mechanisms, civil society 
stakeholders and NHRIs.” 
                                                        
528 Point 6 of working methods, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CED/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
AN EU MECHANISM ON DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS | 181 
 
The report is examined in the context of a 
‘constructive dialogue’ between the Committee 
and the delegation of the State party. 
 “Following the review by the Working Group, a 
report is prepared by the troika with the 
involvement of the State under review and 
assistance from the OHCHR. This report, referred 
to as the “outcome report”, provides a summary 
of the actual discussion. It therefore consists of the 
questions, comments and recommendations made 
by States to the country under review, as well as 
the responses by the reviewed State.” 
It is a ‘state driven process’. 
The documents on which the reviews are based 
are:  
1) information provided by the State under 
review, which can take the form of a “national 
report”;  
2) information contained in the reports of 
independent human rights experts and groups, 
known as the Special Procedures (see below), 
human rights treaty bodies, and other UN 
entities;  
3) information from other stakeholders including 
national human rights institutions and non-
governmental organisations. 
With the support of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), special procedures include country 
visits to analyse the human rights situation at the 
Special procedures 
regularly make 
recommendations to 
countries and other 
stakeholders in their 
reports to the Human 
Rights Council. 
All recommendations 
contained in country visit 
reports by special 
procedures since 2006, as 
well as direct access to 
the reports in which the 
recommendations are 
included, are accessible 
through the Universal 
Human Rights Index.  
The database provides 
easy access to country-
specific human rights 
information emanating 
from 
international human 
rights mechanisms in the 
United Nations system: 
the Treaty Bodies, the 
Special Procedures and 
Human Rights 
Council (Special 
Procedures) 
Idem Independent human 
rights experts with 
mandates to report 
and advise on human 
rights from a thematic 
or country-specific 
perspective.567 
As of 27 March 2015 
there are 41 thematic 
and 14 country 
mandates. 
Special procedures are 
either an individual 
(called “Special 
Rapporteur” or 
“Independent 
Expert”) or a working 
group composed of 
five members, one 
from each of the five 
United Nations 
regional groupings: 
Africa, Asia, Latin 
                                                        
567 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx See also ‘Facts and Figures’ at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/SP/Facts_Figures2013.pdf  
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America and the 
Caribbean, Eastern 
Europe and the 
Western group. 
The Special 
Rapporteurs, 
Independent Experts 
and members of the 
Working Groups are 
appointed by the 
Human Rights 
Council and serve in 
their personal 
capacities.  
national level; act on individual cases and 
concerns of a broader, structural nature by 
sending communications to States and others in 
which they bring alleged violations or abuses to 
their attention; conduct thematic studies and 
convene expert consultations; contribute to the 
development of international human rights 
standards; engage in advocacy, raise public 
awareness, and provide advice for technical 
cooperation. Special procedures are reported 
annually to the Human Rights Council; the 
majority of the mandates also reports to the 
General Assembly.530 
All State parties are obliged to submit regular 
reports to the Committee on how the rights are 
being implemented. States must report initially 
one year after acceding to the Convention and 
then every two years. The Committee examines 
each report and addresses its concerns and 
recommendations to the State party in the form of 
“concluding observations”. 
“In order to facilitate the work of the Committee, 
States parties are once again requested to ensure 
that the reports correspond strictly to the 
provisions of the Convention and that they are 
drafted in accordance with the guidelines 
adopted by the Committee. States parties are 
the Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR). Refer to 
http://uhri.ohchr.org/. 
These recommendations 
can be searched by topic, 
right, mandate, region or 
country. 
Follow-up565  
CERD has a special 
follow-up procedure for 
its recommendations and 
for considering the 
situation of State parties 
that have not submitted 
even an initial report, or 
whose reports are 
considerably overdue. 
The Committee, through 
its observations and 
recommendations with 
respect to State parties in 
such a situation, draws 
the attention of the State 
party concerned to the 
consequences of such 
non-compliance and 
reminds it of its 
reporting obligations 
                                                        
530 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Introduction.aspx. 
565 For an overview on follow up by Treaty body refer to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/FollowUpProcedure.aspx  
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invited to submit reports that are as succinct and 
concise as possible.” 
The procedure is as follows:531 reports of State 
parties, presence of the delegations of State 
parties, introductory presentation of State party’s 
representative, action of country rapporteurs,532 
interventions by members of the Committee, 
reply of the State party’s representative, 
Committee’s concluding observations, written 
comments by State party. 
 
“In addition, the Convention establishes three 
other mechanisms through which the Committee 
performs its monitoring functions: the early-
warning procedure, the examination of inter-state 
complaints and the examination of individual 
complaints.” 
The Committee will be provided by the 
secretariat, well in advance of the session, with 
country presentations concerning the State parties 
whose periodic reports are due to be considered 
by the Committee, or the State parties scheduled 
for examination under the review procedure. 
These presentations, to be treated as confidential 
documents, should contain a summary of the 
under article 9 of the 
Convention.  
It furthermore makes 
recommendations to the 
State party with a view 
to ensuring the 
implementation of the 
Convention. The 
Committee includes a 
special chapter on such 
cases in its annual report 
to the General Assembly 
for the Assembly to take 
what action it deems 
appropriate.566 
CERD can request 
additional information 
and even a new report by 
the State concerned on 
the implementation of its 
recommendations. It 
appoints for a period of 
two years a coordinator 
of the follow-up 
procedure, and presents 
                                                        
531 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CERD/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx#A. 
532 “The country rapporteurs, in presentations that should also not exceed 30 minutes, must highlight aspects relevant to the fulfilment of the obligations arising under the 
Convention, and also those where shortcomings or deficiencies are apparent. They will also put questions aimed at supplementing the information received and ensuring greater 
clarity or precision with respect to the information received. These questions may be conveyed to the State party beforehand”, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CERD/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx#J. 
566 http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/FollowUp.aspx?Treaty=CERD&amp;Lang=en  
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information available on the country in 
connection with the periodic reports.533 
The Committee can also carry out missions by 
members to States parties. “in order to assist 
where their presence would be useful in 
facilitating better implementation of the 
Convention. The Committee appoints one or 
more members to undertake such missions. When 
an invitation for a mission is received between 
meetings of the Committee, the Chairman will 
request one or more members to undertake the 
mission, after consulting the members of the 
Bureau. Members of the Committee participating 
in such a mission will report to the Committee at 
its next session.” 
There is first a pre-sessional working group which 
convenes five days before each of the 
Committee’s sessions. It is composed of five 
members of the Committee nominated by the 
Chairperson. 
The Group identifies the key issues or questions 
or list of issues (LOI) which will structure the 
dialogue with the State in question. 
As it is stated “24. It is generally accepted that the 
complex nature and diverse range of many of the 
issues raised in connection with the 
the follow-up report 
before the Committee. 
Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies568  
  CESCR may request the 
State to provide more 
detailed information or 
statistics concerning 
specific follow-up issues 
before the next periodic 
reporting period. It can 
also ask a State party to 
implement a technical 
assistance mission (one 
or two committee 
members) and if the State 
is unwilling to cooperate 
CESCR may submit the 
issue for consideration at 
the Economic and Social 
Council. The Committee 
decided at its 36 session 
to proceed as follows: 
“(a) In all concluding 
observations, the 
Committee would 
request the State party to 
inform the Committee, in 
                                                        
533 On methods refer to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CERD/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx.“Overview of the methods of work of the Committee”, of the report of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on its forty-eighth and forty-ninth sessions. Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 
18(A/51/18), paras. 587-627. 
568 Refer to The United Nations Human Rights Treaty System, Factsheet No. 30/Rev. 1, 2012 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet30Rev1.pdf For an 
overview of the current working methods of the nine Human Rights Treaty Bodies refer to UN, International Human Rights Instruments, Overview of the human rights treaty 
body system and working methods related to the review of States parties, 12 April 2013. 
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implementation of the Covenant constitute a 
strong argument in favour of providing States 
parties with the possibility of preparing in 
advance to answer some of the principal 
questions arising out of their reports. Such an 
arrangement also enhances the likelihood that the 
State party will be able to provide precise and 
detailed information.”534 
Depending on the expertise of the member 
concerned, issues are allocated within the 
Working Group. They function as ‘country 
rapporteurs’ and the final version of the list is 
adopted by the entire group. 
The Secretariat provides the Working Group with 
a country analysis and other relevant documents. 
The list of issues is then sent to State members,535 
requesting them to provide in written their 
replies. 
As part of the Dialogue, representatives of the 
State concerned should be present at the meetings 
of the Committee.536 
its next periodic report, 
about steps taken to 
implement the 
recommendations in the 
concluding observations; 
(b) Where appropriate, 
the Committee may, in 
its concluding 
observations, make a 
specific request to a State 
party to provide more 
information or statistical 
data at a time prior to the 
date that the next 
periodic report is due to 
be submitted; (c) Where 
appropriate, the 
Committee may, in its 
concluding observations, 
ask the State party to 
respond to any pressing 
                                                        
534 Quoted from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
535 This includes a note stating the following: “The list is not intended to be exhaustive and it should not be interpreted as limiting or in any other way prejudging the type and 
range of questions which members of the Committee might wish to ask. However, the Committee believes that the constructive dialogue which it wishes to have with the 
representatives of the State party is greatly facilitated by making the list available in advance of the Committee’s session. In order to improve the dialogue that the Committee 
seeks, it strongly urges each State party to provide in writing its replies to the list of issues and to do so sufficiently in advance of the session at which its report will be considered 
to enable the replies to be translated and made available to all members of the Committee.” 
536 The following procedure is followed: “[T]he representative of the State party is invited to introduce the report by making brief introductory comments and providing any new 
information that may be relevant to the dialogue. The Committee then considers the report by clusters of articles (usually articles 1–5, 6–9, 10–12 and 13–15), taking particular 
account of the replies furnished in response to the list of issues. The Chairperson will normally invite questions or comments from Committee members in relation to each issue 
and then invite the State party representatives to reply immediately to questions that do not require further reflection or research. Any remaining questions are taken up at a 
subsequent meeting or, if necessary, may be the subject of additional information provided to the Committee in writing. Members of the Committee are free to pursue specific 
issues in the light of the replies thus provided, although the Committee has urged them not to (a) raise issues outside the scope of the Covenant; (b) repeat questions already 
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After the relevant procedure, the Committee 
drafts its ‘concluding observations’ with the 
following structure: introduction, positive 
aspects, principal subjects of concern and 
suggestions and recommendations. State parties 
can make comments to the concluding 
observations. 
Working Methods:537 “Once the State party has 
ratified the Covenant it should submit, one year 
after the Covenant enters into force, its initial 
report to the Committee. For periodic reports, it is 
the Bureau of the Committee, at the end of the 
session at which the State party report is 
examined, which decides the number of years 
after which the State party should present their 
next report.  
The general rule (ever since this system was 
started two years ago) is that State parties should 
present their periodic report to the Committee 
every four years. However, the Bureau can add or 
subtract one year to this four-year period 
depending on the level of compliance with the 
Covenant’s provisions by the State party.”538 
The Committee may call for a report three, five or 
six years after the submission of a periodic report, 
depending on the State party’s level of 
compliance with the provisions of the Covenant, 
specific issue identified 
in the concluding 
observations prior to the 
date that the next report 
is due to be submitted; 
(d) Any information 
provided in accordance 
with (b) and (c) above 
would be considered by 
the next meeting of the 
Committee’s pre-
sessional working group; 
(e) In general, the 
working group could 
recommend that the 
Committee take one of 
the following measures: 
(i) That the Committee 
take note of such 
information; 
(ii) That the Committee 
adopt specific additional 
concluding observations 
in response to that 
information; 
(iii) That the matter be 
pursued through a 
                                                        
posed or answered; (c) add unduly to an already long list on a particular issue; or (d) speak for more than five minutes in any one intervention.” Quoted from 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
537 Refer to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx and the Guidelines are available at 
http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/doc/Implementing_Human_Rights/English/Reporting/UN%20Conventions/Guidelines/ICCPR.pdf. 
538 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
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including its reporting record. Refer to Rules 66 
and 70, para. 1, of the rules of Procedure. 
‘Pre-Session Working Group’  
Country Report Tasks Forces (between four and 
six members) which identify in advance the 
questions which will constitute the principal 
focus of the dialogue with the representatives of 
the reporting State. One of these members is the 
country rapporteur who is overall responsible for 
the drafting of the list of issues. 
The working methods of the Country Report Task 
Force are as follows: First, the country rapporteur 
presents the draft list of issues for discussion to 
the Country Report Task Force. Once the 
members have made their observations, the list of 
issues is adopted by the Task Force as a whole. 
The Task Force then allocates to each of its 
members principal responsibility for a certain 
number of questions included in the list of issues, 
based in part on the areas of particular expertise 
or interest of the member concerned. Once the list 
of issues is adopted and edited, it is transmitted 
to the State party.539 
‘Constructive Dialogue’ 
It is the practice of the Committee, in accordance 
with Rule 68 of its Rules of Procedure, to examine 
reports in the presence of representatives of the 
reporting States. 
request for further 
information; or (iv) That 
the Chairperson of the 
Committee be authorized 
to inform the State party, 
in advance of the next 
session, that the 
Committee would take 
up the issue at its next 
session and that, for that 
purpose, the 
participation of a 
representative of the 
State party in the work of 
the Committee would be 
welcome; (f) If the 
information requested in 
accordance with (b) and 
(c) above is not provided 
by the specified date, or 
is patently 
unsatisfactory, the 
Chairperson, in 
consultation with the 
members of the Bureau, 
could be authorized to 
follow up the matter 
with the State party.” 
                                                        
539 “In preparation for the Country Report Task Force, the secretariat places at the disposal of its members a country analysis as well as all pertinent documents containing 
information relevant to each of the reports to be examined. For this purpose, the Committee invites all concerned individuals, bodies and non-governmental organizations to 
submit relevant and appropriate documentation to the secretariat.” 
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Committee on the 
Elimination of 
Racial 
Discrimination 
(CERD)569 
Application of the 
International 
Convention on the 
Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
 
The Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination is 
composed of 18 
independent experts 
who are persons of 
high moral standing 
and acknowledged 
impartiality. 
Consideration must 
also be given to 
equitable geographical 
distribution and to the 
representation of the 
different forms of 
civilisation as well as 
of the principal legal 
systems. 
Members are elected 
for a term of four 
years by State parties 
in accordance with 
article 8 of the 
Convention. Elections 
for nine of the 
eighteen members are 
held every two years, 
ensuring a balance 
between continuity 
Procedure: The representative of the State party is 
invited to introduce the report by making brief 
introductory comments, followed by the replies to 
the first group of questions included in the list of 
issues.  
It should be noted that State parties are 
encouraged to use the list of issues to better 
prepare for a constructive discussion, but are not 
expected to submit written answers. After this 
intervention, the Committee members will 
provide comments or further questions in relation 
to the replies provided. Although all Committee 
members participate in this dialogue, the 
members of the Country Task Force who are 
responsible for a pre-assigned number of 
questions, will have priority when asking 
questions to the representatives of the State party. 
The representative of the State party is then 
invited to reply to the remaining questions on the 
list of issues, to which will again follow the 
comments and questions of the Committee. 
 
‘Concluding Observations/Comments’  
The final phase of the Committee’s examination 
of the State report is the drafting and adoption of 
its concluding observations. The country 
rapporteur prepares draft concluding 
observations for the consideration of the 
Committee.540 
The Committee has a 
special follow-up 
procedure. It shall 
appoint a special 
rapporteur to report back 
to the Committee 
concerning information 
received from the State 
party (within a specified 
deadline) as to the steps 
taken to meet the 
recommendations of the 
Committee provided in 
the Concluding 
Observations. 
This sessional follow-up 
progress report will 
prompt the Committee 
plenary to make a 
determination of the 
date/deadline for the 
submission of the next 
report.  
This special follow-up 
procedure does not 
apply in cases of 
examination of country 
situations (i.e. when the 
Committee examines the 
                                                        
569 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CERD/Pages/CERDIndex.aspx  
540 The agreed structure of the concluding observations is as follows: introduction; positive aspects; factors and difficulties impeding the implementation of the Covenant; principal 
subjects of concern and suggestions and recommendations. 
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and change in the 
composition of the 
Committee. Members 
serve in their personal 
capacity and may be 
re-elected if 
nominated. 
Reports by State parties to the Committee.541 So it 
is a ‘state driven process’. 
 
Documentation supplied by the Secretariat: The 
Committee will be provided with country files on 
the reporting State party. These files will include 
all material received by the secretariat, such as the 
official report, NGO and IGO information and 
other relevant documents. 
It also envisages cooperation with other 
specialised UN bodies and agencies, as well as 
NGOs and human rights organisations before the 
examination of a State report by the Committee.542 
State parties are obliged to submit regular reports 
to the Committee on how the rights of the 
Convention are implemented. During its sessions 
the Committee considers each State party report 
and addresses its concerns and recommendations 
to the State party in the form of concluding 
observations. 
In accordance with the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention, the Committee is mandated to: (1) 
receive communications from individuals or 
measures taken by the 
State party in the 
implementation of the 
Covenant in the absence 
of a State report). 
“When the State party 
has not presented a 
report, the Committee 
may, at its discretion, 
notify the State party of 
the date on which the 
Committee proposes to 
examine the measures 
taken by the State party 
to implement the rights 
guaranteed under the 
Covenant. If the State 
party is represented by a 
delegation, the 
Committee will, in 
presence of the 
delegation and in public 
session, proceed with the 
examination on the date 
                                                        
541 On the simplified reporting procedure refer to UN ICCPR, Focused reports based on replies to ‘lists of issues prior to reporting’ (LOIPR): Implementation of the new optional 
reporting procedure (LOIPR procedure), 29 September 2010, so instead of a period report there is a so-called “focused report based on replies to a list of issues”. The LOPIR 
includes two sections: a first section on “General information on the national human rights situation, including new measures and developments relating to the implementation 
of the Covenant”; and a second section “where questions are organized according to clusters of provisions as in the standard list of issues, highlighting specific issues depending 
on the situation of the concerned State party and the information available to the Committee, in particular, the recommendations included in the last concluding observations 
addressed to the State party as well any follow-up information provided by the State.” 
542 The Committee, in its Annual Report (2002), stated that it reserved the right to determine, at a later stage, whether other briefings by non-governmental organisations should 
also become part of the Committee’s official record: (10) Paragraph 12, Annex III, Annual Report of the Human Rights Committee (2002), A/57/40 (Vol. I). 
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groups of individuals submitting claims of 
violations of rights protected under the 
Convention to the Committee and (2) 
initiate inquiries into situations of grave or 
systematic violations of women’s rights. These 
procedures are optional and are only available 
where the State concerned has accepted them. 
The Committee also formulates general 
recommendations and suggestions. General 
recommendations are directed to States and 
concern articles or themes in the Conventions. 
The procedure is also based on State reporting.543 
States are under the obligation to submit 
information regarding the ways in which they 
have or are implementing the Convention, as well 
as the ‘recommendations’ of the Committee.  
They will need to submit a report one year after 
the entry into force of the Convention, and then 
periodic reports every four years. It can also 
consider individual communications, adopting 
general comments and implement inquiries.544 
Similar to other treaty bodies, CATS has adopted 
guidelines for States’ initial and periodic reports, 
which includes a common core document to be 
used when submitting the report to the 
Committee. 
assigned. If the State 
party is not represented, 
the Committee may, at 
its discretion, either 
decide to proceed to 
consider the measures 
taken by the State party 
to implement the 
guarantees of the 
Covenant at the initial 
date or notify a new date 
to the State party. In both 
cases the Committee will 
prepare provisional 
concluding observations 
which will be 
transmitted to the State 
party. The Committee 
will mention, in its 
Annual Report, that 
these provisional 
concluding observations 
were prepared, but their 
text will not be 
published.”570 
Moreover, in case of non-
cooperation by a State 
party, the Special 
                                                        
543 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
544 CAT C/3/Rev 5, Rules of Procedure, 21 February 2011.  
570 http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/kokusai/humanrights_library/treaty/data/HRC_GC_30e.pdf  
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Special focus is paid in the reporting to the 
practical implementation of the Convention as 
well as challenges characterising this 
implementation.  
During the phase preceding the preparation of the 
reports by the States, the Committee consults with 
national human rights organisations as well as 
NGOs, which may provide information 
substantiating the work of the Committee.  
The Committee drafts a list of issues (LOI), which 
is sent to the State concerned.  
The States are under the obligation to respond to 
the LOI in writing, before the dialogue with the 
State’s delegation takes place. 
“The Committee holds two sessions annually, a 
four-week session in November and a four-week 
session in May, examining between 8 and 9 
reports per session; a delegation from each 
country is invited to be present during the 
dialogue.”545 
The assessment of the report occurs in the shape 
of a ‘dialogue’:  
“The aim of the dialogue is to enhance the 
Committee’s understanding of the situation in the 
State party as it pertains to the Convention and to 
provide advice on how to improve the 
implementation of the Convention provisions in 
the State party. The dialogue also provides an 
Rapporteur may call for a 
meeting with a 
representative of the 
State party. Also, “the 
Committee has produced 
and updated a follow-up 
table which includes all 
the information on States 
parties that have gone 
through the follow-up 
process since July 2006. 
The table is presented as 
an annex to the follow-
up progress report. The 
Committee also 
publishes on its website 
CSO submissions on 
follow-up together with 
the follow-up replies 
from States parties.”571 
Committee on 
Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR)572  
 
Monitors the 
implementation of the 
International 
Covenant on 
Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. 
The Committee was 
established 
The Committee on 
Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights is 
composed of 18 
independent experts 
who are persons of 
high moral character 
and recognised 
CEDAW introduced a 
follow up procedure 
back in 2008. CEDAW 
calls states to give follow 
up information on the 
way in which they have 
implemented two 
recommendations in two 
                                                        
545 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
571 UN, International Human Rights Instruments, Other activities of the human rights treaty bodies and participation of stakeholders in the human rights treaty body process, 
HRI/MC/2013/3, 22 April 2013, page 3. 
572 http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cescr/pages/cescrindex.aspx  
192 | BÁRD, CARRERA, GUILD & KOCHENOV 
 
under ECOSOC 
Resolution 1985/17 of 
28 May 1985 with the 
main task of 
monitoring functions 
assigned to the United 
Nations Economic 
and Social Council 
(ECOSOC). 
competence in the 
field of human rights. 
Members 
are elected for a term 
of four years by State 
parties in accordance 
with ECOSOC 
Resolution 1985/17 of 
28 May 1985. 
Members serve in 
their personal capacity 
and may be re-elected 
if nominated. 
opportunity for the State party to further explain 
its efforts to enhance prevention of torture and ill-
treatment and to clarify the contents of its report 
to the members of the Committee. Exceptionally, 
the Committee may examine a report in the 
absence of representatives of the State party 
when, after being notified, they fail to appear 
without providing strong reasons.” 
 
How the meeting takes place is interesting. 
According to the CAT website: 
“Two public meetings, a half-day meeting on the 
first day and another half-day on the following 
day, are generally devoted to the examination of a 
report. The first meeting begins with a short 
presentation by the State party’s representatives, 
who usually update the information contained in 
the report and, if applicable, highlight the most 
relevant issues of the replies to the LOI previously 
sent in written to the Committee. Subsequently, 
the country rapporteurs and other Committee 
members make comments, ask questions and seek 
additional information related to issues that they 
consider require clarification. They can raise 
matters that had not been referred to in the LOI. 
years’ time. A rapporteur 
is also appointed to 
monitor the follow up. 
“It requests the State 
party to provide 
information within a 
period of one or two 
years on steps taken to 
implement specific 
recommendations. Such 
recommendations are 
selected because it is 
considered that their lack 
of implementation 
constitutes a major 
obstacle for the 
implementation of the 
Convention and 
implementation is seen 
as feasible within the 
suggested time frame. 
The Committee has a 
Rapporteur on follow-up 
and a Deputy 
Rapporteur who review 
and assess the follow-up 
information.”573 
                                                        
573 CEDAW/C/54/3, Methodology of the Follow up Procedure, 13 March 2013. 
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Human Rights 
Committee574 
Review the 
application of the 
International 
Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. 
The Human Rights 
Committee is 
composed of 18 
independent experts 
who are persons of 
high moral character 
and recognised 
competence in the 
field of human rights. 
Members are elected 
for a term of four 
years by State parties 
in accordance with 
Articles 28 to 39 of the 
Covenant.575  
Members serve in 
their personal capacity 
and may be re-elected 
if nominated. 
On the following day, the second meeting will be 
devoted to the replies of the State party’s 
representatives to the questions posed by the 
members during the first meeting as well as to 
any follow-up issues that might be raised by the 
Committee. 
Individual members do not participate in any 
aspect of the examination of the reports of the 
States parties of which they are nationals. 
Press releases in English and French are issued 
immediately by the United Nations Information 
Service (www.unog.ch) regarding the meetings at 
which a State report is examined. Summary 
records are also issued after the closure of the 
session in English or French.” 
So a key incentive for State parties to provide 
information is that the assessment will take in any 
case place if they don’t provide the report “and 
such review would be carried out on the basis of 
information that is available to the Committee, 
including sources from outside the United 
Nations.”546 
CAT has a special follow-
up procedure.576 The 
concluding observations 
include577 ‘issues to be 
followed up’ and which 
require the State party to 
report back on progress 
within the period of one 
year. 
“The Committee 
identifies some of its 
recommendations that 
are serious, protective 
and can be achieved 
within one year, which it 
would like to receive 
information from the 
State party. The State 
party, within one year, 
must provide 
information on measures 
taken towards their 
implementation. 
The Committee has 
appointed a rapporteur 
to follow-up on the State 
                                                        
574 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIndex.aspx  
575 United Nations, ICCPR, Human Rights Committee, Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, 11 January 2012. 
546 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/172/18/PDF/G1517218.pdf?OpenElement. 
576 Refer to Article 72 of the Committee’s Rules of Procedure. 
577 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 44 (A/58/44), para. 12. 
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Following the examination the two rapporteurs 
draft ‘concluding observations’ are discussed and 
adopted in plenary of the Committee. The 
Conclusions follow a specific format, which after 
a brief introduction include a section on ‘positive 
aspects’ and another one on ‘subjects of concern 
and recommendations’. The State parties may 
provide any follow-up or mention 
complementary issues in light of the concluding 
observations. They can also elaborate comments. 
It foresees the possibility of simplified reporting 
procedures.547 
The LIOs are prepared by “two country 
rapporteurs on the basis of the information 
contained in the report, previous concluding 
observations addressed by the Committee to the 
State and information originating from other 
treaty bodies, special procedures and from the 
United Nations system as well from others 
sources, including regional human rights 
mechanisms, NHRI and NGO and adopted by the 
Committee in plenary”.548 
 
It is the only Treaty body which does not require 
State parties to submit reports. The ICPPED does 
party’s compliance with 
these requests.”578 The 
Rapporteur sends 
reminders to the States 
concerned. 
Its Annual Report (2014-
15) states: 
“The Committee 
deplores the fact that that 
some States parties do 
not comply with their 
reporting obligations 
under article 19 of the 
Convention. At the time 
of reporting, there were 
28 States parties with 
overdue initial reports 
and 37 States parties with 
overdue periodic 
reports”. Refer to 
Chapter II of the Annual 
Report.” 
As a strategy to 
encourage compliance, 
the Annual Report to the 
General Assembly 
includes a full list of 
                                                        
547 See http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=HRI/MC/2014/4. 
548 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
578 Two documents of interest are the Overview of the Follow Up Procedure 2003-2015, available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/Shared%20Documents/ 
1_Global/INT_CAT_FGD_7408_E.pdf; and Annual Report A/70/44, Chapter IV, paragraphs 46-74, Follow up to Concluding Observations on States’ Parties reports, 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/172/18/PDF/G1517218.pdf?OpenElement  
AN EU MECHANISM ON DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS | 195 
 
not require State parties to submit periodic 
reports. 
This body also constitutes an exception when it 
comes to ‘individual communications’. In 
comparison to the other bodies it is not possible 
for it to receive them. 
It has two main competences: 
First, visits to any place where a person may be 
deprived of liberty in State party territories.549 
There are four types of visits: SPT country visits, 
SPT country follow-up visits, NPM advisory visits 
and OPCAT advisory visits. 
Second, advice and assistance to State parties on 
the establishment of National Preventive 
Mechanisms (NPMs), independent national 
bodies for the prevention of torture.550 The setting 
up of NPMs constitutes a requirement for State 
parties to the Optional Protocol. 
It publishes an Annual Report551 which is 
presented before the CAT and the General 
Assembly.  
 
According to the SPT website,552 “The SPT 
undertakes country visits during which a 
delegation of its members visits places where 
persons may be deprived of their liberty. During 
‘overdue reports’. The 
Annual Report states that 
the Committee will 
“establish a working 
group on the follow-up 
to concluding 
observations to prepare a 
note on follow-up to 
concluding observations 
and discuss the use of 
indicators” and  
“ (j) To request the 
rapporteurs on reprisals 
to prepare a document 
on concrete actions 
against reprisals.” 
Page 17 of the annual 
report states: “In 
November 2014, in his 
oral report to the 
Committee, the 
Rapporteur said that, in 
the light of the treaty 
body strengthening 
process and the 
Convention against 
Torture Initiative to 
                                                        
549 For a list of visits see http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/CountryVisits.aspx. 
550 The Subcommittee has provided guidelines on the setting up of NPMs, see http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/OPCAT/Pages/NationalPreventiveMechanisms.aspx. 
551 For a full list refer to http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=12&DocTypeID=27. 
552 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/OPCAT/Pages/OPCATIntro.aspx. 
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its visits, the SPT examines the conditions of their 
detention, their daily life, including the manner in 
which they are treated, the relevant legislative 
and institutional frameworks, and other questions 
that may be related to the prevention of torture 
and ill treatment. At the end of its visits, the SPT 
draws up a written report which contains 
recommendations and observations to the State, 
requesting a written response within six months 
of its receipt. This then triggers a further round of 
discussion regarding the implementation of the 
SPT’s recommendations, and thus begins the 
process of continual dialogue. The SPT visit 
reports are confidential, though State parties are 
encouraged to make them public documents, as 
permitted by the OPCAT. 
When undertaking NPM advisory visits, the SPT 
focuses on issues concerning the establishment 
and/or operation of the NPM in the country 
concerned. OPCAT advisory visits focus on high-
level discussions with the relevant authorities 
concerning a whole range of issues concerning 
OPCAT compliance. 
The working methods can be summarised as 
follows.553 
State parties undertake to submit to the 
Committee reports on the implementation of the 
Convention within two years of the entry into 
force of the Convention for the State party 
ensure universal 
ratification within 10 
years, it was incumbent 
upon the Committee to 
enhance the follow-up 
procedure. He also said 
that two overriding 
questions were how to 
strengthen compliance 
with the Convention and 
how to measure the 
extent of that 
compliance. In May 2015, 
he suggested that the 
follow-up procedure 
could be strengthened in 
several ways, such as by 
making the 
recommendations clearer 
and more 
implementable, inviting 
State parties to meet with 
the Committee on 
follow-up, using an 
assessment grading 
system to evaluate 
compliance, and using 
quantitative indicators to 
assist with the 
assessment of 
                                                        
553 Refer to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
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concerned and thereafter every five years (Article 
44.1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child). 
The Committee has issued guidelines for 
structuring and facilitating the dialogue with 
State parties.554 The agenda for the discussion 
takes place around the articles structuring the 
convention: 
(a) General measures of implementation (Arts. 4, 
42 and 44.6); (b) Definition of the child (Art. 1); (c) 
General principles (Arts. 2, 3, 6 and 12); (d) Civil 
rights and freedoms (Arts. 7, 8, 13-17 and 37a); (e) 
Family environment and alternative care (Arts. 5, 
18.1, 18.2, 9, 10, 27.4, 20, 21, 11, 19, 39 and 25); (f) 
Basic health and welfare (Arts. 6.2, 23, 24, 26, 18.3, 
27.1, 27.2 and 27.3); (g) Education, leisure and 
cultural activities (Arts. 28, 29 and 31); (h) Special 
protection measures:  
(i) Children in situations of emergency (Arts. 22, 
38 and 39); (ii) Children in conflict with the law 
(Arts. 40, 37 and 39); (iii) Children in situations of 
exploitation, including physical and 
psychological recovery and social reintegration 
(Arts. 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 39); (iv) Children 
belonging to a minority or an indigenous group 
(Art. 30).  
 
Before the session in Committee where the report 
is assessed, there is a pre-sessional working 
implementation. He also 
highlighted the role of 
civil society 
organizations in the 
follow-up procedure.”  
 
Committee on the 
Elimination of 
Discrimination 
Against Women 
(CEDAW)579 
 
The Committee on the 
Elimination of 
Discrimination 
against Women 
(CEDAW) is the body 
of independent 
experts that monitors 
implementation of 
the Convention on the 
Elimination of All 
Forms of 
Discrimination 
against Women. 
 
CEDAW consists of 23 
experts on women’s 
rights from around the 
world. A total of 104 
experts have served as 
members of the 
Committee since 1982. 
The officers of the 
Committee consist of a 
Chairperson, three 
Vice-Chairpersons 
and a Rapporteur. 
Office-bearers serve 
for two year terms and 
are eligible for re-
election “provided 
that the principle of 
rotation is upheld”. 
 
“if the State party refuses 
to co-operate or fails to 
take steps to improve the 
situation in light of the 
SPT’s recommendations, 
the SPT may request the 
Committee against 
Torture to make a public 
statement or to publish 
the SPT report if it has 
not yet been made 
public” 
Committee Against 
Torture (CAT)580 
It monitors 
implementation of 
The Committee is 
composed of 10 
There is not a general 
obligation or special 
                                                        
554 CRC/C/5 and CRC/C/58. 
579 http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cedaw/pages/cedawindex.aspx  
580 http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cat/pages/catindex.aspx  
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 the Convention 
against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading 
Treatment or 
Punishment by its 
State parties. 
independent experts 
who are persons of 
high moral character 
and recognised 
competence in the 
field of human rights. 
Members are elected 
for a term of four 
years by State parties 
in accordance with 
article 17 of 
the Convention 
against Torture. 
Members serve in 
their personal capacity 
and may be re-elected 
if nominated.  
group. The group organises a private meeting 
with UN agencies and bodies, NGOs, and other 
competent bodies such as National Human Rights 
Institutions and youth organisations. 
 
This pre-sessional working group leads to the 
enactment of a list of issues, whose purpose 
according to the Committee’s working methods 
follows:  
 
“The list of issues is intended to give the 
Government a preliminary indication of the issues 
which the Committee considers to be priorities for 
discussion. It also gives the Committee the 
opportunity to request additional or updated 
information in writing from the Government 
prior to the session. This approach gives 
Governments the opportunity better to prepare 
themselves for the discussion with the 
Committee, which usually takes place between 3 
and 4 months after the working group. In order to 
facilitate the efficiency of the dialogue, the 
Committee requests the State party to provide the 
answers to its List of Issues in writing and in 
advance of the session, in time for them to be 
translated into the working languages of the 
Committee. It also provides an opportunity to 
consider questions relating to technical assistance 
and international cooperation.”  
procedure to reply in 
written to the concluding 
observations and 
recommendations issues 
by the Committee. The 
State concerned ‘is 
expected to’ send the 
Committee written 
information on the 
follow-up measures. 
The Committee may 
decide to send to any 
relevant agency (such as 
OHCHR, UNICEF, ILO, 
UNESCO, WHO and 
UNHCHR) “any reports 
from States parties 
containing a request or 
indicating a need for 
technical advice or 
assistance, along with the 
Committee’s 
observations and 
suggestions.”581 
 
The Committee has 
underlined the 
importance of timely 
reporting.  
                                                        
581 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx  
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The State party report is discussed in an open and 
public session of the Committee. The focus is on 
‘progress achieved’ and ‘factors and difficulties 
encountered’ when implementing the 
Convention, but also a more strategic discussion 
with the delegation representing the State 
concerned, so as to discuss ‘future goals and 
implementation priorities’. 
 
The discussions with the State are led by two 
country rapporteurs appointed between the 
members of the Committee. 
 
After the discussions the Committee will draft 
‘concluding observations’ which also contain 
recommendations and specific suggestions. After 
an introduction, the concluding observations 
provide a similar format or structure dealing with 
positive aspects (including progress achieved); 
factors and difficulties impeding the 
implementation; principal subjects for concern; 
suggestions and recommendations addressed to 
the State party.  
 
The observations are made public and sent to the 
State involved, and they are submitted to the 
United Nations General Assembly, through the 
Economic and Social Council, for its 
consideration, every two years. 
 
“The secretariat prepares country files for the pre-
sessional working group, containing information 
“At its twenty-ninth 
session (see CRC/C/114, 
paragraph 561), the 
Committee decided to 
send a letter to all States 
parties whose initial 
reports were due in 1992 
and 1993, requesting 
them to submit that 
report within one year. In 
June 2003, similar letters 
were sent to three States 
parties whose initial 
reports were due in 1994 
and never submitted. 
The Committee further 
decided to inform those 
States parties in the same 
letter that should they 
not report within one 
year, the Committee 
would consider the 
situation of child rights 
in the State in the 
absence of the initial 
report, as foreseen in the 
Committee’s “Overview 
of the reporting 
procedures” (CRC/C/33, 
paras. 29-32) and in light 
of rule 67 of the 
Committee’s provisional 
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relevant to each of the reports to be examined. 
These include country specific information 
submitted by United Nations bodies and 
specialized agencies, non governmental 
organizations and other competent bodies. The 
secretariat also prepares country briefs. Prior to 
the plenary session both file and country briefs 
are updated and made available to the Committee 
members during the sessions.”555 
 
The monitoring system is based on States’ 
reporting in light of Article 73 of the 
Convention.556 
Article 73 of the Convention states: “1. States 
Parties undertake to submit to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations for consideration 
by the Committee a report on the legislative, 
judicial, administrative and other measures they 
have taken to give effect to the provisions of the 
present Convention: 
(a) Within one year after the entry into force of the 
Convention for the State Party concerned; (b) 
rules of procedure 
(CRC/C/4).”582  
The United Nations 
Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) is the body 
playing a specific 
function in following up 
the concluding 
observations of CRC, 
with the support of 
OHCHR and other 
partners.583 
Subcommittee on 
the Prevention of 
Torture (SPT)584 
It has a preventive 
mandate “focused on 
an innovative, 
sustained and 
proactive approach to 
the prevention of 
torture and ill 
treatment.” It 
commenced its 
activities in 2007 on 
the basis of the 
Optional Protocol to 
the Convention 
Its composition 
include 25 
independent and 
impartial experts from 
different backgrounds 
and from various 
regions of the world. 
Members are elected 
by States Parties to the 
OPCAT for a four-
year mandate and can 
be re-elected once. 
 
                                                        
555 Working Methods document retrievable from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. See also the Committee “Guidelines for the 
participation of partners (NGOs and individual experts) in the pre-sessional working group of the Committee on the Rights of the Child.” (CRC/C/90, Annex VIII.) 
556 See Rules of Procedure of the Committee, HRI/GEN/3/Rev.1/Add.1 7 May 2004. 
582 Working Methods document retrievable from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx  
583 UN, International Human Rights Instruments, Other activities of the human rights treaty bodies and participation of stakeholders in the human rights treaty body process, 
HRI/MC/2013/3, 22 April 2013, page 4. 
584 http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cat/pages/catindex.aspx. 
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against Torture 
(OPCAT). 
Thereafter every five years and whenever the 
Committee so requests.” 
The reports focus on ‘factors and difficulties’ 
affecting the implementation of the Convention. 
They will also include information on the 
characteristics of migration flows in the State 
concerned. 
Article 74.1 stipulates: “The Committee shall 
examine the reports submitted by each State Party 
and shall transmit such comments as it may 
consider appropriate to the State Party concerned. 
This State Party may submit to the Committee 
observations on any comment made by the 
Committee in accordance with the present article. 
The Committee may request supplementary 
information from States Parties when considering 
these reports.”557 
The Committee then presents an Annual Report 
before the General Assembly on the 
implementation of the Convention, which 
contains its own considerations and 
recommendations “based, in particular, on the 
examination of the reports and any observations 
presented by States Parties.” 
Committee on the 
Rights of the Child 
(CRC)585 
 
It monitors the 
implementation of the 
Convention on the 
Rights of the Child by 
its State parties. It also 
monitors 
implementation of 
two Optional 
Protocols to the 
Convention, on 
involvement of 
children in armed 
conflict (OPAC) and 
on sale of children 
child prostitution and 
child pornography 
(OPSC). On 19 
December 2011, the 
UN General Assembly 
approved a third 
Optional Protocol 
on a communications 
procedure (OPIC), 
which allow 
individual children to 
submit complaints 
regarding specific 
The Committee on the 
Rights of the Child is 
composed of 18 
independent experts 
who are persons of 
high moral character 
and recognised 
competence in the 
field of human rights. 
Members are elected 
for a term of four 
years by State parties 
in accordance with 
Article 43 of the 
Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. 
Members serve in 
their personal capacity 
and may be re-elected 
if nominated. 
“It identifies a number of 
specific 
recommendations of 
concern in its concluding 
observations and 
requests the State party 
to provide additional 
information, within a 
period of up to one year, 
on implementation of 
those.” 
The Committee may 
request States to provide 
written information on 
the implementation of 
the suggestions and 
recommendations. 
 
“The Committee may 
appoint one of its 
members to serve as 
rapporteur to follow up, 
who will then submit a 
follow-up report to the 
Committee within two 
months of receiving the 
                                                        
557 The same article states: “6. The Committee may invite representatives of other specialized agencies and organs of the United Nations, as well as of intergovernmental 
organizations, to be present and to be heard in its meetings whenever matters falling within their field of competence are considered.” 
585 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/CRCIndex.aspx. 
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violations of their 
rights under the 
Convention and its 
first two optional 
protocols. The 
Protocol entered into 
force in April 2014. 
Article 76 provides signatories to recognise the 
competence of the Committee “to receive and 
consider communications to the effect that a State 
Party claims that another State Party is not 
fulfilling its obligations under the present 
Convention.” 
And Article 77 “to receive and consider 
communications from or on behalf of individuals 
subject to its jurisdiction who claim that their 
individual rights as established by the present 
Convention have been violated by that State 
Party”. 
Similar to other Treaty bodies, the Committee 
identifies a set or list of issues prior to reporting 
(LoIPR) which are sent to the States concerned 
and which are aimed at structuring the periodic 
reporting procedures. On the basis of the reports 
by State parties, the Committee elaborates 
Concluding Remarks or observations.  
 
There is also a simplified reporting procedure.558  
The reporting by States follows the common set of 
harmonised guidelines on reporting under the 
human rights treaties.559 
information from the 
State party.”586 
And the Working 
Methods state: 
“22. The follow-up 
rapporteur will establish 
a deadline, not exceeding 
12 months from the date 
of notification, for States 
parties to submit the 
information requested. 
Once the requested 
information is received 
from the State party, the 
follow-up rapporteur 
will submit a follow-up 
report to the Committee 
within two months. If the 
follow-up rapporteur 
does not receive the 
requested information by 
the deadline, he or she 
will inform the 
Committee.” 
                                                        
558 http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/OptionalReporting.aspx?TreatyID=7&Lang=En. 
559 United Nations, International Human Rights Instruments, HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6, 3 June 2009. 
586 Quoted from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/FollowUpProcedure.aspx . 
AN EU MECHANISM ON DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS | 203 
 
Committee on 
Migrant Workers 
(CMW)587 
 
It monitors the 
implementation of the 
International 
Convention on the 
Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and 
Members of Their 
Families.588 
“It is composed of 14 
independent experts 
(persons of high moral 
character, impartiality 
and recognized 
competence in the 
field covered by the 
International 
Convention on the 
Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and 
Members of their 
Families). 
Members are elected 
for a term of four 
years by States parties 
in accordance with 
article 72 of the 
Convention. Members 
serve in their personal 
capacity and may be 
re-elected if 
nominated. 
Members are elected 
at meetings of States 
The Working Methods can be summarised as 
follows:560 
It is a State reporting based model. Article 35, 
paragraph 1, of the Convention stipulates that 
State parties are obliged to submit to the 
Committee within two years of the ratification of 
the Convention, and every four years thereafter, a 
report on the implementation of the Convention. 
It is also based on a framework of ‘constructive 
dialogue’ between the Committee and the State. 
The dialogue starts on the basis of a list of issues, 
which according to the working methods 
document  
“5. On the basis of information at its disposal, the 
Committee will formulate in advance a list of 
issues for which supplementary information to 
that contained in the common-core and treaty-
specific documents is required. States parties will 
be requested to provide brief and precise replies 
in writing, not exceeding 30 pages. States parties 
may submit additional pages of statistical data, 
which will be made available to Committee 
members in their original format, as submitted.” 
The Committee nominates one or two country 
rapporteurs on each of the reports received by 
each country, and “The country rapporteur(s) 
shall prepare a draft list of issues on the State 
“It requests States parties 
to provide information 
within one year on the 
steps taken to implement 
specific 
recommendations of its 
concluding observations. 
Such recommendations 
are identified because 
they are particularly 
serious, urgent, 
protective, and/or can be 
achieved within short 
periods of time. The 
Committee has 
appointed a Follow-up 
Rapporteur, who shall 
assess, in consultation 
with the country 
rapporteurs, the 
information provided by 
the State party and 
report at every session to 
the Committee on 
her/his activities.”590 
                                                        
587 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CMW/Pages/CMWIndex.aspx  
588 Refer to Factsheet No. 24 (Rev 1) 
560 UN, Working Methods of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities adopted at its fifth session (11-15 April 2011), CRPD/C/5/4, 2 September 2011. 
590 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/FollowUpProcedure.aspx. 
204 | BÁRD, CARRERA, GUILD & KOCHENOV 
 
parties, in accordance 
with article 72  of the 
Convention.”589 
Party report for which they are responsible prior 
to the dialogue, and draft concluding 
observations following the constructive 
dialogue.”561 
The State reports are examined in a public 
hearing, where all the relevant stakeholders may 
attend. The States are represented by delegations 
who “comprise persons who possess the 
knowledge, competence and authority to explain 
all aspects of the human rights situation of 
persons with disabilities in the reporting State”. 
Following the structured dialogue, the Committee 
will adopt the Concluding Observations which 
will be structured as follows: “Positive aspects • 
Factors and difficulties that impede the 
implementation of the Convention • Principal 
topics of concern • Suggestions and 
recommendations”. 
“Concluding observations will be made public on 
the last day of the session at which they were 
adopted, and posted on the website of the Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR).” 
There is also a simplified reporting procedure.562 
Committee on the 
Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities 
(CRPD)591 
 
It monitors the 
Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (GA 
resolution 
A/RES/61/106). 
“The Committee is a 
body of 18 
independent 
experts which 
monitors 
implementation of the 
Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. The 
members of the 
Committee serve in 
their individual 
capacity, not as 
government 
representatives. They 
are elected from a list 
of persons nominated 
by the States at the 
Conference of the 
State Parties for a four 
year term with a 
possibility of being re-
 
                                                        
589 Quoted from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CMW/Pages/Membership.aspx  
561 See http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRPD/C/5/4&Lang=en. 
562 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/Simplifiedreportingprocedure.aspx and 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/OptionalReporting.aspx?TreatyID=4&Lang=En. 
591 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/CRPDIndex.aspx. 
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elected once (cf. 
Article 34 of the 
Convention).”592 
The Working Methods are outlined here.563 They 
are founded on the Convention and the 
Committee’s rules of procedures. 
The reporting is carried out following an article 
by article basis, and if necessary on 
complementary information. The focus is on the 
state of implementation and progress achieved 
and obstacle encountered.  
“The Committee encourages the involvement of 
families of victims’ organizations, human rights 
defenders working on the issue of enforced 
disappearance, non-governmental organizations 
and National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) 
in the process of consultations leading to the 
preparation of reports. The Committee also 
encourages civil society stakeholders and NHRIs 
to directly provide to it information on the 
implementation of the provisions of the 
Convention at the national level.”564 
The Committee appoints two or more country 
rapporteurs by report, which carry out the 
review. They draft the list of issues and the 
concluding observations which are then validated 
by the Committee. 
After the report is received,  
“the Committee shall transmit a letter to the State 
party concerned notifying it of the dates, duration 
Committee on 
Enforced 
Disappearances 
(CED)593 
 
It monitors the 
International 
Convention for 
the Protection of 
All Persons from 
Enforced 
Disappearance. 
 
It is composed of 10 
independent experts.  
 
    
                                                        
592 Quoted from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/QuestionsAnswers.aspx  
563 Refer to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CED/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
564 Point 6 of working methods, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CED/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
593 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CED/Pages/CEDIndex.aspx  
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and venue of the session at which its report will 
be examined as well as a list of issues about which 
the Committee would like to receive additional 
information. The list of issues facilitates the 
preparation by the State party for the constructive 
dialogue; provide a focus for the constructive 
dialogue, without restricting it; and improve the 
efficiency of the reporting system.” 
Also, “In reviewing States Parties reports, the 
Committee may take into consideration 
information originating from other treaty bodies, 
special procedures, in particular the Working 
Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances, and from the United Nations 
system as well from others sources, including 
regional human rights mechanisms, civil society 
stakeholders and NHRIs.” 
The report is examined in the context of a 
‘constructive dialogue’ between the Committee 
and the delegation of the State party. 
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ANNEX 4 
Rule of law: economic impact and the costs of an EU 
scoreboard 
 
by Prof. Dr Wim Marneffe – Hasselt University – Policy Management Research Group 
 
 
1. The rule of law and economic performance 
1.1 Introduction 
One of the key research questions in economic literature is what causes some countries to grow more 
rapidly than others. Within this strand of literature, the relationship between institutions and economic 
growth has become a dynamic research domain of theoretical and empirical analysis by economic, 
political and legal scholars. Since the 1990s (neo-)institutional and growth research have crossed paths 
in the literature and scholars are increasingly examining institutional variables and their positive causal 
relationship with growth, investments, employment, etc.594 For the remainder of the present chapter, 
we focus on the rule of law as the institutional variable of interest. The goal is not to provide an 
exhaustive overview of the institutional literature on the impact of the rule of law, but to highlight the 
most important scholars and findings on this topic. As discussed extensively in Chapter 2.4, numerous 
definitions of rule of law are being used, and the same appears to be the case in the institutional 
literature.  
1.2 The concept of rule of law in economic literature 
The institutional literature makes a distinction between a narrow and a broad definition of the concept 
of rule of law. Voigt clearly describes these different approaches used in the institutional literature.595 
The broad concept of rule of law has various dimensions: law and order, citizens’ respect for formal 
legislation, democracy and human rights. This part of the Research Paper presents an overview of the 
variables/indicators being used in the institutional literature to measure the rule of law, such as the 
separation of powers,596 judicial constitutional review,597 judicial independence,598 fair trial599 and 
                                                        
594 See e.g. Acemonlu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A. ‘The colonial origins of comparative development: 
empirical investment’. American Economic Review, 91, 1369-1386 (2001); Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. 
A. ‘Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth’, in Aghion, P. and Durlauf, S. (eds.), Handbook of 
Economic Growth, Vol. 1A, North Holland, Amsterdam, 385-472 (2005); Easterly, W. and Levine, R., ‘Tropics, germs, 
and crops: How endowments influence economic development’, 50 Journal of Monetary Economics 1, 3–39 (2003); 
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A. and Trebbi, F. ‘Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over geography and 
integration in economic development’, Natl. Bur. Econ. Res. Work. Pap. 9305 (2002). 
595 Voigt, S. ‘How to measure the rule of law’. Kyklos, 65(2), 262-284 (2012). 
596 Beck, T., G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer and P. Walsh (2001), “New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political 
Economy: The Database of Political Institutions” World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 165-176. 
597 La Porta, R. ‘Judicial Checks and Balances’. J. Pol. Econ., 112, 445-470 (2004). 
598 Feld, L.P. and Voigt, S. ‘Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of 
indicators’. European Journal of Political Economy, 19(3), 497-527 (2003). 
599 Hathaway, O. (2002), “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 111, No. 8, pp. 
1935-2042.  
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fundamental rights.600 The author also finds that the correlation between the various dimensions of the 
rule of law is also quite low, which shows that these dimensions are not perfect substitutes for each 
other and should be measured separately. Skąpska outlines a theoretical framework for the economic 
importance of the rule of law.601 Rational law presents a necessary condition for economic transactions, 
and its application creates a sense of foreseeability and predictability on the part of economic agents. 
The latter is a necessary condition in order for rational economic actions to occur. Butkiewicz & 
Yanikkaya state that most developed economies are characterised by two dimensions: democracy and 
the rule of law.602 While the empirical evidence clearly reflects the rule of law’s impact on economic 
growth, democracy’s impact is less straightforward.  
1.3 Theoretical and empirical relationship between rule of law and economic 
performance 
One of the most interesting studies in this research domain is Haggard & Tiede.603 The authors identify 
four major theoretical routes from the rule of law to economic growth: through the mitigation of 
violence; through protection of property rights; through institutional checks on government; and 
through control of private capture and corruption. For each of these four theoretical routes, we highlight 
some of the major empirical studies: 
- Reducing violence: The first studies on the rule of law focused almost entirely on the 
provision of security. The logic is that it makes little sense to discuss security of property or 
the contract integrity if economic agents themselves are not secure.604 Numerous studies 
have demonstrated the impact of reducing violence on economic growth and job creation. 
For instance, the World Bank estimated that decreasing the homicide rate by 10% increased 
per capita GDP by 0.7–2.9% over the subsequent five years.605 
- Protection of property rights: Among economists, the central theoretical mechanisms that 
connects the rule of law and economic prosperity are property rights and contract 
enforcement.606  
                                                        
600 Cingranelli, D.L. ‘The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) human rights data project’. Human Rights Quarterly, 32, 395-
418 (2004). 
601 Skąpska, G. ‘The rule of law, economic transformation and corruption after the fall of the Berlin wall’. Hague 
Journal on the Rule of Law, 1(2), 284-306 (2009). 
602 Butkiewicz, J.L. and Yanikkaya, H. ‘Institutional quality and economic growth: Maintenance of the rule of law 
or democratic institutions, or both?’. Economic Modelling, 23(4), 648-661 (2006). 
603 Haggard, S. and Tiede, L. ‘The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where are We?’. World Development, 39(5), 
673-685 (2011). 
604 See e.g. Belton, R. ‘Competing definitions of the rule of law: Implications for practitioners’. Carnegie. Rule of 
Law Ser. #55. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endow. Int. Peace (2005); Black, B., Kraakman, R. and Tarassova, A. 
‘Russian privatization and corporate governance: what went wrong?’. Stanford Law Review, 1731-1808 (2000); 
Narayan-Parker, D. and Patel, R. ‘Voices of the poor: can anyone hear us?’, World Bank Publications, Vol. 1 Oxford 
Univ. Press, New York (2000). 
605 World Bank. ‘Crime, violence and economic development in Brazil: Elements for effective public policy’. 
Washington, D.C. Working Paper No. 36525 (2006). 
606 See e.g. Alchian, A.A. ‘Some economics of property rights’. Il politico, 816-829 (1965); Alchian, A.A. and Demsetz, 
H. ‘The property right paradigm’. The Journal of Economic History, 33(01), 16-27 (1973); Coase, R.H. ‘The problem of 
social cost’. Journal of Law and Economics, 3. 1-44 (1960); Demsetz, H. ‘Toward a theory of property rights’. American 
Economic Review, 57, 347-359 (1967); Williamson, O.E. ‘The vertical integration of production: market failure 
considerations’. The American Economic Review, 61(2), 112-123 (1971); Williamson, O.E. ‘The Economic Institutions of 
Capitalism Firms Markets Relational Contracting’. The Free Press, New York (1985); Asoni, A. ‘Protection of property 
rights and growth as political equilibria’. Journal of Economic Surveys, 22(5), 953-987 (2008); Barzel, Y. ‘Economic 
analysis of property rights’. Cambridge University Press, New York (1997); Furubotn, E.G. and Pejovich, S. ‘Property 
rights and economic theory: a survey of recent literature’. Journal of Economic Literature, 10(4), 1137-1162 (1972); 
Dam, K.W. ‘The law-growth nexus: The rule of law and economic development.’ Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 
D.C. (2007); Haber, S., Maurer, N. and Razo, A. ‘The politics of property rights: political instability, credible commitments, 
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- Institutional checks on governments: For most economists, institutional checks on executive 
discretion, including through independent judiciaries, are also part of the broad concept of 
the rule of law. Henisz has conducted the most comprehensive effort to construct a cross-
national database of institutional checks on government.607 The author finds a significant 
and positive relationship between such checks and economic growth, foreign direct 
investment, and investment in infrastructure.608 In a seminal article, La Porta et al. proxy 
judicial independence through objective indicators such as judicial tenure and the 
lawmaking power of judicial decisions, and show that independence has positive effects on 
the security of property rights.609 However, another study finds that judicial independence 
is not associated with long-term growth.610 These divergent findings are explained by Feld 
& Voigt, who make a distinction between the ‘de facto’ (actual independence as enjoyed by 
judges) and the ‘de jure’ measures (independence from looking at the letter of the law) of 
the rule of law.611 The authors find that whereas GDP growth (1980–98) is not affected by 
de jure independence measures, such as formal institutional arrangements, it is affected by 
de facto independence, such as the effective length of terms and trends in budgets. 
- Control of corruption: Since the 1990s scholars have been increasingly examining the link 
between corruption and economic growth. Mauro indicated that greater corruption 
(measured by surveys of investors) leads to lower investment and growth.612 Numerous 
                                                        
and economic growth in Mexico, 1876-1929’. Cambridge University Press, New York (2003); North, D.C. ‘Institutions, 
institutional change and economic performance’. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1990); North, D.C. ‘Structure 
and change in economic history’. W.W. Norton, New York (1981); North, D.C. and Thomas, R.P. ‘The rise of the western 
world: A new economic history’. Cambridge University Press, New York (1973). In economic literature almost all 
studies clearly find that more robust property rights protection leads to significantly improved long-term economic 
performance (Asoni, A. ‘Protection of property rights and growth as political equilibria’. Journal of Economic Surveys, 
22(5), 953-987 (2008); Barro, R. J. ‘Determinants of economic growth: A cross-country empirical study.’ National Bureau 
of Economic Research. The MIT Press, Cambridge (1997); Clague, C., Keefer, P., Knack, S. and Olson, M. (1996). 
‘Property and contract rights in autocracies and democracies’. Journal of Economic Growth, 1(2), 243-276; Keefer, P. 
‘Beyond legal origin and checks and balances: Political credibility, citizen information, and financial sector 
development’. World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4154 (2007); Knack, S. and Keefer, P. ‘Institutions 
and economic performance: cross‐country tests using alternative institutional measures’. Economics & Politics, 7(3), 
207-227 (1995); Scully, G.W. ‘The institutional framework and economic development’. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 652-662 (1988); Zak, P.J. and Knack, S. ‘Trust and growth’. The Economic Journal, 111 (470), 295-321 (2001); 
Alston, L.J. and Libecap, G.D. ‘The determinants and impact of property rights: Land titles on the Brazilian frontier’. 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 12(1), 25-61 (1996); Anderson, T.L. and Hill, P.J. ‘The evolution of 
property rights: a study of the American West’. The Journal of Law & Economics, 18(1), 163-179 (1975); Bazzi, S. and 
Clemens, M. (2009). ‘Blunt instruments: On establishing the causes of economic growth’. Center for Global Development, 
Working Paper No. 171 (2009); Libecap, G.D. ‘Contracting for property rights’. Cambridge University Press, New 
York (1989); Kaufmann, D. The worldwide governance indicators project: answering the critics (Vol. 4149). World Bank 
Publications (2007); Malesky, E. and Taussig, M. ‘Out of the gray: The impact of provincial institutions on business 
formalization in Vietnam’. Journal of East Asian Studies, 9(2), 249-290 (2009). 
607 Henisz, W.J. ‘The institutional environment for economic growth’. Economics & Politics, 12(1), 1-31 (2000); Henisz, 
W.J. ‘The institutional environment for multinational investment’. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 16(2), 
334-364 (2000). 
608 See also Stasavage, D. ‘Private investment and political institutions’. Economics & Politics, 14(1), 41-63 (2002); 
Stasavage, D. ‘Public debt and the Birth of the democratic state: France and Great Britain 1688–1789’. Cambridge 
University Press, New York (2003). 
609 La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. ‘The quality of government’. Journal of Law, 
Economics, and organization, 15(1), 222-279 . (1999). 
610 Glaeser, E.L. and Shleifer, A. ‘Legal origins’. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1193-1229 (2002). 
611 Feld, L.P. and Voigt, S. ‘Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of 
indicators’. European Journal of Political Economy, 19(3), 497-527 (2003). 
612 Mauro, P. ‘Corruption and growth’. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 681-712 (1995). 
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other studies followed which showed that countries facing less corruption are associated 
with greater economic development.613 
Haggart & Tiede perform an interesting cross-country study of 74 developing and transition economies 
in the 2003-07 period.614 They grouped 11 indicators for the rule of law into the four dimensions as 
discussed above. Interestingly, the authors find that the correlations across various rule of law measures 
are mostly lower than expected, which reflects a previous finding that the impact of the rule of law on 
economic growth is dependent on the indicator used.615 The authors do find that the dimension 
positively and significantly impacts long-term economic growth. The corruption dimension appears to 
be the strongest and has the most significant impact on economic performance.616 
The economic literature has seen a remarkable increase in the number of studies examining the causal 
relationship between the rule of law and economic performance of countries. Part of this increased 
attention stems from the discussion on the ‘right’ measures or indicators for the rule of law. On the one 
hand some scholars make use of subjective indicators, which means they are based on expert 
evaluations or surveys among investors or citizens. On the other hand, scholars are implementing so-
called ‘objective’ indicators that capture features of the institutional and legal environment. This 
difference between subjective and objective indicators has been an ongoing point of controversy. 
Glaeser et al. argue that scholars should limit their analysis to “objective” measurement due to the risk 
of bias in subjective measures.617 Kurtz & Schrank also show that the significance of subjective 
governance variables disappears in cross-country growth regressions when controlling for economic 
performance.618 
1.4 Summary 
To sum up, we can see that authors of the economic literature are increasingly examining the 
relationship between the rule of law and economic performance of countries. In the beginning this 
literature was mostly theoretical and focused on the relevance of property rights and security. In recent 
decades authors have more frequently used a broad definition of the rule of law to examine the impact 
of corruption, judicial independence, etc. Furthermore, authors still debate the use of objective versus 
subjective indicators of the rule of law, which could lead to divergent results, but in general the broad 
consensus remains that a higher degree of rule of law is associated with increased economic 
                                                        
613 E.g. Ades, A. and Di Tella, R. ‘Rents, competition, and corruption’. The American Economic Review, 89(4), 982-993 
(1997); La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. ‘The quality of government’. Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization, 15(1), 222-279 (1999); Keefer, P. and Knack, S. ‘Polarization, politics and property rights: 
Links between inequality and growth’. Public Choice, 111(1-2), 127-154 (2002); Pellegrini, L. and Gerlagh, R. 
‘Corruption's effect on growth and its transmission channels’. Kyklos, 57(3), 429-456 (2004); Wei, S.J. ‘How taxing is 
corruption on international investors?’. Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(1), 1-11 (2000); Treisman, D. ‘The causes 
of corruption: a cross-national study’. Journal of Public Economics, 76(3), 399-457 (2000); Treisman, D. ‘What have we 
learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of cross-national empirical research?’. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., 
10, 211-244 (2007). 
614 Haggard, S. and Tiede, L. ‘The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where are We?’, 39 World Development 5, 673-
685 (2011). 
615 Arndt, C. and Oman, C. ‘Uses and Abuses of Governance Indicators’. Paris: Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. Development Centre Series (2006). 
616 See also Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. ‘Governance matters VII: Aggregate and individual governance 
indicators for 1996–2007’. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4654. Washington, D.C. (2008); Skaaning, 
S.E. ‘Corruption in the post-communist countries: A study of its particularity and diversity’, in Backes, U., 
Jaskulowski, T. and Polese, A. (eds). Totalitarismus und Transformation: Defizite der Demokratiekonsolidierung in Mittel-
und Osteuropa, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen (2009). 
617 Glaeser, E.L., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. Do institutions cause growth?. Journal of Economic 
Growth, 9(3), 271-303 (2004). 
618 Kurtz, M.J. and Schrank, A. ‘Growth and governance: A defense’. Journal of Politics, 69(2), 563-569 (2007). 
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performance of countries. Further research in the coming decades can, it is hoped, provide more insights 
into which dimensions of the rule of law have the most significant economic impact. 
2. Costs of the EU Scoreboard on the rule of law 
The European Union is likely to reap substantial societal benefits from a well-designed and -enforced 
Scoreboard. Yet the setup and maintenance of such a Scoreboard will also entail non-negligible costs. 
The assessment of these costs is made on the basis of a permanent multi-actor and multi-method annual 
insourced Scoreboard cycle to monitor and enforce the rule of law throughout the Union, administered 
by an independent EU Rule of Law Commission . The Scoreboard is not a standardised benchmarking 
system (which would significantly reduce its costs, but also its benefits) (see Chapter 4.5). 
In assessing the costs of such a Scoreboard, a clear distinction has to be made between (1) the 
preparatory and implementation phase, (2) the Monitor and the Monitored States, and (3) the three 
scenarios of adherence to the rule of law. 
2.1 Costs in the preparatory phase  
2.1.1 Monitor 
The preparatory phase starts with the set-up of the EU Rule of Law Commission . Set-up costs include 
the selection of independent scholars who will administer the Scoreboard process, guaranteeing the 
objectivity, impartiality and scientific soundness of the assessment methods used in the EU Scoreboard. 
The EU Rule of Law Commission (henceforth, ‘the Monitor’) will be responsible for the actual 
monitoring and evaluation of the rule of law. 
 
Next, the Monitor has to develop the final Scoreboard and help to set up an organisational model. As a 
result, the Monitor will incur information and planning costs. They comprise the costs of building the 
Scoreboard (determining which variables shall be included and how information shall be gathered, e.g. 
country visits), identifying and making agreements with cooperating partners (e.g. CoE), setting up a 
timetable for the annual process, developing a sanctioning mechanism, and establishing the 
organisation that will manage the Scoreboard on a daily basis (i.e. quantifying the need for data 
collectors and (IT-)administrators, screening, hiring or reallocating as well as training of personnel, etc.).  
 
Furthermore, the Monitor will incur some one-shot start-up costs for infrastructure (office equipment, 
ICT, etc.). 
2.1.2 Monitored States 
The Monitored States will also incur information and planning costs (getting acquainted with the 
Scoreboard (e.g. organising get-to-know work-shops), preparing and organising the national 
administration to meet the reporting demands, training of personnel, hiring or reallocating personnel, 
as well as infrastructural costs (office equipment, information and communications technology, etc.).  
 
Furthermore, the Member States may engage in lobbying activities to influence the final design of the 
Scoreboard. While these so-called ‘rent-seeking costs’ are difficult to measure, they cannot be ignored. 
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2.2 Costs in the implementation phase 
2.2.1 Monitor 
Once the Scoreboard methodology and timetable are elaborated, the Monitor will start the annual cycle 
of gathering, collecting, interpreting, discussing, monitoring and evaluating country-specific 
information on the rule of law. The implementation phase entails operational, administrative, 
monitoring and enforcement costs. In regulatory impact assessment, a clear and strict distinction is 
made between these cost categories. However, since the essence of the Scoreboard is to inform and 
monitor, the administrative and monitoring costs are part of the operational costs, which include: 
compensation of staff and/or external consultants gathering and collecting information, compensation 
of the Copenhagen experts interpreting and evaluating information, country visits, drawing up of 
annual (country-specific) reports, etc.  
 
If the Monitored States do not comply with their reporting duties on the rule of law, the Monitor will 
have to take steps to obtain the necessary information, thus incurring informational enforcement costs 
(additional costs of data collection).  
 
Since the Scoreboard system will be used for upholding European values, a mechanism will be 
implemented that will remedy any breach of those values and reverse negative trends. As the breaches 
of the rule of law are more severe, costs are likely to rise. Three scenarios have to be distinguished. In 
the scenarios 1 and 2, breaches are such that the Monitored State is willing to self-remedy them. The 
Scoreboard mechanism then follows a “sunshine policy”, which will engage the Monitored States in 
self-remedying and/or self-reversing. The enforcement costs of the Monitor are thus relatively limited, 
especially since the burden of proof is shifted to the Monitored States (see Chapter 4.9). 
 
Scenario 3 is fundamentally different from the first two and involves a Member State which undermines 
democracy and the rule of law. There is no indication that this State will return to the rule of law by its 
own initiative. It follows that the sunshine policy does not apply. In this third scenario, enforcement 
costs are incurred by starting an infringement procedure and drafting an inter-institutional agreement 
that – in case of breach of the rule of law – will impose sanctions.  
2.2.2 Monitored States 
The costs incurred by the Monitored States in the implementation phase are to a large extent the mirror 
image of the Monitor’s. The States will also have to gather information and provide it to the Monitor. 
The interpretation of the raw data will require and be the subject of a discussion between the Monitor 
and the Monitored State. The annual Scoreboard cycle thus entails operational, administrative, 
monitoring and enforcement costs for the Monitored States. As mentioned, in regulatory impact 
assessment, the administrative burden and monitoring costs are typically distinguished from the 
operational costs. But in the case of the Scoreboard, both will fall under operational costs and include: 
additional or imputed compensation of staff and/or compensation of external consultants gathering 
and collecting information, presenting the information in the Copenhagen format, interpreting and 
evaluating information internally, organising country visits, discussing information with the 
Copenhagen group, etc. If the Monitored State does not fully comply with its reporting duties, it will 
have to allocate additional resources to provide the information required by the Monitor (compliance 
costs). 
 
As mentioned, when a breach of rule of law is observed, three different scenarios may apply. Scenarios 
1 and 2 assume that the Monitored State is willing to solve the problem. The Scoreboard mechanism 
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thus follows a “sunshine policy”. In those scenarios, the costs of remedying and/or reversing the breach 
of the rule of law are primarily borne by the Monitored State. Since the enforcement costs of the Monitor 
in the first and second scenarios are relatively limited, the bulk of the costs are the State’s compliance 
costs (changing laws or policies, etc.).  
 
However, in the third scenario, where the Scoreboard process indicates that a Member State is 
undermining democracy and the rule of law and there is no indication that this Member State will return 
to the rule of law by its own initiative, the sunshine policy does not apply. The Monitored States thus 
faces substantial enforcement costs (procedural costs, financial sanctions, economic sanctions, etc.). 
 
2.3 Economies of scale and efficiency gains 
As previously pointed out, there is a common understanding “not to reinvent the wheel” and avoid 
duplications. Concretely, the costs of the Scoreboard on the rule of law can be substantially reduced if 
the European Union realises the economies of scale that are within reach, by cooperating with the 
Council of Europe and the United Nations and relying on their existing mechanisms while 
complementing them with EU-specific elements. This third-party approach will also strengthen the 
objective and perceived impartiality of the Scoreboard, which in turn will increase the political support 
by the Monitored States.  
 
Bringing all existing information (from CoE and UN) as well as new EU-specific information on the rule 
of law under the umbrella of one Monitor (i.e. the EU Rule of Law Commission ) also has several cost 
advantages. First of all, in building its own institutional capacity to assess the rule of law, the European 
Union avoids wasting time and money on discussing legal inconsistencies that might arise from the 
special characteristics of the EU legal system.  
 
Second, the Monitor can and should uphold a timetable that is consistent with other EU-reporting 
activities (instead of relying on CoE or UN). In order to reduce the administrative burden on the 
Monitored States, the reporting duties of the Monitored States should indeed be bundled. One way to 
achieve efficiency gains might be to link the EU Scoreboard on the rule of law to the timetable of the 
European Semester and Cycle of Economic Governance. However, since a Scoreboard is incapable of 
catching the most atrocious violations and detecting internal linkages sufficiently, a comprehensive and 
qualitative assessment is recommended. Moreover, the purpose of the Scoreboard is not only to monitor 
but also to enforce. Unfortunately, the recommendations following the European Semester have so far 
not been enforced adequately.619  
2.4. Summary 
 
The costs of setting up and maintaining a Scoreboard on the rule of law are summarised in Table 1, 
which makes a clear distinction between the costs borne by the Monitor and the Monitored States in the 
two phases of preparation and implementation and in the three scenarios of (non-)compliance. The 
analysis is based on the concept of a permanent annual insourced Scoreboard cycle administered by an 
independent EU Rule of Law Commission .  
 
                                                        
619 See e.g. Darvas, Z. and Leandro, Á. ‘The Limitations of Policy Coordination in the Euro Area Under the European 
Semester‘, Brussels: Bruegel Institute, Policy Contribution 2015/19, November 2015; Deroose, S. and Griesse, J. 
‘Implementing Economic Reforms – are EU Member States Responding to European Semester recommendations?’, 
Brussels: European Commission, ECF in Economic Brief 37, October 2014. 
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Table 1. Scoreboard costs 
 Monitor Monitored States 
 
Preparatory phase  
(one-shot costs) 
Expert group set-up costs *  
Information and planning costs * * 
Infrastructural costs * * 
Rent-seeking costs  * 
 
Implementation phase  
(recurrent costs  
 on annual basis) 
Operational costs * * 
 (Administrative costs) * * 
 (Monitoring costs) *  
Compliance costs (information)  * 
Enforcement costs (information) *  
Compliance costs (scenarios 1, 2)  * 
Enforcement costs (scenario 3) * * 
 
Although the precise format of the Scoreboard has not yet been determined (hence the cost categories 
cannot be monetised precisely), the operational costs of the Monitor in the implementation phase of a 
stand-alone Scoreboard (no economies of scale) can be estimated at €4 million per year, based on the 
experience of the Venice Commission. If the EU decides to cooperate with the CoE, some important 
economies of scale can be realised. However, the unknown cost factor today lies precisely in the degree 
of specificity of the EU Scoreboard on the rule of law (which data of CoE can and cannot be used, which 
additional data have to be collected) and the enforcement mechanism (how much manpower is needed 
to follow up serious breaches as described in scenario 3). 
 
This final section discusses the benefits of a rule of law monitoring instrument. First of all, there are 
non-economic benefits relating to the improved quality of the rule of law, democracy and human rights. 
These non-economic benefits are captured by an improved (sense of) well-being of individuals and 
increased level of confidence in society (in general) and in other individuals and businesses (in 
particular). These benefits have already been discussed extensively and will not be detailed in this 
section. Secondly, we have the economic benefits of a rule of law monitoring system. These effects are 
discussed in the literature review above. Improving the rule of law leads to increased confidence of 
consumers and/or investors, leading to increased transactions and consequently investments (in 
employment, capital, etc.). The empirical literature has shown that the growth effects of improvements 
in the level of rule of law are significant. The potential of growth, however, differs between countries 
based on their previous level of rule of law and other growth factors. Currently, no detailed study 
examines the effects of an overall improvement in the rule of law in Europe on growth. Thus the 
consensus is that a rule of law improvement will lead to additional growth, though the degree of growth 
will differ from country to country. 
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